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ABSTRACT 
A methodology is presented for performing quantitative cost-
benefit comparisons of protection systems. Protection systems in 
both programming languages and machine architectures can be under-
stood and described in terms of the concept of a domain, an abstract 
entity which defines the access privileges of an executing program 
to objects in a system. Though the issues of protection and addressing 
can be treated separately, the realisation of the close relationship 
between protection and addressing can assist in the implementation 
of domains using addressing techniques and provides a basis for the 
comparison of protection systems. 
Current formal models of protection are seen to aid 
qualitative comparisons but do not provide an effective yardstick 
with which to compare protection systems. Based on the ideas of 
protection through addressing, a protection model is developed 
from which cost and benefit measures of protection are derived in 
order to achieve the quantitative comparison methodology. 
Two detailed examples of the application of the methodology are 
presented. The first concerns the protection implemented in various 
Algol W run-time systems, and the second compares the protection 
system of IBM's 370 DOS/VS operating system with a proposed alternative 
protection system. 
Finally, the comparison of protection systems which exploit 
structure to achieve protection is discussed. The notion of a 
structured domain is introduced and used in an assessment of the 
protection afforded by programmer defined types and a supporting 
architecture. 
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1.1 Protection 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Protection in a computer system is concerned with controlling the 
access of executing programs to resources in the system. Included in 
the term 'resources' are physical resources, such as main memory and 
input/output devices, and logical resources such as files and programs. 
The prime function of a protection system, in a multiprogramming. 
timesharing or multiprocessor computer system. is the prevention of 
unwanted interference between executing user programs. This function 
has two aspects: 
1. isolating user programs from each other during their execution 
and preventing an executing user program from interfering with 
the supervisor. and 
2. facilitating the controlled sharing of resources and information. 
The term sharing has a number of connotations. It includes the true 
serial use of a resource. as in the allocation of the CPU in a multi-
programming environment, sharing of a divisible resource such as main 
memory, and cooperative sharing as in sharing a file or data structure. 
Even in the situation where concurrent execution of programs takes place 
without communication between programs, there is typically sharing of 
physical resources and operating system routines on the grounds of 
economy. To some extent. sharing is a matter of synchronisation as well 
as protection. For instance, if several users wish to modify or 
examine the contents of a file, not only must they have authority to 
perform such actions but the actions must be synchronised. 
Protection can be regarded as part of the wider issue of security. 
Security concerns essentially the integrity of a computer system against 
any form of unauthorised penetration. Security issues include the 
correct identification of users, approved use of terminals, prevention 
of wire tapping, privacy, the handling of tapes and disk packs, as well 
as the control of executing programs accessing resources within the 
com~uter system. 
computer system. 
Protection deals with security internal to the 
Other types of threats perpetrated outside the 
computer system, such as the monitoring of communication lines, are not 
addressed directly by protection, though occasionally protection provides 
means for detecting illegal probes into the computer system. 
Protection systems generally assume that users and their processes 
are correctly identified. This identification in the case of users 
usually takes the form of a password scheme. It is clear that however 
secure the protection system is itself, if the identification mechanism 
can be subverted, a user will have little difficulty in gaining access 
to any information he wants. It is also usual for protection systems 
to assume the reliability of the hardware on which the protection 
system operates, though some hardware failures may be detected by 
protection checks. The PRIME project (Fabry 1973) has attempted to take 
account of the unreliability of hardware and the protection system itself 
by performing two independent protection checks on every access request. 
We restrict consideration of protection to the control of access 
to resources by a process such that a decision on whether or not to allow 
a requested access to proceed can be made independently of the information 
(if any) contained in the resource. Data-dependent access checks, such 
as only permitting a doctor to view medical records of patients who have 
had a specific disease, can be implemented in the following manner. A 
procedure is constructed which performs the necessary data-dependent 
checking when supplied with the access request. The user is given the 
authority to invoke the procedure but not to access the file of medical 
records directly. Thus, all his accesses to the file are constrained to 
go via the procedure. Hoffman (1969) discusses this and similar issues, 
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which we would classify under the heading of privacy, and proposes a 
method of solving many of the problems (Hoffman 1971). 
Another problem, sometimes considered to be in the realm of 
protection but which we exclude, is that of guaranteeing that a process 
is 'confined ' . That is, the process does not retain after completion any 
of the information that has been supplied to or derived by the process 
during its execution, nor transmit such information to unauthorised 
processes. The classic example involving a process which should ideally 
have these properties is the provision of a proprietary program to 
calculate income tax. A user of the program supplies data concerning his 
earnings etc., the program returns details of the amount of tax he owes 
and reports the cost of using the program to the owner of the program. 
The program must be guaranteed not to retain nor transmit in any manner 
details concerning the financial status of the user. A protection 
mechanism can be used to prevent the direct transmission of information, 
but Lampson (1973) and Fenton (1974) have demonstrated that much more 
complicated mechanisms are necessary to prevent indirect transmission of 
information. For instance, by making abrupt changes in the traffic on 
a channel a process can in certain circumstances transmit data to a 
second process. 
The need for protection systems arises from the observed fact that 
programs often contain errors and from the necessity of guarding against 
the malicious user. Design and implementation techniques such as structured 
programming (Dahl, Dijkstra and Hoare 1972) and the chief programmer team 
(Baker 1972), and the efforts being directed towards developing effective 
program proving techniques, can aid significantly in the reduction of 
errors but do not guarantee their absence. 
A significant proportion of errors manifest themselves as protection 
violations. Protection systems contribute to reliable computing systems 
by aiding the early detection of errors, and hence their diagnosis and 
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correction, and by helping to isolate the effects of an error within 
one part of a system. 
A protection system can contribute to the reliability of a process 
itself if facilities exist for splitting a process into a number of parts 
and treating each part as a separate unit for protection purposes. The 
protection system is then able to detect errors sooner, because protection 
is applied to a unit smaller than the process, and is able to detect certain 
errors which previously could not be detected because the process was 
treated as a whole. 
Since the specification of a process, and in particular how a process 
is to be subdivided, involves the use of a programming language, it is 
reasonable to take a wider view of protection than has been typical in the 
past. Protection has usually been regarded as one of the functions of the 
hardware and operating system, but in this thesis we also consider the 
protection aspects of programming languages. 
With the development of high level programming languages, 'scope rules' 
were introduced mainly for storage allocation optimisation, but they also 
act as protection rules defining the allowed use of variables within a 
program. Recent developments with regard to programmer defined 'types' 
(e.g., forms in Alphard (Wulf 1974a), clusters in CLU (Liskov and Zilles 
1974)) provide further means for a programmer to use facilities of 
protection systems within his programs. Also, by including programming 
languages in the study, notions such as 'context' and 'scope of names' 
can be used to aid our understanding of protection systems. 
1.2 The Comparison of Protection Systems 
A recent report on the future of real time technology (Dept. of 
Industry 1975) suggests that: 
liThe most significant trend in real time technology will be the 
implementation of systems as sets of interacting subsystems. The 
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value of this approach has already been recognised in software with 
the concept of structured programming; it will also become feasible 
in the hardware as the improved technology makes distributed computing 
economic ..... Such interacting parts are usually called processes, 
and the concept of a real time system as a collection of interacting 
parallel processes is fundamental." 
(Dept. of Industry 1975) 
The emphasis in many real time systems is on reliability, and distributed 
computing offers the prospect of enhanced system resilience. Protection 
has a key role in any system composed of interacting parallel processes 
in detecting and containing errors, so preventing unwanted interference 
among processes. Thus the provision of new protection systems with 
improved effectiveness and efficiency will contribute directly to the 
development of successful real time systems. 
There are many protection systems in use today, ranging from systems 
which present a homogeneous attitude to protection throughout a computer 
system (e.g., CAL-TSS in which all protection is based on capabilities 
(Lampson 1969b))to those which are formed from a collection of ad hoc and 
often unrelated mechanisms, each applicable to a specific type of resource 
and providing differing degrees of protection (e.g., storage keys for 
physical memory, segmentation for virtual memory, access control lists for 
fil es). 
With the increasing pressure for secure systems, the need for reliable 
and effective protection systems is certain to grow. Current work on 
types ((Wulf 1974a), (Morris 1973a), (Wang 1974), (Liskov and Zilles 1974)) 
is likely to lead to novel protection methods since it simultaneously 
addresses the questions of protection within a programming language and 
within a system of interacting processes. The timeliness of relating 
programming language constructs and operating system/machine architecture 
constructs is unde~lined by the report mentioned above: 
"Architecture and language should be two sides of the same coin. In 
the past there has been a divergence between the two, but the 
increased power of the hardware and greater understanding of language 
design is bringing them closer together .•... as operating (system) 
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facilities are codified and incorporated into language and as the 
hardware provides improved run-time facilities, this divergence 
will reduce, until programming languages become the primary inter-
face for the system implementer. 1I 
IIIt is to be expected that the availability of low cost hardware 
will encourage the introduction of new architectural features .•• 
Perhaps the most significant effect for real time systems is that 
the difference between the program as written and as executed is 
likely to decrease so that the programmer will have greater 
control over what the computer actually does. 1I 
(Dept. of Industry 1975) 
Existing machine architectures are still more heavily influenced by hard-
ware considerations (e.g., word/byte access, arithmetic, etc.) than by 
the structural and logical characteristics of the tasks they are set. It 
is anticipated that architectures influenced by more macroscopic 
considerations such as block structure, control structure, composite 
data items, etc., will have the effect of eliminating some of the 
potential sources of error in conventional programming, and of assisting 
the detection, diagnosis, and the determination of the extent of errors. 
In this somewhat confused situation, there is lacking a means of 
comparing protection systems. When designing a new machine architecture 
or a programming language and its run-time system, it would be useful 
to be able to compare various alternative protection schemes to obtain 
some relative indication of their suitability for the intended environment, 
as well as estimates of their costs in terms of execution time, storage 
space and implementation. 
Abstract models of protection, such as those proposed by Lampson (1971) 
and Jones (1973), allow many of the salient features of a protection system 
to be identified and thus compared with other protection systems in a 
qualitative manner. This thesis attempts to show that there are, however, 
useful alternative methods of comparison based on, as far as possiul' 
quantitative rather than a very abstract qualitative comparison. 
Underlying the method of comparison proposed in this thesis is the 
recognition of the relationship between protection and addressing. An 
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understanding of this relationship is both useful for the development of 
a methodology for the comparison of protection systems and for the 
development of new protection methods. The relationship is a unifying 
factor between programming languages, operating systems and machine 
architectures, encouraging a synthesis of ideas from each of these areas 
in the design of new protection systems. 
The comparison methodology is a cost-benefit analysis method, based 
on measures for cost and benefit. The general form of these measures is 
derived but the precise form will depend on the actual comparison being 
made, that is the protection aspects one is interested in, the given 
environment, and the criteria for choosing the best protection mechanism. 
Examples of the use of the comparison methodology given in the thesis 
illustrate the variety of comparisons which the methodology includes. 
There are also aspects of protection systems not amenable to 
quantification which should also be considered in order to make a 
comparison in some sense complete. The effect of the protection system 
on the way programs are written is such a factor since the provision of 
protection information by programmers could influence the design of a 
program. 
1.3 Summary of Thesis 
Until very recently, many people working in the area of protection 
have argued that protection and addressing are separate issues and so 
protection systems can be considered independently of any particular 
addressing mechanism being used. A great deal of thought and analysis 
of the concepts underlying protection has resulted in the realisation 
of the close relationship between protection and addressing. A detailed 
discussion of this relationship and its relevance to the relationship 
between machine architecture and programming languages forms the first 
major topic of this thesis. 
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Secondly, having brought the issues of protection and addressing 
together, it was then feasible to develop a proposal for the cost-
benefit analysis of some protection systems. The third topic is the 
successful application of the comparison methodology in two practical 
experiments comparing different protection systems. Finally, ways in 
which protection systems exploiting structure can be characterised and 
compared are considered. 
The nature of protection and its relationship to addressing are 
considered in Chapter 2. Characterisations are given of the concepts 
of process and domain, and the often unrecognised link between the 
concept of a domain and notions of scope of names, context, etc., in 
programming languages is pointed out. Examples of protection in 
operating systems and programming languages are presented to illustrate 
that the basic issues of protection are similar in both areas. 
Chapter 3 contains brief descriptions of current abstract models 
of protection which, in principle, offer a feasible means of comparison, 
at least of a qualitative nature. These models are shown to be inadequate 
for our purposes though a measure suggested by Jones (1973) points the 
way to an alternative approach; that of comparing protection systems by 
means of cost-benefit measures. 
The proposed methodology for comparing protection systems is explained 
in Chapter 4 and Chapters 5 and 6 contain two examples of the use of the 
methodology. The first example concerns protection in programming languages. 
specifically Algol W (Wirth and Hoare 1966). Statistics were gathered on 
a set of 'typical ' Algol W programs which were then used to compare the 
protection aspects of different implementations of Algol W. Protection 
between processes is the central concern of the second example, illustrating 
the comparison of protection systems where the issue of the isolation of 
processes is paramount. Statistics were gathered on programs run under the 
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DOS/VS operating system (IBM 1973) on an IBM 370/135 computer and used 
to compare the protection system of DOS/VS with an alternative protection 
system which also uses the storage key mechanism of the 370/135 (IBM 1972). 
Chapter 7 introduces the concept of a structured domain which is 
used to characterise protection systems which exploit structure to 
achieve effective and efficient protection mechanisms. A measure of 
structure is derived, based on the notion of a structured domain, and 
is used in brief comparisons of some protection systems. The protection 
advantages afforded by programmer defined types and a supporting 
architecture, which retains at run-time the structure provided by the 
programmer, are considered in detail. 
The final chapter presents the conclusions of this research and 
attempts to put the work into perspective. 
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Chapter 2 
PROTECTION AND ITS RELATION TO ADDRESSING 
In this chapter, the elements with which protection is concerned 
are considered: the entities to be protected (objects) and the entities 
to be protected against (processes). Programming language notions such 
as the name, identity and address of variables, and context are seen 
to be of direct relevance to protection. In particular, these notions 
assist the understanding of the transformation function, which, given an 
object name issued by a process, produces the identity and the location(s) 
of its representation. The significance of this transformation function 
is that protection checks are typically carried out during the application 
of the transformation function or are actually embodied in the trans-
formation function itself. The transformation function, commonly under-
stood as the addressing mechanism, is thus frequently bound up with 
protection. 
The abstract notion of domain (Lampson 1969a) is seen as fundamental 
to protection and forms a unit of structuring for protection purposes, 
allowing a process to be associated with a group of access privileges. 
Inter-process and intra-process protection can be discussed in terms of 
domains. The emphasis placed on domains reflects their importance to 
the cost-benefit analysis which relies on the concept for the definition 
of cost and benefit measures. 
To perform any sort of access check, it is necessary to have some 
alternate specification against which the intended action can be validated. 
The domain provides such a specification, but the information describing 
what a program may access, from which the domain can be established, has 
to be furnished in some manner. Various ways in which such redundant 
information can be provided are briefly considered. 
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The application of protection checking can take place at a number 
of points in time and space. Attention can be restricted to dynamic 
checks made between the point of issue of an access request and the 
actual access being performed on the object, or enlarged to include 
static checks, performed, for example, at compile-time or load-time. 
Different attitudes to the time and place of run-time protection checks 
result in a variety of mechanisms to implement protection. In this 
thesis, we are principally concerned with the dynamic verification of 
access requests. 
2.1 Objects 
We refer to the entities within a computer system which are to be 
protected against unpermitted access as objects. I Object I defies 
precise definition, but the intuitive notion of object is sufficient 
in any particular case to decide whether or not an entity constitutes 
an object. An object may be a physical resource, such as a page frame, 
a terminal, a tape drive or disk track, or a logical resource such as 
a file, a segment, a user defined data structure or a procedure. An 
object may also be made up of other objects. 
An access to an object is an algorithm, defined by hardware, 
microcode or a piece of program, to reference the object in order to 
change the value of the object or to extract information from the object. 
For a particular object there may be a number of different ways in which 
the object can be accessed. For example, the possible accesses defined 
for an object which is a segment could be READ a word, WRITE a word, and 
INCREASE the size of the segment. 
Objects are divided into disjoint classes by ~, the distinguishing 
characteristic being that all objects of a given type have the same set 
of defined accesses. Thus, for any object which is a segment, the accesses 
READ a word, WRITE a word and INCREASE the size of the segment would be 
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defined, though the protection system may limit the access a given process 
has to a particular segment to READ a word. For any object, its type 
is known and so the possible accesses which can be made to the object are 
also known. The set of available types may be fixed at the time of 
creation of the system or it may be dynamic in that new types can be 
created or old types deleted during the lifetime of the system as is 
possible in Hydra (Wulf et al 1974b). 
Details of an object, the internal form of its representation, or 
indeed whether or not it"exists as a physical realisation, need not be 
available outside the defined accesses for that type of object. Indeed, 
one can conceive of Ivirtual l objects, objects represented in the form 
of a set of procedures rather than data. 
For the purposes of protection, the information required concerning 
an object is the identity of 'the object, to distinguish it from other 
objects, its type, since this identifies the accesses which are defined 
for the object, the accesses permitted to the object by the requesting 
process, and the requested access. A consequence of the restrictions 
which were outlined in Chapter 1 is that a protection system is not con-
cerned about the nature of objects, the information content of an object, 
or the semantics associated with particular accesses. A protection 
system provides a facility which given the identity of an object and a 
requested access either permits or prohibits the requested access to the 
object. 
Objects are not necessarily atomic, an object may be formed from 
a composition of other objects and this process may be recursive. A 
system will initially provide a certain set of objects and support for 
a number of types, and possibly a mechanism for defining new types. New 
objects of certain types can be created, e.g., segments and pages, and 
existing objects deleted. Dynamic creation and deletion of physical 
resources will in general not occur, though a system may cater for the 
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attachment of new devices or the temporary removal of a device from 
system. 
Though creation of a new object may bring into existence a new 
object to be handled by the system, at some level this 'creation' may 
appear as a regrouping and renaming of other objects. Ultimately, all 
logical resources are forms of information represented as sequences of 
bits, and except for paper tape, magnetic tape, etc., there is no 
possibility of creation of storage media. 
Similarly, object deletion may not be as simple as the destruction 
of the object. Parts of an object, that is other objects of which an 
object is composed, may be intended to continue their existence, and 
certainly in the case of the deletion of a file there is no intended 
destruction of the disk tracks on which the file resided. 
The choice as to what constitutes objects (or a primitive set of 
objects in the case of systems permitting programmer defined types) in 
a particular system is at the discretion of the designer of the protection 
system, and the determination of objects should be made to meet the 
requirements of the system as a whole. In the case of memory protection. 
for instance, one may choose a word, page or segment as the basic storage 
unit of protection. 
2.2 Processes 
An object has a passive role; the entities initiating access requests 
to objects are executing programs, i.e., processes. During execution, a 
process retrieves information from objects and manipulates objects via 
the accesses defined for each object. 
We take as our basic definition of a process that given by Horning 
and Randell (1973), where a process is defined as a triple (S,f,s): S is 
a state space, f is an action function in that space, and s is the subset 
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of S which defines the initial states of the process. A computation is 
a sequence of states from the state space obtained by applying the 
action function f first to an initial state and then to each succeeding 
state. 
Working from a strict low level definition of a process such as 
this, and using techniques of combination, abstraction and refinement, 
as discussed by Horning and Randell, to deduce new 'higher' level 
processes, will not always yield the most appropriate structuring of a 
system into processes. This is because at the level of user programs 
and operating systems the notion of a process is somewhat arbitrary. 
The techniques of combination, abstraction and refinement allow many 
choices at each stage, thus it is often the case that a system can be 
structured into processes in a variety of ways. 
Figure 2.1 
The process structure of a system 
Consider a spooling system which schedules user jobs one at a time, where 
each job consists of three phases: reading the program and data, execution 
of the program and printing of the results. This system can be viewed in 
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two ways as illustrated in Figure 2.1. (This example is taken from 
Brinch Hansen (1973)). 
The first view, indicated by the single line arrows, is that which 
would be taken by a user of the system. Each job is considered to 
correspond to a process; initially it is scheduled to do the input, then 
the execution phase of the job and finally the printing of the results. 
Thus a user would recognise the processes: 
job consisting of rl xl pl 
job 2 consisting of r2 x2 p2 
The designer of such a system is likely to take the alternative 
view indicated by the double line arrows and partition the system into 
three processes of a cyclical nature each in control of a physical resource, 
viz: 
reader process comprising rl r2 r3 
execution process comprising xl x2 x3 
printer process comprising pl p2 p3 
These three processes progress independently except during short intervals 
when they must exchange data. The execution process must receive user 
programs and data from the reader process, or at least an indication of 
their location, and the printer process must be informed by the execution 
process where user results are stored. 
Both decompositions are useful for a particular purpose, but being 
abstractions each of them obscures facts about the original system. The 
first decomposition hides the fact that the jobs share the same reader, 
processor and printer and from the second decomposition it is not evident 
that the reader, execution and printer processes execute a stream of jobs. 
A decomposition of a system into a set of processes is a partial description 
or an abstraction of that system. How one chooses an abstraction depends on 
ones purpose. 
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Though there is this degree of arbitrariness with respect to what 
constitutes a process, the one aspect which any process structuring must 
preserve is the degree of permitted parallelism in a system. Thus any 
act which modifies the degree of permitted parallelism must be regarded 
as involving an alteration to a process. The essential idea of process 
structuring has to do with minimising the interactions between parts of 
a system (Simon 1962), (Myers 1975). In any practical realisation of a 
process structuring, one wants to choose the basic entities (in this 
case processes) such that interaction occurs within an entity rather than 
between entities. If a structuring has been devised in which the majority 
of interactions occurs between entities rather than within the entities, 
then perhaps the most appropriate structuring of the system has not been 
obtained. 
In this thesis, we assume that a process is associated with the 
execution of a user job, though alternative views, such as that illustrated 
in the previous example, may be more appropriate in other circumstances. 
Though we associate a process with a user job, we do not want to limit 
the operating system from having further processes inside of itself, e.g., 
for spooling. In a particular system, the abstract concept of a process 
will have some concrete representation, such as a Iprocess control block'. 
Thus, we assume that during execution a user job is represented by a 
particular Iprocess control block ' , also that each process created by the 
operating system corresponds to a particular Iprocess control block'. If 
a user job has inherent parallelism, it will cause two or more processes 
to be created in which case there will be more than one Iprocess control 
block ' corresponding to the user job. 
In a uni-programming system with both supervisor and problem states, 
the execution of a program can be regarded as a single process executing 
at certain times in supervisor state and at other times in problem state, 
or as two processes, one which executes only in supervisor state and the 
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other which executes only in problem state. As will be seen in Chapter 
6, we take the former view, though in this case either view is probably 
equally valid and the distinction between them will depend on how one 
wishes to view the system. 
2.3 Domains 
2.3.1 Concept of a Domain 
We define a domain to be the abstract entity which specifies the 
objects a process can access at a given point in time and the manner in 
which each object can be accessed. Typically, the permitted accesses 
to an object will be a subset of those defined for the type of the 
object. The domain in which a process executes thus defines the access 
privileges of the process. A process may execute out of a number of 
domains during its lifetime, though at any particular instant it will 
be associated with precisely one domain. 
The access privileges of a process change when either a process 
moves from one domain of execution to another, a switch in domains, or 
the set of access privileges constituting the current domain alter, a 
domain change. The distinction being drawn here can perhaps be clarified 
by considering an analogy with a variable in a programming language. A 
variable has a name and a value, and though its value may change its name 
remains the same. A switch to a new domain implies a switch from one 
domain variable to another. Such a switch may well be a temporary one 
and the previous domain variable can then be reused. A change in the 
access privileges contained in the domain corresponds to a change in the 
value of the domain variable. In general, the difference between the 
contents of two domains is likely to be much greater than the differences 
within a domain during its lifetime. 
The aim of allowing the contents of a domain (i.e., access privileges 
contained in a domain) to change with time is so that over-frequent 
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domain switches can be avoided. The contents of a domain can be changed 
either by the addition of new objects, the deletion of currently accessible 
objects, or changed types of access including revocation of access 
privileges by other processes. By a series of such changes the contents 
of one domain could be altered to coincide with that of another domain, 
thus avoiding the need for domain switches altogether. However, domain 
switches are retained as it is sometimes more efficient to make a sudden 
change in the set of accessible objects by means of a domain switch. 
It is expedient to regard domains as objects, since a switch between 
domains can then be treated as an access to a domain object and hence be 
controlled by the protection system. In addition, creation of domains 
and alterations to the contents of a domain can be monitored by the pro-
tection system. If certain functions or instructions, e.g., privileged 
instructions, are to have their use limited, treating them as objects 
allows them to be included in domains and thus their use can also be 
controlled by the protection system. 
The aim of protection is to restrict a process to those objects it 
needs to access at any particular time. In the ideal situation, a process 
would be restricted, at any instant, to accessing a single object, viz. 
the object it currently wishes to access. This scheme would achieve 
complete protection, but is impractical and inefficient, it involves 
a switch in domain prior to each access. In the other extreme, a process 
is executed in just one domain, in which case the domain must contain all 
the objects which the process may possibly want to access. As a compromise 
between these extremes, a number of domains are usually associated with a 
process. This approach gives much greater flexibility and facilitates 
tighter protection since the instantaneous name space of the process is 
restricted to the objects of immediate interest, as parts of a process 
can be run in more restricted domains than would be the case if the whole 
process had to be run in a single domain. Against this, however, must be 
balanced the cost associated with the creation and maintenance of the extra 
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domains and the cost of switching between.domains. 
We have emphasised the notion of multiple domains being associated 
with a process since this facilitates the provision of intra-process 
protection and includes the simple case where a process is executed in a 
single domain. Domains are also a suitable abstraction for considering 
inter-process protection and the notion of controlled sharing of objects. 
Providing the domains of all processes in a computing system are set up 
in an appropriate way, interference between processes can be prevented. 
Sharing of an object is achieved by including access privileges, not 
necessarily identical, to the same object in the domains of different 
processes. For instance, one process may be permitted read access to a 
particular file, whereas another process may be permitted read and write 
access to the same file. 
Though the concept of a domain.is well understood, what constitutes 
a domain in a particular system is somewhat arbitrary, thus one has a 
choice of what aspects of a system should be linked to the concept of a 
domain. Some choices are of course more natural than others, but the 
aim, as with the use of the process concept, is to reflect the structuring 
of the system. The ways in which programs and operating systems are 
designed and the manner in which workloads are presented to a system lead 
to large and abrupt changes in what is going on, specifically the objects 
being accessed, within the computer system. The relation between processes 
and domains can be one-to-one, many-to-one or one-to-many. This degree 
of flexibility can be exploited in order to achieve a structural description 
of a system which captures the practical realisation in a luseful l way. 
That is, it not only describes it well in that large and small changes in 
what is going on in the system have corresponding changes in the abstract 
structural representation, but also the associated costs of the changes 
are minimised. As is discussed later in this thesis, this is particularly 
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related to obtaining a structural description of a system such that 
protection can be achieved through addressing. 
Domains are a protection structuring device and intuitively it is 
appealing to tie protection structure directly to some form of program 
structure. This has the advantage that a change in the program entity 
being executed then implies a switch in the domain of execution. If 
protection and program structure are independent, the problem of how to 
signal a switch in the domain of execution remains to be solved. 
Processes are a structuring imposed on activity and domains are a 
structuring imposed on accessibility, just as procedures, say, are a 
structuring imposed on a program text. Each such structuring can be 
done well or badly, and their interrelationship can be set up well or 
badly. We have enumerated some of the criteria which are likely to be 
important in structuring activity using processes and accessibility 
using domains. For the sake of generality, we assume a many-to-many 
relationship between processes and domains, and assume that each is 
linked appropriately to some program structuring scheme - e.g., domain 
linked to procedure, and process to class. 
2.3.2 Domains and Locality 
The utility of the domain concept depends partly on the notion of 
'locality of reference,' that is, the experimentally observed phenomenon 
that a process tends to access only a small subset of the available objects 
during a relatively extended period of execution. In many cases, the set 
of objects which a process actually accesses changes only slowly over a 
period of time, but studies of reference patterns (e.g., (Morrison 1973), 
(Hatfield and Gerald 1971), (Hatfield 1972)) have shown that many processes 
are subject to occasional sudden changes in their behaviour, corresponding 
to an abrupt and massive change in the set of objects being accessed. 
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Reference pattern of the META7 compiler 
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Typically, a process will be performing different logical functions in 
different time periods and thus will tend to concentrate its activity on 
well-defined subsets of objects. Localisation in space is a desirable 
characteristic since it can provide limitations on the free access of 
information and aid recovery :in the event 6f"failure (Dept. of Industry 
1975). 
Example 
Figure 2.2, taken from a paper by Opderbeck and Chu (1974) displays 
a reference pattern for an execution of the META7 compiler. 
liThe horizontal axis represents virtual processing time measured in 
units of 50,000 page references, while the vertical axis represents 
virtual memory at 512 word resolution. The dark areas show which 
pages have been used during a given time interval. This reference 
pattern illustrates the sudden changes of program behaviour as 
observed during the execution of the META7 compiler. As Figure 
2.2 suggests, the execution of META7 consists of three different 
phases .... " (Opderbeck and Chu 1974). 
Evidence such as this suggests that it is quite realistic to associate 
multiple domains with a process and hence afford the process improved 
protection. This is not to say that it will be obvious how to allocate 
access privileges to domains or how to associate the different domains 
with the different phases of execution of a process. 
At this point, it is useful to draw a distinction between the 
concepts embodied in the words 'possibilities' and 'probabilities'. 
Possibilities are the objects which may be accessed in the future by a 
process. Information about possibilities comes, for example, from the 
explicit provision by programmers of statements which affect domain 
changes and domain switches. These statements are 'redundant' in the 
sense that they contribute nothing to the intended progress of the 
process. 
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Probability is concerned with the study of accessing patterns, i.e., 
how programmers actually use objects, to predict what a program will do 
in the near future based on recent history. Denning (1968), in his work 
on the working set model has been concerned with 'probabilities'; The 
notion of locality is directly connected with 'probability'. 
The important distinction to be made here is that locality is not 
an aspect of 'possibility'. 'Probabilities' are assessed over recent 
history and used to predict some short future interval. Thus, 
'probabilities' are not necessarily a subset of the present 'possibilities'. 
Since a domain indicates 'possibilities', it says something about 
which objects can be accessed while the process executes in the domain. 
A paging mechanism, for instance, might make use of such predictive 
information. Thus a domain may contain information which could be useful 
to other parts of an operating system. 
2.3.3 Examples of Domains 
A capability list (Dennis and Van Horn 1966) associated with a 
process defines a domain since it denotes all the objects the process 
may access. Since a process may execute with different capability lists 
at different times, protection based on capabilities supports multiple 
domains per process. The use of multiple domains per process can be found 
in programming languages too. The scope rules of Algol-60, for 
instance, can be used to define domains conSisting of all the variables, 
arrays, etc., which lie in the scope of the block being executed, 
together with the parameters which have been passed to any enclosing 
procedures. If such domains are used, a switch in the current domain 
of execution will occur on entry to or exit from a block or procedure. 
In practice, the Algol run-time system designer will choose explicitly 
what sorts of Algol constructs will involve domain switches, so that 
an Algol programmer will make implicit choices of domain. 
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Some systems (e.g. RC-4000 multiprogramming system (Brinch Hansen 
1970)) support only one domain per process, often on the grounds that 
it is too costly to switch domains during execution of a process. In 
the RC-4000 multiprogramming system, each object in the system is owned 
by one process and that process alone is permitted access to the object. 
If a process wants to access an object: owned by another process it sends 
a request, in the form of a message, to the owning process. The owning 
process decides whether or not to invoke the request, and if it does, it 
returns the information in a reply message. 
CAL-TSS (Lampson 1969b) allows up to 12 domains to be associated 
with a process. Each domain is directly attached to a 'subprocess' so 
that, when control passes to a subprocess, the process automatically 
enters the domain associated with that subprocess. In the Hydra system 
(Wulf et al 1974b), a 'procedure' includes a specification (template) 
of the domain in which it is to run on invocation. When the procedure 
is invoked by a process, the domain in which, the procedure is to run 
(called the Local Name Space) is constructed from the template and the 
parameters passed to the procedure. In principle, Hydra allows a 
process to execute in an unlimited sequence of different domains, but 
the cost of domain switches constrains 'procedures', in the context of 
Hydra, to be larger than the typical procedure occurr;-ng within a program. 
Not all uses of the domain concept coincide with our definition. 
Lampson treats a domain both as a collection of names (i.e., a set of 
allowed accesses) and as the active entity performing the access. Viewing 
domains as the active entitie~ initiating access requests within a system 
conflicts with our intended role of a domain. We want the facility to 
add access permissions to a domain or delete access permissions already 
contained within a domain, while still maintaining the identity of the 
domain. Thus, we subscribe to the view that a domain is a set of allowed 
accesses. 
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2.4 Protection and Redundancy 
Protection is concerned with checking that the accesses to objects 
attempted by a process obey certain restrictions on the objects the 
process may access and the operations which may be invoked. Such checks 
depend on the provision, by the programmer, of explicit or implicit 
redundant information. This redundant information forms an alternate 
specification of what the program may do. In general, this information 
is not so detailed as the program, but is provided so that errors in 
the program may be detected when the program is being executed and 
damage to other processes or information prevented. The term Iredundancyl 
is used here in the sense of useful redundancy - it adds nothing to the 
execution of the program, but can be utilised for protection. 
Instructions to switch execution to another domain are a very obvious 
example of information which is redundant, yet can be used to indicate 
that a process is in error, either in that it has attempted to access an 
object in an unintended manner, or that previously it had specified an 
incorrect domain switch. 
A less obvious example of redundancy is that provided unwittingly 
by a programmer when he signs on at a timesharing terminal. The manner 
of sign-on (e.g., the password used, the identity of the terminal used) 
may well imply information about what the: programmer is allowed to do 
(e.g., a batch terminal for student jobs), information that can be used 
by the system in checking his program1s actions. The IJCL 1 preceding 
a request to execute a program typically specifies the files and/or 
devices which are to be used for input and output of data. 
The block structure of Algol provides another form of redundancy. 
The programmer uses the block structure to signify that certain variables 
can or cannot be accessed within a specific block. The compiler uses 
this extra information to check that no illegal accesses are attempted. 
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The union of the information on the restrictions to be imposed on 
an executing program, provided from sources such as those mentioned above, 
can be used to define the domain(s) of the executing program. Although 
potentially useful information may be provided, it will not necessarily 
all be utilised in the monitoring of the execution of the program. Infor-
mation provided in the source program may be ignored by the compiler, or 
used during compilation but not retained in the object form of the 
source program. Type information is commonly required at compile-time 
but is often discarded before run-time. At least two machine architectures, 
the Burroughs B6700 (Burroughs 1972) and the Rice computer (Feustel 1972), 
however, have been devised to make use of type information at run-time 
to 'limit the operations which may be applied to data. Codewords, 
developed by Iliffe and Jodeit in the Basic Language Machine (Iliffe 1969) 
and in the Rice computer (Jodeit 1968), were aimed at the retention of 
structure present in programs written in a high-level language so that 
it can be utilised for addressing and protection purposes. 
If information, which is potentially valuable to a protection 
system, is discarded before the protection system can view it, the amount 
of protection which can be provided to the executing program is 
necessarily reduced. However, the protection system itself may make 
only limited use of the information with which it is supplied. 
It is useful to separate out two aspects of redundancy: 
1. What can be provided in the way of an alternate specification 
of a program1s intended behaviour, and 
2. The use made by a protection system of the information with which 
it is provided. 
The first aspect is easily understood from manuals describing the 
programming language and the system being used, though research needs to 
be carried out on the best form of this specification. This thesis 
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concentrates on the second aspect; measuring the use made of protection 
information by protection systems. 
2.5 Name, Identity and Address 
To invoke an access to an object, the invoking entity (process) 
must name an object and the access to be made. The object name used by 
the process must in some manner be translated into the identity of the 
object, to distinguish the object from other objects. It is useful to 
distinguish between the name and identity of an object and, where 
appropriate, its address or physical location, by analogy with programming 
languages. The definitions of identity, context and universe of discourse 
given here are due to Dijkstra and Randell. 
Even within a single program written in, for example, Algol-60 
or PL/l, a particular object may be referred to by different names 
(called lidentifiers l in Algol-60) and the same name, in different 
contexts, may refer to different, (simultaneously existing!) objects. 
A similar situation exists in a multiprogrammed environment in which 
separate programs may share data or items from a common library. 
Different names referring to the same object, or the same name 
referring (in different contexts) to different objects are relations 
which only make sense with respect to a universe of discourse in which 
different objects have different identities, regardless of the various 
names that may be used to refer to them in various contexts. A context 
defines how names may be mapped into identities, the latter obviously to 
be understood in an implied (constant or common) universe of discourse. 
For instance, at a given stage of execution of an Algol program, the 
name of a quantity can only be understood in the context provided by 
the block structure and the depth of nesting of procedure calls. 
Taking a step backwards, the universe of discourse of a process 
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may present itself as a sub-universe among many others in a surrounding 
universe. What was 'universe ' then becomes Icontext l and what was 
'identity' becomes Inamel to be understood in that context. From this 
viewpoint, the notion of identification acquires an essentially 
recursive nature. 
In the original von Neumann machine, working in its isolated finite 
universe, addresses of storage locations serve both as names (occurring 
in the program text) and as identities of the information held in the 
locations. Multi-level storage systems force upon us the clearest 
possible distinction between identity of information and the addresses 
of the actual locations where the information can be found. As information 
drifts around the storage system the address associated with a given item 
of information will no longer be constant in time, it may even be non-
unique, viz. when copies of an item exist simultaneously on different 
storage levels. 
These notions apply equally well to general objects in a computer 
system. For instance, Fraser (1971) has illustrated how the concept of 
context underlies both the problem of file identification within a 
computer system and that of the design of programming languages. When 
a new program is submitted to a system, it will name the context in 
which it is to run, or the context will be implicit in the manner in 
which the program is sUbmitted. 
A mechanism or transformation function must exist for the translation 
of an object name issued by an executing program (either explicitly or 
implicitly) first to the identity of the object and then to its address. 
In certain cases, it may be possible to bypass the identity in the total 
transition from name to address. 
The nature of names used for objects and the transformation function 
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can have a significant bearing on the protection system. For instance, 
one approach to protection is that a process should only be able to 
name those objects to which it is permitted access. The other extreme, 
which avoids altogether the problem of the name to identity transformation, 
is to use unique global names for all objects. In this case, there is a 
single universe of discourse in the system containing all objects, in 
which all processes execute. 
Many writers on the subject of protection (e.g., (Wulf et al 1974b), 
(Fabry 1971), (Lampson 1971), (Jones 1973)) make the assumption that all 
objects within a system are uniquely identified, not only in space (i.e., 
from other objects which exist concurrently) but also in time, over the 
whole lifetime of the computer system (i.e., amongst all objects existing 
in the past or in the future). The mechanism used for such global names 
is a unique integer of,_say, 64 bits, which is assigned to an object on 
its creation and identifies the object throughout its lifetime. Such 
global names necessarily pervade the whole system and though they finesse 
the transformation of name to identity, unique names do not provide an 
easy means of locating objects, indeed global names give rise to a number 
of problems in this area (Lampson 1969b). 
Systems such as the Rice computer (Feustel 1972) and the Burroughs 
86700 (Organick 1973) testify that unique global names for all objects 
are not a basic requirement of efficient and effective protection systems. 
We do not deny unique names as an approach to protection, but argue that 
insistence on such an assumption may preclude potentially useful protection 
systems. In particular, the exploitation of the notion of context in both 
programming languages and operating systems offers the possibility of 
cheap effective protection methods without the need for absolute unique 
identifiers for objects to be explicit throughout a system. 
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2.6 Protection and Addressing 
Perhaps one of the simplest illustrations of the concept of achieving 
protection through addressing is the use of a single pair of relocation 
and bounds registers. Segmentation provides an extension of this idea and 
enables different types of access (e.g., read, write or execute) to be 
allowed or denied to each segment included in the address space of the 
executing program. Both these schemes have the advantage that they can 
be largely implemented in hardware and so the addressing, and therefore 
the protection, is efficient. 
Lampson (1968) took protection by addressing a stage further and 
considered how access could be controlled by addressing mechanisms not 
only to areas of main memory but also to so-called 'privileged' instructions. 
Privileged instructions are those instructions which could lead to a 
process accessing information outside of its address space, e.g., I/O 
instructions, instructions which alter the address mapping hardware, etc. 
The conventional way of handling privileged instructions is to provide 
two modes of execution 'superv i s'or' and 'user'. In supervi sor mode, a 11 
instructions, including privileged instructions, can be executed, whereas 
in user mode privileged instructions are prohibited. The prohibition is 
usually enforced by causing a switch into supervisor mode and transferring 
to a standard system routine whenever attempted execution of a privileged 
instruction is detected. Lampson's proposal was to include in a special area 
of memory provided for each process those privileged instructions which 
the process would be allowed to execute. The appropriate instructions 
would be placed in this area by a supervisor routine. The addressing 
mechanism would allow privileged instructions fetched from this area to 
be executed, but execution of other privileged instructions would be 
suppressed. 
The DEC PDP 11 computers (Digital Equipment Corporation 1972) achieve 
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protection of I/O devices in a similar manner. I/O devices are 
represented by addresses in real memory, reference to an address 
corresponding to a device causes the reference to be made to the actual 
device. Devices can then be protected by the addressing mechanism by 
including or not including them in the virtual memory of a process. 
A number of people have argued that conceptually the issues of 
addressability and protection should be separated. Lampson (1971), 
in his abstract treatment of protection, assumes that every object ever 
in a computer system has a unique name. The protection system can then 
be represented by an access matrix, the rows and columns of which 
correspond to all the different objects and different domains respectively. 
Each element of the matrix indicates what types of access are permitted 
to a part-i.cular object by a process when in a given domain. The 
protection system is then independent of any addressing mechanism used. 
Jones (1973) takes a similar view and Needham (1972) argues the 
case for a lock and key system which is independent of the method of 
addressing objects. Achieving a protection scheme which is independent 
of the addressing scheme used is possible, e.g., storage keys on IBM 
~ 
System/360 computers (IBM 1968a), though pragmatic considerations eventually 
force most designers back to some form of addressing technique. 
The importance of addressing techniques in respect of protection is 
that such techniques can provide a great deal of protection in an efficient 
manner. Assume a situation in which a process may access objects only 
through an addressing mechanism provided to it, such that the process 
cannot alter the mechanism. The mechanism interprets every reference to 
an object as a name (not an address) in a set of names provided to the 
program. If that set of names includes only objects which the program is 
allowed to access, then the addressing mechanism provides a first level 
of protection since the process has no way of referring to objects for 
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which no access is permitted. Thus, in a given domain, a process would 
not 'know ' the name of any object for which it did not have some type of 
access. This is to be contrasted to a system of protection in which the 
process has a large space of names or addresses, many of which it is not 
allowed to refer to, so that a check of each acces~ is required to determine 
if the access is p~rmitted. 
In practice, unless the number of bits available to form names permits 
only the proper names to be formed, a check is still required with addressing 
schemes, though it is usually possible to arrange that the check is a 
particularly simple one. The capability mechanism (Dennis and Van Horn ,1966), 
for instance, has the advantage that names may be arranged in such a way 
as to simplify the check needed with each reference. Usually the check 
need entail no more than comparing an index with a limit. 
With the addressing technique, the fUnction of the protection system 
has been reduced to that of ensuring that only the right types of access 
are allowed. In principle, even this function of the protection system 
can be thought of in terms of addressability. For simplicity, consider 
just the special case of read or write access to a variable X. Instead 
" 
of, as above, considering that one has a variable X and operations LOAD 
and STORE, one can think of having two separate (though of course related) 
functions LOADX and STOREX. This immediately leads to the possibility of 
having a name space in which one could specify (i.e., name) the function 
LOADX but not the function STOREX. So the question of type of access to 
X has been reduced to that of addressability of functions that can be 
applied to X. Such a scheme can be immediately extended to the control 
of peripheral devices along the lines of the DEC PDP 11 manner of 
addressing I/O devices (Digital Equipment Corporation 1972). There would 
be problems in implementing such a scheme for achieving protection since 
the product of the number of functions and the total number of objects will 
in general be very large. However it demonstrates that all protection can 
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be thought of in terms of addressability. 
A characterisation of protection by addressing is that protection 
is achieved by a simple check at the cost of a level of indirection. With 
a lock and key protection system, absolute addresses of objects can be 
used as names, since protection checking is independent of the access 
path to the object. However, in many systems, e.g., a segmented virtual 
memory, a level of indirection already exists, so protection through 
addressing does not have to introduce an extra level of indirection. 
Recognising this relationship between protection and addressing does 
not immediately solve all protection problems. However, it does allow 
one to consider protection in terms of existing programming language 
concepts such as name, value and context, and to consider techniques 
that have been developed for addressing in structured languages, such 
as Algol, and at systems such as the Burroughs B6700 (Organick 1973) for 
pointers to the design of sophisticated protection systems. 
In designing a protection system, any reasonable structure, useful 
redundancy or knowledge concerning the behaviour of programs should be 
exploited to achieve protection by limiting the name space available to 
a program during execution. The relocation and bounds registers example 
above recognises a static name space, viz. 0,1, ... , L-l (where the 
bounds register is set to L). The Algol addressing mechanism is a good 
example of how the name space of a program can change dynamically during 
program execution. The use of a display and address couples in block-
level implementations of Algol-like languages (see Section 5.1) limits 
the set of names recognised by the addressing mechanism to precisely those 
which are defined as valid by the language. 
A way of increasing the effectiveness of protection achieved via 
addressing is to exploit structure contained in a system. Chapter 7 
concentrates on structure, considering the notion of a structured domain, 
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and examining such domains in various computer systems. 
2.7 Time of Protection Checking 
The objective of this section is to consider some of the many 
mechanisms which have been devised for enforcing protection and to see 
how they can be characterised in terms of time of protection checking • 
• 
We are concerned only with run-time checks performed during execution of 
a process. Static checks performed by a compiler are useful since 
error indications can be obtained without the need to execute the 
program. However, to place total reliance on a compiler and run the 
object code without checks requires that: 
the compiler be correct and trusted aiways to produce correct 
object code; 
- all names be bound at compile time; 
information describing access authorisations is not changed 
between compilation and execution; 
- the object code cannot be altered before execution. 
Similar comments can be made concerning load-time checking. 
The safest time to check the validity of an access is immediately 
before it is performed. Then, concern about whether a compiler was 
used and its correctness, or whether the object program had been corrupted, 
is allayed. 
Dynamic protection checking, performed at run-time, is also a form 
of check on the compiler, the loader, the run-time system and the hardware. 
As such, it contributes towards the reliability of the system. Because 
of the significance of dynamic protection checking, we concentrate our 
attention on protection systems which perform explicit checks on every 
reference to an object or embody protection checks in the addressing 
mechanism. 
In general, there is a time delay between an access request and its 
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execution. This delay may be due to the address mapping function, 
queuing of the request due to time delays involved with input/output 
devices or delays introduced by the fact that the central processor is 
multiprogramming a number of processes. For similar reasons, there may 
be a time interval between the time of protection checking and the 
performance of the access. Thus, the possibility can arise that though 
an access request was valid at the time of the protection check, it may 
be invalid by the time the access is performed • 
. Example 
In IBM's VM/370 system (Belady and Weissman 1974), the 
protection check and the execution of the action validated by 
that check are separated by some dlstance in time in the case 
of channel programs. It is possible, under certain conditions, 
such as the occurrence of an interrupt, for the user to change the 
parameters examined by the check before the action occurs and 
thus subvert the protection system. This flaw depends on the 
interruptibility of the check-action sequence and the 
accessibility of the access request to the user after it has 
been checked. 
To make the protection system as secure as possible, it is desirable 
that the protection check be carried out as close as possible to the 
performance of the access, reducing the possibility of the checked request 
being altered or the specifications of the allowance of that access being 
revoked before the, access is executed. 
Dynamic protection checking can be performed during the transformation 
of an object name to an address either at a single point or at multiple 
points during the transformation. Since the transformation function is 
applied to every object name issued by a process, associating protection 
with the transformation ensures that every access is validated. The obvious 
places for the application of protection checks are: 
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- the point at which names are generated; 
- the location of the object; 
- at some intermediate point(s). 
The set of valid object names and accesses is delineated by the domain 
in which the process is executing so, when considering different times 
of protection checking, one also considers different representations of 
domains. 
The capability list of Dennis and Van Horn (1966) is an example of 
protection enforced at the place of generation of access requests. The 
capability list .encodes the domain in a table of capabilities. The 
names of objects used by a process are simple integers which index into 
the capability list. A simple test that the object name does not exceed 
the length of the capability list suffices to determine the validity of 
the object name. Each capability contains the global name of the object 
it represents and a specification of the accesses permitted to the 
object by the process. In this implementation, the information describing 
a domain is concentrated in one place, at the site of execution, so 
information is directly available on all the objects which the process 
may access. 
The access control list mechanism, as implemented in Multics 
(Graham 1968), exemplifies the storage of protection information with 
objects. The access control list attached to each object consists of a 
set of pairs, each pair consisting of the identity of a user who is 
allowed access to the object and the permitted types of access. Such 
an implementation implies that the object has to be located before 
the protection check can be carried out. Since the information on each 
domain is distributed throughout the system it is very difficult to 
determine all the objects to which a given domain allows access. However, 
the access control list mechanism enables the set of users who have 
access to a given object to be determined trivially. 
36 
Protection checks are applied at each stage of address translation 
in the Cambridge CAP computer (Walker 1973) and the Recursive Virtual 
Machine (Lauer and Wyeth 1973). An address issued in the executing 
environment is translated to an address in each of the containing 
environments in turn. Protection checks are carried out at each 
translation from one environment to the containing environment. 
Protection checking is not always associated with the transformation 
function. For instance, lock and key systems (e.g., storage keys 
on IBM System/360 computers (IBM 1968a)) are not intimately bound with 
the transformation function. 
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Chapter 3 
THE COMPARISON OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
To compare different approaches to protection, it is desirable 
to distinguish between a functional or logical scheme for protection 
and its mechanisation or implementation. The term protection system 
is used loosely to cover both the logical protection scheme and its 
implementation. For instance, the capability scheme, as presented 
by Dennis and Van Horn (1966), is a logical protection scheme. The 
Plessey PP250 processor (England 1972) is an actual implementation of 
capabilities used for protection. 
Ideally, one would like to contrast protection systems in terms 
of their logical schemes, so avoiding in the first instance at least 
questions of mechanism, machine architecture, etc. Different 
implementations of a given scheme could then be compared to give a 
complete comparison of protection systems. 
The descriptive language of a formal model of protection, if 
sufficiently general, would appear to be an attractive means of 
comparing the functional schemes of protection systems. The two most 
notable formal models which have been proposed to date are the access 
matrix model of Lampson (1971) and the environment model of Jones (1973). 
3.1 Formal Models of Protection and Their Use in Comparisons 
3.1.1 Lampson's Access Matrix Model 
Lampson's model of protection (Lampson 1971) comprises three parts: 
1. A set of objects X. An object is any entity to which access 
must be controlled. Each object has associated with it an 
identification number which is unique among other objects in 
the system for all time. 
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2. A set of domains D. Domains are the entities which permit 
access to objects. Since domains must be protected from 
each other, in the sense that execution of a process must 
pass from one domain to another in a controlled manner, 
domains are also considered to be objects. 
3. An access matrix A which governs the accessing of objects 
by domains. 
The access rights which domains have to objects are specified in 
the form of an access matrix. Domain names identify the rows and 
object. names the columns. The entry A(d,x) contains a list of the 
access rights held by domain d to object x. A monitor checks for 
each access request (d,~,x) whether ~ is in A(d,x), and allows ~ access 
of d to x if ~ f A(d,x) and not otherwise. When a process executing 
in domain d requests oc access to x, the identification of the domain 
is provided by the 'system' and thus, in principle, cannot be forged. 
Hence, a process executing in a given domain can only access objects 
as permitted by the access matrix. 
A set of four rules governs the establishment, deletion and 
modification of the elements A. These rules facilitate the transfer 
and deletion of access rights on command of a domain, providing the 
domain requesting the change has the appropriate authorisation. For 
this purpose, Lampson introduces the attributes of 'owner' and 
'control' and the notion of the 'copy' flag. 'Control' access reflects 
a partial ordering between domains. Each object has one or more 
'owners' who are automatically granted the complete set of access 
rights to the object. The copy flag is introduced so that a domain 
can prevent an untrustworthy subordinate domain from giving away access 
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permissions to objects. The monitor of the access matrix enforces 
these rules, ensuring that the access matrix is altered only in an 
authorised manner. 
The question of whether the lowner l of an object should be able 
to take away access permissions to the object from other domains is 
still open. Many systems, including Lampson's model, permit it, but 
Vanderbilt (1969) puts forward a contrary view. 
The switch of a process from one domain to another is also controlled 
by entries in the matrix. A process can only enter those domains for 
which the current domain, in which the process is executing, has the 
'call ' attribute. 
Above, we have talked of a single monitor validating all access 
requests. In any real system, it is likely that objects would be 
divided into classes such as files, segments and terminals. Associated 
with each class would be a monitor through which all accesses to objects 
of that class would pass to be validated. In the case of files the 
monitor would be the file system and for segments the segmentation 
hardware. It is a key point of the model that access rights are 
interpreted by object monitors at the time accesses are attempted. 
Graham and Denning (1972) have extended Lampson's work ;n several 
directions. They allow more than one process to execute out of a domain 
and so introduce the term subject to denote the entity which requests 
access to objects. A subject is identified as a (process,domain) pair. 
This is a more faithful abstraction of many systems which do not 
implement a number of distinct domains for each process or even a 
domain per process. For instance, the domain characterised by super-
visor state on IBM System/360 computers (IBM 1968b) ;s shared by all 
processes, but each process has its own problem state domain characterised 
by a particular storage key. 
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Graham and Denning have also investigated the problems of creating 
and deleting subjects and objects. Creation of a non-subject object, 
e.g., a segment, is straightforward and consists of adding a new column 
to the access matrix. The destruction of an object, permitted only to 
its owner, corresponds to deleting the column representing the object 
from the access matrix. 
In the case of a subject, creation consists of adding a row and 
a column to the matrix. The destruction of a subject, permitted only 
to its owner, corresponds to deleting both the row and the column from 
the access matrix. 
A number of minor extensions are also considered by Graham and 
Denning, such as the requirement that subjects be members of a hierarchy 
and the idea of indirect access, to facilitate the implementation of 
cooperation among mutually suspicious subsystems. 
3.1.2 Jones's Environment Model 
Jones's model (Jones 1973) attempts to formalise notions of 
protection within a set of processes sharing the use of objects. The 
objective of protection is seen to be the restriction of a process to 
the objects of immediate relevance to the task that the process is 
performing. Fundamental to the model is the concept of a domain 
(referred to as an environment by Jones). A domain is defined as a 
set of rights, each specifying an object and an access applicable to 
that object. 
The model has three major aspects: the enforcement of protection, 
the transfer of rights into or out of domains, and the binding of 
process execution to domains. 
The activity of a process is controlled by the enforcement rule 
which states that a process can access an object only when the right 
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to do so is in the current domain of that process. The enforcement rule 
;s fixed for all protection systems, but variations in the representation 
of domains and the manner in which protection checking is performed give 
rise to a variety of protection mechanisms. 
To facilitate changes to a domain, a protection system must 
specify a policy for the movement of access rights into and out of a 
domain. To accommodate a variety of policies, the model provides a 
mechanism in the form of a set of primitives (viz.: COPY, DELETE, GRANT, 
CREATE) in terms of which a policy may be specified. The primitives are 
the only means by which domains may be manipulated. 
The way suggested by Jones to control the use of primitives on 
individual rights, is to extend each right by a field which specifies 
how the right itself may be manipulated. An obvious example is the 
specification of whether or not the primitives COPY,GRANT,DELETE can be 
applied to a right by the process executing in the domain containing 
the right. To control the alteration of domains, domains are treated 
as objects so that they can be protected by the protection system. 
The domain binding rule of the model requires specification of how 
crossings between domains can take place. Hydra (Wulf et al 1974b), 
for instance, links domain boundary crossing to nested procedure calls. 
In connection with domain boundary crossing, Jones discusses in detail 
the passage of rights between domains as parameters and defines a 
primitive AMPLIFY to cover the case where rights to a parameter are 
expanded during the act of crossing to the new execution domain. The 
purpose of amplification is to provide a controlled means to permit a 
called procedure domain to have greater access to an object named in a 
parameter right than the caller possesses. 
The model allows the dynamic creation of types, that is programmer 
defined types of objects, based on the already existing set of types. 
, 
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Objects of a programmer defined type can be created and accesses to such 
objects controlled by the protection system in the same manner as is 
done for other objects. Each object is assumed to have a unique global 
name so that an object can be identified uniquely among all objects in 
the system. 
Jones illustrates how different abstract protection systems can be 
defined in terms of the model and then compared on an informal basis in 
terms of this notation. 
Jones introduces the concept of closure which, together with the 
model, forms the basis of a technique for stating and proving properties 
that restrict execution. Informally, the closure of a domain is the 
set of domains which can be derived from the given domain by applying 
the rules governing the movement of rights into and out of domains. 
The idea of obtaining proofs concerning the properties of a 
protection system is a very attractive one. It could lead the way to 
a formal treatment of protection with the obvious benefits of practical 
systems being supported by a well developed theory. In her thesis, 
Jones proves only one or two weak properties of an elementary system 
and it would be necessary to demonstrate that stronger and practically 
useful results could be obtained before this approach could be used 
as an aid to compare protection systems. 
3.1.3 Criticisms of the Models 
Formal models have a definite place in the comparison of protection 
systems, but their utility to date has been limited. Both models allow 
many protection systems to be expressed in a common abstract framework. 
For comparison purposes, this is a reasonable start, since protection 
systems which can be adequately described in terms of a model can be 
compared in the common language of the model. This leads to a qualitative 
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comparison but does not provide a yardstick for a quantitative comparison. 
The description of a protection system in terms of the primitives 
of Jones's model would appear to be extremely complex, judging by the 
examples contained in her thesis (Jones 1973). This implies that it 
would be very difficult to extract important differences and note 
similarities between descriptions of two protection systems in terms 
of her model. However, if from the description of a protection system 
in terms of the model, theoretical results could be derived, along the 
lines indicated by the property of closure, then the formal model could 
prove a useful tool for the purposes of comparison. 
Lampson's work (Lampson 1969a, 1971) was a first attempt to present 
the functional capabilities of several of the existing protection systems 
within a unified context. Different existing systems seem to correspond 
roughly to different ways of representing the matrix A and different 
choices of access modes and the rules, which permit changes to be made 
to the contents of the access matrix. 
Not all protection systems can be readily described in terms of 
the access matrix. The form of addressing and protection typified by 
the Burroughs B6700 system (Hauck and Dent 1968), where a domain is 
structured into a display and sets of descriptors, is not well suited 
to a lucid description by the access matrix. (To be precise, we 
are referring to a modified form of the B6700, along the lines of the 
Algol W run-time system described in Chapter 5, in which all necessary 
protection checks are carried out.) 
The drawbacks of Lampson's model include its inability to reflect 
directly any structure in a protection system, since all domains, objects 
and access rights are expressed in terms of a single matrix. The model 
assumes that an access permission applies uniformly to an object and 
its components. To enforce different domains having different access 
permissions to the components of an object (e.g., rec~rds of a file) 
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it is necessary to represent each component as an object in the access 
matrix as well as the object itself. Thus, a file is regarded as an 
object and some of its records may be objects too. With the access 
matrix model one has to be content with an unstructured, one-level 
view of the set of objects constituting a system. It is not possible 
to reflect the relationship between an object and its components, 
that is to represent objects formed by the combinations, regroupings 
and renaming of other objects. The creation and deletion of such 
objects thus poses difficult questions, largely ignored in the 
description of the access matrix model. 
In Jones's model some of these criticisms are overcome. Objects 
have a more natural structural representation in terms of other objects 
and the type of each object is recognised. 
An important aspect of both models is that objects must have unique 
identification numbers. Though necessary for realising the access 
matrix, many protection systems achieve protection without the need for 
names of global validity, for instance the Cambridge CAP machine (Walker 
1973) and the Recursive Virtual Machine (Lauer and Wyeth 1973). 
A key issue in both models is the checking of all accesses to objects, 
in particular, the access matrix model implies an active check of each 
access. In contrast, possession of a capability in the system proposed 
by Dennis and Van Horn (1966) is taken to be prima facie evidence of the 
right to access an object. No checking is thus needed at the time of 
access. 
The achievement of a comparison method based on a formal model 
does not seem imminent. Thus. the remainder of the thesis will concentrate 
on more practical and less formalised means of comparing, and hence 
classifying, protection systems. 
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3.2 Suitability Measure of Jones 
As a contrast to the formal model approach, which concentrates on 
a detailed description of protection systems, another line of attack is 
to gain a macroscopic view of protection systems and use that for 
comparison purposes. 
An example of a quantitative macroscopic measure is the suitability 
measure of Jones (1973). Jones considers a demand, that is the specifi-
cation of a situation to be satisfied by a protection system, to be 
defined in terms of: 
a. constraints on the contents of domains, and 
b. constraints on processes crossing from one domain to another. 
So, a demand consists of a set of processes, a set of domains and their 
contents, and the possible domain crossings which each process may make. 
Given a demand expressed in these terms, the aim is to compare how 
different protection systems satisfy or approximately satisfy such a 
demand, without adding processes or domains or otherwise altering the 
specifications. If a protection system requires domains to be nested 
one within another, then the implementation of a given demand may 
require that some domains contain more objects than necessary. Thus a 
protection system may prevent the construction of a domain which contains 
precisely the access rights needed to perform a computation. 
To measure how accurately an execution domain suits its use, Jones 
introduces the accuracy measure. 
Definition 
The accuracy measure of a domain is the ratio of the number 
of access rights exercised in the domain compared to the total 
number of rights which could be exercised within the domain 
during the performance of one task. 
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If a procedure is invoked in a domain a number of times, the 
accuracy measure for that domain is defined to be the average of the 
accuracy measures over a representative sample of procedure invocations. 
This measure has a maximum value of 1, attained when the domain is 
exactly tailored to its use, and a lower bound of 0 approached as the 
number of unused rights in the domain increases. 
Using the accuracy measure to quantify how closely an implementation 
of a single domain meets the specification of that domain's contents, 
Jones proposes a measure, the suitability measure, which indicates how 
well a particular implementation satisfies a given demand. 
Definition 
The suitability measure of a system with respect to a given demand 
is the average of the accuracy measures of the implementations of 
all domains required by the demand specification. 
A system cannot introduce new processes or domains to satisfy a 
demand, but might force processes or domains to be merged, and thus, or 
in some other way, cause the number of access rights that are provided 
in a domain to be 'unnecessarily' increased. For example, a demand 
can specify between which domains a process can cross. When an 
implementation cannot meet such a specification, Jones assumes that 
the two specified domains, between which a process is to cross, will be 
implemented as one domain, so that the crossing is rendered unnecessary. 
A specific demand, which involves say k domains, has an 
implementation, in terms of a particular protection system, involving 
k or less domains. An accuracy measure can be computed for the 
implementation of each of the k domains. Merging domains in the 
implementation lowers the accuracy measure for those domains so that 
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an implementation's approximate solution to a domain crossing 
specification is reflected in the average of the accuracy measures. 
The suitability measure ranges in value between 1, which 
indicates that the demand has been met exactly by the implementation 
and 0, a lower bound approached in cases where the implementation 
fails to reflect the demand situation. 
Given a specific demand, the suitability measure will yield an 
ordering of protection systems along the suitability scale. Jones 
uses the suitability measure in an informal manner to compare the 
protection facilities of IBM's OS/360 MVT (IBM 1968b), Multics 
(Graham 1968), CAL-TSS (Lampson 1969b) and Hydra (Wu1f et al 1974b), 
and obtains the following ordering: 
o < S(OS/MVT) < S(Multics) < S(CAL-TSS) < S(Hydra) < 1 
where S(Z) indicates the value of the suitability measure for the system 
Z. 
As pointed out by Jones, the accuracy measure for an execution 
domain is dependent on the execution which takes place in the domain. 
This in turn is dependent on the decomposition of the problem into 
processes and domains. The accuracy measure will indicate when a 
domain has more rights than are needed, but does not reflect 'under-
stacking', which occurs if an unnecessarily fine decomposition generates 
multiple tasks each to be executed in almost identical domains. We 
return to this point in the next section. 
3.3 The Modularisation Problem 
The example contained in this section demonstrates that, although 
approximate, the suitability measure is useful for comparing protection 
systems, but also points to some of its deficiencies. 
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Consider a process P which uses access rights a,b,c,d,e,f, and can 
be viewed as two closely interacting routines Pl and P2, where Pl uses 
rights a,b,c,d and P2 uses rights a,b,e,f. 
'P Pl' 
D Dl 
a a 
b b 
c c 
d d 
e 
f 
Suitabil ity 
= 1 
measure 
(a) 
P2 
D2 
a 
h 
e 
f 
Suitability 
= 
measure 
(b) 
Figure 3. 1 
Pl,P2 
D 1= (Dlu D2) 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
Suitability 
= 2/3 
measure 
(c) 
Possible execution domains of P and their suitability measures 
In Figure 3.1, the three relevant implementations of the domains 
are shown. In (a), the process is regarded as a single entity P and 
executes out of the domain D which contains the six required access rights. 
The suitability measure in this case is 1. 
Case (b) shows the process viewed as two separate routines Pl and 
P2, each executing in its own domain, Dl and D2 respectively. This 
implementation achieves greater protection than (a) in the sense that 
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the process is more restricted in what it can access at any time. In 
(a), the process can access any of six objects at any instant, but in 
(b) the process is always restricted to four objects. The suitability 
measure has the same value (namely 1) in both cases but does not 
reflect the extra protection achieved in (b). The reason for this is 
that the demand in (a) was specified as a process P and a domain 0 
containing rights a,b,c,d,e,f, no indication being given that P splits 
into Pl and P2. 
The third implementation (c) illustrates a protection system which 
although cognizant that P splits into Pl and P2 is unable to support sepa-
rate domains Dl and D2. The suitability measure for (c) = 2/3. This 
reduced suitability measure, compared to that for (b), reflects the 
fact that the protection system has had to merge the two domains Dl and 
D2 into the domain D'. 
This example illustrates that the suitability measure provides a 
means of comparing protection systems with respect to the original 
demand specification given in terms of processes and domains. The 
suitability measure is an attempt to quantify how closely a given 
protection system satisfies a given demand. What is not expected of 
the suitability measure is that it should indicate when a demand would 
be better phrased in terms of a different set of domains and domain 
crossings. The optimum manner in which any programming problem should 
be divided into processes and 'modules' and hence into domains and 
domain crossings is a very difficult question and is largely a matter 
of intuition. 
This is the problem highlighted by cases (a) and (b) above, where 
(a) and (b) are two specifications for the same situation using different 
sets of domains. A measure which would indicate that (b) gives better 
protection than (a) is the average (with respect to time or number of 
50 
references) of the number of rights available to a process. 'Better' 
protection is interpreted in the sense that the process has, on average, 
fewer access rights which it can use, since this reduces the chance of 
an undetected error. 
This measure would indicate that more protection (in the restrictive 
sense) could be achieved by introducing more domains. This is how the 
protection was increased in (b) over that in (a). This will often be 
the case, but there is likely to be some optimum number of domains for 
a given problem. If a problem is decomposed into the maximum number of 
domains possible, each domain would contain exactly one access right. 
One then has the extremely costly situation of switching domains each 
time the process wants to exercise a different right. A single domain 
prohibits the decomposition of a process into suitable routines, each 
executing in its own domain, so there is likely to be some intermediate 
point which offers a large degree of protection for a reasonable cost 
in terms of number of domains and domain crossings. It would be very 
difficult to determine by a measure the optimum number of domains for 
a given situation. since the decomposition of a problem into modules 
has many side effects other than protection, such as reliability and 
understandability. 
The suitability measure provides a practical means of comparison 
but is limited in its scope. No account is taken of maintaining domains 
and other questions of cost, nor of excessive domain crossings. The 
suitability measure depends only on the concept of a domain and not on 
other aspects of Jones's model, such as the primitives by which access 
rights are created and deleted. However, this measure demonstrates the 
feasibility of comparing protection systems in terms of measures. The 
next chapter pursues this approach and develops measures which facilitate 
a cost-benefit comparison of protection systems. 
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Chapter 4 
A MODEL OF PROTECTION AND A METHODOLOGY FOR COMPARISON 
This chapter develops a more pragmatic approach to comparing 
protection systems than that of formal models, namely that of obtaining 
a macroscopic rather than a microscopic view. Another major 
distinction between this new model and those discussed in the last 
chapter, is that it is very closely based on the arguments given in 
Chapter 2 for considering protection and addressing together, rather 
than as separate or separable issues. 
A simple model of protection is proposed and the application of the 
model to the comparison of protection systems is described. The model 
is somewhat arbitrary and, is not important in itself, it is used 
primarily as a vehicle for obtaining precise definitions for cost and 
benefit measures. The comparison of protection systems is in terms 
of a cost-benefit analysis based on the measures. 
4.1 A Simple Protection Model 
" 
For programs written in most, if not all, languages, it is 
possible at any point in the execution of a program to identify various 
sets of variables. Two such sets are the set of accessible variables 
and the set of variables which exist but are not currently accessible. 
The protection model formalises the notions of the various sets of 
interest. 
Examples of these sets can be identified, for instance, in the 
execution of an Algol program. During the execution of a block or 
procedure in an Algol program, there is a specific subset of all 
variables declared in the program which are accessible, as defined by 
the rules of Algol. This subset includes the local variables declared 
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in the given block or procedure, the global variables declared in any 
containing block and any parameters passed to the enclosing procedures. 
If a standard implementation of Algol is considered (such as that 
described by Randell and Russell (1964)), the set of accessible 
variables can be identified with a collection of accessible regions of 
the run-time stack. There will be portions of the stack inaccessible 
to the block or procedure currently being executed, corresponding to 
variables declared within blocks or procedures not within the scope of 
the current block or procedure. As execution proceeds, blocks and 
procedures will be entered and left, and these sets of variables 
will change. 
4.1.1 Program Model 
Two types of program instruction are distinguished, variable 
accessing instructions and context changing instructions. 
A variable accessing instruction specifies an operation, such as 
add, read, etc., and one or more object names. The object names may be 
explicit names or they may be implicit in the operation, for example, 
'add the two integers currently on top of the run-time stack', The type 
of operation and the exact form and representation of objects will 
depend on the 'level' of machine in which one is interested. The aim 
of the protection model is to abstract from the physical representation 
of objects so the model is applicable to any desired 'level' within a 
computing system. 
Before considering context changing instructions, we define the 
environment and the domain of a process. 
Definition 
The environment of a process is the set of existing objects 
potentially accessible by the process. 
i 
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This somewhat vague definition attempts to convey the intuitive notion 
of an environment. An environment delimits the totality of objects which 
a process may attempt to access. In terms of Chapter 2, an environment 
corresponds to the universe of discourse of a process. 
The current domain of execution of a process will only allow the 
process to access a subset of the process's environment. The environment 
is the union of all objects to which all domains, which a process may 
enter, permit access. The fact that an object is in the environment of 
a process only makes that object potentially accessible by the process, 
because the process will have to enter a domain which specifically 
permits access to the object before being able to access that object. 
An environment is a dynamic entity. Objects may be created and 
become accessible to the process or the process may be granted access 
to an already existing object, in either case the object is added to 
the environment of the process. If an object is destroyed it will be 
removed from the environment. 
Example 
In the Cambridge Capability Computer (Walker 1~7~), the enviro~ment 
of a process is specified by the process ca~ablllty segment WhlCh 
contains the complete set of capabilities w ich potentially may be 
referenced by a process. 
At a specific point during execution, a process may be restricted 
to a subset of its environment. This subset is referred to as the 
current domain of the process. 
Definition 
The domain Qf a process at time t (measured in process time) is 
the set of access permissions which the process is able to exercise 
at time t. 
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Sometimes we will refer to the objects in a domain, meaning those objects 
in the process's environment to which the domain permits access. 
The introduction of time here is only a device by which to distinguish 
different domains, actual time is unnecessary, something as simple as 
numbers of instructions executed will suffice. A process can only be 
in one domain at any instant, but at two different times t l ,t2,(tltt2) 
a process may be executing in two quite different domains dl ,d2. 
Example 
In the Cambridge Capability Computer, a process is restricted, 
at any instant, to a subset of the process capability segment 
as defined by the current indirection tables (Walker 1973). 
A change in the contents of a domain or a switch to a new domain 
is indicated by one or more context changing instructions. The 
function of such instructions is to provide the addressing/protection 
mechanism with information which determines the currently accessible 
set of objects. 
A transformation function is required which will take any name 
issued by a process and use it to identify unambiguously an object 
within a given environment. In performing this transformation, use 
may be made of the information provided by the context changing 
instructions. 
Example 
In a typical Algol run-time system, names of variables tak~ the 
form of address couples (l,d); 1 indicates the lexicogr~ph1cal. 
level and d the displacement within that level. If a d1Spl~y 1S 
maintained-in registers O(O),O(l), ••• ,O(n), the transformat10n 
function is: 
0(1) + d 
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(c9nte~ts of the.l-th.display register plus the displacement d). 
Trl1s Y1elds the 1dent1ty (address) of the variable in the stack 
which is the environment for the Algol program. Typically, this 
identity will be converted to a virtual address by adding the 
address of the base of the stack and then to a physical address 
via segmentation hardware. 
In those protection systems in which protection is embodied in the 
addressing mechanism, the domain of a process is specified by context 
information. Context information is a priori knowledge, saying that, 
for some probably significant time period, it is known that the state 
of the addressing mechanism will be constant. Rather than transmit 
such information with each instruction or address, it can be more 
efficient to extract it and provide it once at the beginning of the 
time period. Setting up the display on entry to a block in an 
Algol program, for example, can be viewed as the transmission of 
information defining the new domain. 
4.1.2 Set Definitions 
The protection model consists of the identification of five sets 
of objects pertaining to a process: the totality of objects in a computer 
system T, the environment of a process E, the theoretically accessible 
set A, the accessible set as defined by an implementation AI, and the 
referenced set R. 
The set of objects contained in the environment of a process 
(defined in the previous section) at time t is denoted by E. 
In general, a process will only be permitted to access a subset 
of the objects contained in )ts environment at a given time. Normally, 
we can distinguish between two subsets of the environment, the 
theoretically accessible set A and the accessible set AI as defined 
by a particular implementation, though in some cases A and AI may have 
I . 
the same contents. 
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Definition 
The theoretically accessible set A is a subset of the environment 
E. A contains those objects within E which the process may access 
at time t, as defined by some external specification. 
The set A corresponds to the current domain of execution defined by 
information on the job-card (together with a definition of the JCL), for 
instance, or by certain statements (e.g., statements affecting scope 
rules) in the programming language used to write the program. 
Example 
In the execution of an Algol program, where domains are tied to 
blocks and procedures, the set E corresponds to all variables, 
arrays, etc., stored on the run-time stack. The set A consists 
of all variables, arrays. etc. accessible from the block currently 
being executed. 
In practice, the realisation of the current domain in which a process 
executes by a particular implementation may contain objects other than 
those to which the external specification indicates access may be 
required. This may be because the implementation under consideration 
chooses to ignore certain of the information with which it is supplied 
regarding access requirements, perhaps because there is no obvious 
implementation, or because the cost of utilising all the information is 
too great. Another reason may be that certain checks are carried out 
at compile-time but are not reinforced by corresponding run-time checks. 
The accessible set as defined by an implementation is determined by the 
transformation function F (defined in the previous section). 
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Definition 
The accessible set as defined by a particular implementation AI is 
the set of objects, at time t, to which the transformation function 
F will grant access if F is presented with a suitable set of object 
names. 
Example 
In ~he virtual machine design of Price (Parnas and Price 1973), 
(Prlce 1973), the environment of a process is its Virtual Space, 
a set of segment descriptors defining all the data which a 
process may access. The implemented accessible set of a process 
is defined by its Working s~ace since this contains segment 
descriptors describing all he data which a machine instruction 
may reference at a gi ven instant. 
The set A corresponds to what should be accessible to a process, 
whereas set AI corresponds to the set of objects actually accessible 
to a process at any given time. The protection mechanism is presumed 
to detect references to objects not contained in AI. An undetected 
protection violation will occur when an object X£A I is referenced 
and X~A. 
While a process executes in a domain, with a corresponding 
theoretically accessible set A, the process will actually reference a 
set of objects R. 
Definition 
The referenced set R (initially empty), corresponding to domain 
0, is composed of those objects referenced by the process up to 
time t since the process switched execution to domain D. 
When R is referred to without mention of time, it will mean the set of 
objects referenced whilst the process ;s in a given domain. If a domain 
\ 
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D is temporarily left when the set R has the value Rl , then, when execution 
returns to domain D the set R starts with the value Rl • However, each 
time a domain is entered to perform a separate logical function, strictly 
each time a domain is created from the same specification, the set R 
has the initial value ~ (the empty set). Temporary and permanent context 
changes are distinguished by the context-changing instructions which 
cause them. 
The set R may include items outside A and AI because A and AI may 
change with time. R can be a useful indicator of the accessing patterns 
of a process, in particular, one is likely to be interested in R before 
a switch in domain and its relation to R built up after a switch. 
To complete the set definitions and to ease the task of defining 
set transitions, one further set is defined. 
Definition 
The set T is the totality of objects in a computer system. 
The set T is composed of all existing and Inon-existing l objects. 
I, 
This apparent contradiction reflects our view that object creation is 
not truly an act of creation, but rather a combination, regrouping and 
renaming of other objects, similarly for object destruction. 
The relationships between the sets are shown by means of a Venn 
diagram in Figure 4.1 
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T totality of objects 
E environment 
A theoretically accessible set 
AI accessible set defined by an implementation 
R set of objects actually referenced 
Figure 4.1 
Relationships between the sets 
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4.1.3 Transitions Between Sets 
On a domain switch. execution switches to a new domain, thus the 
sets A and AI also switch to new sets corresponding to the new domain 
of execution. During execution within one domain, the actual contents 
of the domain may change resulting in corresponding changes to the sets 
A and A I. 
To accommodate changes to these and other sets it is necessary to 
consider object transitions between sets. The following is a list of 
possible object transitions between sets, involving the theoretically 
accessible set A rather than the implemented accessible set AI. The 
notation Sl~S2 is used to denote a transfer of an object X~Sl from 
Sl to S2' 
1. E~A 
2. A~ E 
3. T~A 
(T~ E) 
4. A~T 
(E~ T) 
5. T~ E 
an object is transferred from the environment to the 
accessible set. 
an object is transferred from the accessible set to 
the environment and so becomes. temporarily at least, 
inaccessible. 
an object (or possibly a group of objects in T regarded 
as a single object in E) is transferred from T to the 
accessible set, and by implication to the environment. 
an object is transferred from the accessible set (and 
by implication from the environment) to the set T; 
due to combination and regrouping the object may be 
represented by a number of objects in T. 
an object is transferred from the set T to the 
environment of the process, thus in some domain the 
process may be able to access the object. 
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6. E~ T an object is removed from the environment and 
transferred to T. again due to regrouping the 
object may be represented by a number of objects 
in T. 
Similar further transitions must also be included if the referenced 
set is being considered. 
A new domain of execution may be specified as a set of additions 
and deletions to the set of access permissions constituting the previous 
domain or might be specified by an explicit list of access permissions. 
Similarly. a set of object transitions can be specified for a domain 
switch to turn the old set A into the new set corresponding to the new 
domain. Alternatively. a complete specification of the new set A may 
be given independent of the previous domain. 
The transition E~T includes the cases of object deletion and 
revocation of access permission. If permission to access an object is 
revoked, then the object is effectively removed from the environment of 
the process. A certain object may not be currently accessible. but may 
be potentially accessible. i.e •• the process could enter a domain in 
which the object would be accessible. If the process enters a domain 
from which it is no longer possible to enter a domain (by one or more 
domain crossings) in which an object x is accessible. then x may be 
deleted from the environment. 
The dynamic creation of objects while executing in a domain, e.g •• 
the use of records in Algol W, involves transitions T~ A and T~ E 
but does not affect the set R. The same transitions are involved in the 
case of a process gaining access to an object not previously in its 
environment, while executing in a specific domain. but again the set R 
is not affected. 
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4.1.4 Extensions to the Model 
The model has been described in terms of restricting access to 
objects, the extension to different types of access presents no problem. 
To distinguish between different types of access permitted to an object, 
consider an object a with possible access types al ,a2, •.. ,an, as a set of 
pairs (O,a,).(0,a 2), .•.• (O,an), and treat each as a separate object. If 
the current domain includes object 0, but only with permitted access types 
ai,aj,a k, then objects (O,ai).(O.a j ) and (O.ak) are in the corresponding 
accessible set A, and objects (O,a h) hti,j.k are not included in A. 
This level of detail may not always be appropriate and the simple 
model described above may be quite sufficient in many circumstances. 
For instance, in Algol-60, apart from value parameters, there is no 
notion of a variable being read-only or write-only, so there is little 
to be gained in trying to make the distinction. However. if procedures 
are included in the set of accessible objects and are represented by 
descriptors and referenced by address couples, as in the Burroughs 
r 
B6700 (Hauck and Dent 1968). to 'read' a procedure could mean the act 
of passing a procedure as a parameter. To 'execute' a procedure would 
have the obvious meaning, but to 'write' a procedure would be meaningless. 
In such a situation, it may well be desirable to make the distinction 
between 'read,write,execute, ... ' types of access to objects. 
The extension to different access types or operations could be of use 
in considering machines with a tagged architecture such as the Burroughs 
B6700 (Burroughs 1972) or the Rice Computer (Feustel 1972). Any operation 
uwould further restrict the set of accessible objects to objects of the 
form (Oi'&)' i.e., those objects 0i£A' for which access type ~ is allowed. 
The inclusion of domain switching operations presents little problem, 
I 
particularly if a 'procedure' or 'subroutine' is associated with a domain. 
The domains to which one could transfer from the current domain would be 
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the 'procedure' objects in the current domain with the access type call. 
Further extensions to the model to include user defined datatypes 
and operations, and the notion of a structured domain are discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
4.2 Value of Protection 
In terms of the above model, the accuracy measure of Jones, for a 
given domain, is the ratio IRI: IAI, (where the notation lsi is used to de-
note the cardinality of the set S), of the size of the set of referenced 
objects R to the set of theoretically accessible objects A. (This 
measure ignores possible problems which may be caused by the fact that 
A may vary with time.) Averaged over a number of domains this measure 
becomes Jones's suitability measure. 
Accuracy alone can give a very distorted picture of the true situa-
tion. A process may only use one object in a domain of two objects, an 
accuracy of 50%, but the domain could be restricting the process to two 
objects out of 1000, so the protection would be quite reasonable. 
I 
Jones's suitability measure deals with what a process actually 
accesses and attempts to evaluate how well a protection mechanism matches 
up to the dynamic behaviour of a process. Basing the evaluation of 
protection systems on the detailed dynamic behaviour of processes gives 
rise to a number of problems (c.f., the modularisation problem discussed 
in Chapter 3) because of the need to know the detailed accessing patterns 
of processes, which vary greatly from one process to another, and because 
of the possibility of measuring aspects of processes rather than protection 
mechanisms. 
An alternative and more direct approach is to consider the use 
t" 
made by protection systems of available information, e.g., context 
information, which can be used to form domain specifications. In other 
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words, the implementation of a domain (i.e., the accessible set AI 
defined by the implementation) compared to the specification of the 
domain (the theoretically accessible set A), based on a priori knowledge. 
It is patently impossible to provide more protection than supplied 
information allows, but it is quite feasible to make only partial use 
of this knowledge. 
Definition 
The value or benefit of a protection mechanism is defined to be 
IA1/IAII 
averaged over the domains of execution of a sample set of programs. 
Thus, the value of a protection mechanism is defined as an empirical 
measure of how well implemented domains match the true domains; that is, 
the use made of context information or an external specification of 
what should be accessible. The measure is independent of the detailed 
behaviour of actual programs, since it is independent of the referenced 
set R. Sample programs are only needed for the specifications and 
implementations of a set of domains over which to average the benefit 
measure. The average can be a simple mean or a weighted average based 
on the Itime l spent in each domain or the importance, from the view of 
potential protection violations, of each domain. 
Within a domain, weights could be applied to objects if some were 
considered much more important than others, e.g., shared objects, critical 
system objects, etc. If objects enter and leave the domains of a process 
during its execution, a time average based on the length of time each 
object remains in a domain can be taken for the benefit measure. 
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Above, we have used the term 'size of a set l without being explicit 
about its definition. The precise meaning of this term will depend very 
much on one's attitude towards objects. An array. for instance, can be 
regarded as a single conceptual object or as a collection of component 
objects. The 'sizes ' of the sets A and AI are thus left to be defined 
for each particular comparison, so that the most appropriate measure 
of size can be used. In the next two chapters, the examples of the 
comparison of protection systems use storage requirements as a 
measurement of size and in Chapter 7 comparisons involving structured 
objects are considered. 
4.3 Cost of Protection 
A protection mechanism may be implemented in a combination of hard-
ware and software, so the true cost of protection might be a measure of 
amount of hardware, speed of system (i.e., amount it is slowed down by 
protection checks), provision of software etc. In addition, a 
protection system or mechanisation may have an influence on the whole 
operating system and on the writing of user programs. It would be 
I 
convenient if protection could be discussed and measured in isolation 
from the rest of the system. This is normally not possible, indeed in 
some systems it is impossible completely to separate the protection 
fUnction from the addressing function since one mechanism has been 
devised to achieve both aims. 
To avoid at least some of these problems, we follow the approach 
of Wortmann (1972) who devised an abstract but potentially useful cost 
measure for the comparison of different implementations of SPL (a 
dialect of PL/l). 
A simple but illustrative cost measure is a line~r measure based 
on the number of domain switches made by a process. 
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This measure is 
t 
crude, but, being easy to calculate. can lead to rapid gross comparisons 
of protection systems. 
Alternatively, a more complicated cost measure can be devised which 
emphasises the amount of information which has to be supplied or transmitted 
to set up domains and the bookkeeping involved in the maintenance of domains. 
We break down the total cost of applying protection to a process into the 
following six components: 
1. Cost of creation of a domain 
2.·· Cost of deletion of a domain 
3. Cost of maintenance of a domain 
4. Cost of domain crossings 
5. Cost of dynamically adding or removing objects from a domain 
6. Cost of protection enforcement, i.e., that a named object 
lies within the current domain. 
The cost of creation of a domain is likely to depend on the size of 
the domain (i.e., the number of objects or access permissions to objects 
v 
contained in the domain) and the amount of parameter checking etc. which 
has to be done. Domain deletion will usually be trivial and may have a 
fixed cost (possibly zero), since it will often involve little more than 
the deletion of information defining the domain. However, in some 
systems, deletion of a domain may be a much more complex task. In the 
Hydra system (Wulf et al 1974b), on the deletion of a domain it is 
necessary to decrement the reference count of every object for which 
there is a capability in the local name space defining the domain. 
The cost of maintenance of a domain will usually reduce to a function 
of the space necessary to store a description of the domain, which in 
turn will depend on the size of the domain. The description of a domain 
, 
may be kept in different places when execution is actually taking place 
in the domain and when the process is temporarily executing in another 
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domain. In the execution of an Algol program, for example, where the 
current domain is represented by the display registers, other domains, 
to which the process may return, are represented in terms of linkage 
information stored on the run-time stack. 
A fixed cost could be assumed for each transfer to a new domain 
(domain switch), this would be appropriate if a domain switch merely 
involved the resetting of a fixed number of registers. A more realistic 
cost would be one related to the 'size' of the new domain, that is the 
amount of information required to specify the new domain. This would 
be applicable to situations in which a description of the domain has to 
be loaded into a specific area of memory or piece of hardware before 
the desired procedure can be executed in that domain. 
The addition of access permissions to a domain or the removal of 
such permissions will involve a cost dependent upon the representation 
of the domain and the amount of information required to indicate the 
change. 
\ 
The cost of protection enforcement may be independent of the 
current domain of execution (e.g., checking access bits in a segment 
descriptor). The total cost of enforcement is then a constant multiplied 
by the total 'time' (e.g., number of references) spent in execution by 
the process. Alternatively, the cost of checking the validity of an 
access may depend on the size of the current domain. One would expect 
the cost of enforcement to have a linear dependence on time, but access 
to 'well-protected' objects may cost more than to other types of objects. 
Certain mechanisms may appear to involve no cost for protection 
enforcement, e.g., storage keys on the IBM System/360. Here though there 
is a hardware cost, albeit a once only cost, and presumably some small 
time delay to test the result of the protection check on each storage 
reference. 
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The general form of the six cost components has been discussed and 
it is envisaged that .these components could be determined for any 
particular protection mechanism. Each component will generally be 
made up of a number of parts, such as storage space, time (in practice 
number of references) and possibly hardware costs. These parts could 
be treated separately or reduced to a common denominator, namely money. 
Each cost component, for example the creation of a domain, will 
involve the invocation of a set of basic or primitive actions, the 
number of times each primitive action is invoked will depend on the 
domain in question. The actual form of the cost measure for a 
particular protection mechanism is obtained by determining the primitive 
actions ~l '~2 , •••• 'Pjk. involved in the i-th cost component (i = 1,2, ... ,6). 
I 
The costs c'l ,c'2, •.• ,c·k of each of the primitives are then determined. I I I . 
I 
The total cost of the protection mechanism for a sample set of programs 
is then: 
6 k j 
L L n.,c .. 
i =1 j=l I) I) 
where n,. is the number of times primitive action p., is invoked during 
I J I) 
execution of the set of programs. We are assuming that the costs of the 
primitives c., have been reduced to a common denominator or time, space 
I) 
etc., are being considered separately, in which case there will be a sum 
of this form for each type of cost. Hardware costs, being once only costs, 
can be determined directly without resorting to such a summation. 
This relatively complicated cost measure is in no sense an absolute 
measure of cost. Instead, this discussion is to be viewed as a set of 
guidelines for determining a more abstract cost measure for a protection 
mechanism, one which will facilitate at least a rudimentary comparison 
of costs of different protection mechanisms. 
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4.4 Comparison of Protection Systems 
The model described above has been developed with a view to 
performing quantitative or qualitative comparisons of protection 
mechanisms. The model provides a measure to evaluate the benefit 
of a protection mechanism and guidelines for deriving a cost measure 
. for the provision of the protection. 
The cost measure is based on the run-time costs of performing 
the protection checks. Attempts have not been made to measure any 
increase or decrease in programming cost due to restrictions or 
requirements of the protection system, nor to evaluate any additional 
benefits which accrue from a particular mechanism. 
Specific instructions for performing a comparison of protection 
mechanisms cannot be given due to the variety of possible criteria for 
evaluating which of several protection mechanisms is best suited to a 
particular application. ~owever, we endeavour to convey a general 
approach by means of two examples contained in the next two chapters. 
• • J 
In the ideal situation, a need would arise to evaluate various 
protection systems in a well understood environment for which many 
'typical
' 
programs are in existence. A simple criterion for 'best' 
would be given, e.g., maximum amount of protection for a given cost. 
A straightforward quantitative analysis is then feasible. First the 
benefit and cost measures to be evaluated must be considered in terms 
of each of the candidate protection mechanisms. From this analysis, 
the statistics required to evaluate the measures can be determined. 
These statistics can then be gathered from the set of 'typical ' 
programs by using a suitable method (e.g., alteration to a compiler, 
interpreter or emulator, or by simulation) without actually implementing 
the protection systems being considered. The measures can then be 
evaluated and the 'best' system determined. 
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If a new system and machine are being designed, it is unlikely 
that programs will exist for the new machine architecture. Thus, 
intelligent guesswork must be used or 'similar' programs measured. 
Account will also have to be taken of the effect of the protection 
mechanism on the remainder of the system and the way it fits into the 
overall design. In some cases, it may only be feasible to use the 
measures in a qualitative manner to discuss the differences of certain 
protection mechanisms or strategies. 
The first example of the comparison of protection systems compares 
various implementations of Algol W run-time systems (Wirth and Hoare 1966) 
and evaluates the value of protection provided by each implementation 
and the associated cost. The second example illustrates the utility of 
the model in the system area, i.e., the problems of inter-user protection, 
by comparing the protection system used in the IBM System/370 DOS/VS 
operating system (IBM 1973) with an alternative system based on the 
same mechanism, namely storage keys. 
The first example deals essentially with protection within a 
sequential process. The second tackles inter-process protection in a 
multiprogramming environment. If there was a system where the whole 
system and user programs were written in a single language (conceivably 
the Burroughs B6700 with Algol, though the B6700 in fact uses various 
differing versions of Algol, but one might find a common denominator), 
then all protection, both internal and external to a process, would be 
expressed in that language. The comparison method applied to such a 
language would have been sufficient to demonstrate the utility of the 
methodology, but such a system was not availab1e to us. 
Further examples, in Chapter 7, illustrate the application of the 
model to characterise protection in computer architectures and languages 
which exploit structure for protection purposes. Together, these examples 
will demonstrate that the model can be applied to almost any level of detail. 
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Chapter 5 
A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF PROTECTION IN IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ALGOL W 
To illustrate the comparison of protection mechanisms, an experi-
ment was conducted to examine the benefit and cost tradeoffs of 
protection in various feasible implementations of the Algol W language 
(Wirth and Hoare 1966), (Bauer et al 1968). The experiment was 
based on a sample of about 100 programs, written in Algol W, collected 
from a wide variety of people in the Computing Laboratory at Newcastle 
Un i ve rs i ty. 
Algol W is a development of the programming language Algol-60 
and is used extensively in the Computing Laboratory for teaching 
purposes and research work. If the list processing facilities 
(records and references) are ignored, which they are for the purposes 
of this study, Algol W can be regarded as a variant of Algol-60, the 
differences in syntax and semantics being of minor significance. The 
important attribute of Algol W with regard to this experiment is that 
it is a block structured language. 
The ready availability of a source of Algol W programs was a 
considerable influence on the selection of this experiment as a 
test bed of the ideas proposed in Chapter 4. However, a major 
advantage of this choice was the existence of an Algol W run-time 
system which has the capability of providing a trace of the execution 
of Algol W programs in source language terms. This system was 
developed by Satterthwaite (1972) primarily to assist the develop-
ment and debugging of programs. It provided the essential basis for 
a means of gathering statistics on the execution of programs necessary 
to evaluate the cost and benefit measures. 
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5.1 Implementations of Algol W 
Run-time implementations of block-structured languages generally 
make use of a stack on which to store program variables and control 
information, exploiting knowledge of the last-in-first-out creation 
and deletion strategy of program objects. Two very common styles 
of implementation perform storage allocation at the block level 
(Randell and Russell 1964) and the procedure level (Hawkins and 
Huxtable 1963), (Wichmann 1973) respectively. The aim of this 
experiment was to examine these two implementation styles from the 
protection aspect. 
The Algol W run-time system provides a stack machine for the 
execution of Algol W programs. This stack machine is an abstract 
machine in the sense that it is simulated on a conventional von 
Neumann type computer. An activation record consisting of three 
parts (link information area, primary allocation and secondary 
allocation) is placed on the stack on entry to a block or procedure 
and is removed at block exit or procedure exit. For the purposes 
of implementation, a block is considered to be a procedure without 
parameters. 
The link information typically includes pointers to the previous 
activation record on the stack (dynamic link) and the activation 
record of the statically enclosing block (static link). The 
primary allocation contains space set aside for the simple (i.e. 
not array) variables and descriptors of any arrays declared in the 
block. If the activation record corresponds to a procedure with 
parameters, space is also included in the primary allocation for 
the specification of the actual parameters passed to the procedure. 
The secondary allocation contains space for the elements of the 
arrays declared in the block. 
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Though the sizes of each primary allocation and each link 
information area can be calculated at compile-time, the size of each 
secondary allocation is not known until the array declarations 
within a block have been executed, since arrays may have dynamic 
bounds. As the exact position of an activation record on the stack 
Cannot be predicted at compile-time, addresses cannot be calculated 
for program variables in terms of an absolute displacement from the 
base of the stack. The method of addressing program variables 
utilised in Algol W is the conventional use of a display and address 
couples (see (Randell and Russell 1964) and (Wichmann 1973)). A 
program variable declared in a block is uniquely defined by an 
address couple (l,d) where 1 = level of static nesting of the block 
in which the variable is declared (the lexicographical level) and 
d = displacement of the variable in the activation record of that 
block. Display registers point to the activation records of the block 
currently being executed and the statically enclosing blocks; the 
address of a variable within the stack is formed by adding the contents 
of the l-th display register and the displacement d. 
This method of addressing permits access to the activation records 
of the blocks on the static chain (i.e., the statically enclosing 
blocks) of the block currently being executed. Other activation 
records on the stack cannot be accessed directly. Strictly speaking, 
a check should be performed on the displacement contained in an 
address couple to ensure that it lies within the appropriate 
activation record. This can easily be achieved if the display 
registers are of the base and limit form. 
Actual parameters, which may lie outside the static chain of 
activation records, are accessed via descriptors placed in the 
appropriate accessible activation records. Array elements are 
f 
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accessed via a descriptor in the primary allocation of the activation 
record. In Algol W, this descriptor takes the form of a dope vector. 
which used in conjunction with the subscripts, facilitates the 
calculation of the address of an array element. 
A possible alternative to the above implementation of the Algol 
W run-time system would be to put an activation record on the stack 
only on entry to a procedure. This is feasible because, although 
procedures may be recursive, blocks within a procedure are not. The 
addressing scheme for storage allocation performed at the procedure 
level is very similar to the case where activation records correspond 
to blocks, except that the level of nesting, 1, ,in an address couple 
is now the level of nesting of procedures. The outermost block of 
a program is treated as a procedure. 
The advantage of this method is that since procedure entry is in 
general less frequent than block entry, fewer activation records are 
placed on the stack. The display will therefore be smaller, 
particularly important if it is desired to keep the display in a 
limited set of registers, and the cost of maintaining the display 
will normally be cheaper. However, to be balanced against this 
saving is the drawback that parts of the stack may be accessible 
which, according to the rules of the language, should not be 
accessible. Thus, if through an error in the compiler or a machine 
malfunction, an address couple describing a location in the 
theoretically inaccessible region of the stack is presented to the 
addressing mechanism, the request for access to the stack will in 
certain cases be granted. 
The activation record for a procedure in such an implementation 
reserves space for all simple variables and descriptors for arrays 
declared in blocks in the procedure. The secondary allocation is 
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handled on a block basis, space for arrays is allocated on execution 
of an array declaration and deallocated on block exit. During 
execution in a procedure. the addressing mechanism will permit access 
to the whole of the procedure's activation record, which includes 
space set aside for variables declared in blocks contained within 
the procedure. The scope rules of Algol W, however, only permit 
access to such variables when execution is taking place within the 
block, in which the variable is declared. or a block enclosed by 
that block. 
The alternative implementation based on procedures has two 
forms; the first which takes account of parallel blocks and the 
second which does not. Within a procedure, two blocks at the same 
level of nesting cannot have variables on the stack simultaneously 
(in the same activation of the procedure). Thus, such blocks can 
use the same space within an activation record for declared variables, 
reducing the size of the activation record. In Figure 5.1, if note 
is taken of parallel blocks the variable R2 can use the same 
storage location as 11 (assuming integers and reals both occupy one 
word) since these two variables can never exist simultaneously in 
one call of the procedure. 
Another feasible implementation is a Fortran-like implementation 
in which space is reserved at program load time for all simple 
variables, array and parameter descriptors, and links for nested 
procedure calls and sequence control. The stack is used solely for 
the allocation of space for arrays and is necessary to permit arrays 
~~: 
to have dynamic bounds. Execution of an array declaration allocates 
space on the stack for the array and fills in the addresses in the 
dope vector or descriptor. The space is deallocated on block exit. 
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PROCEDURE A; 
BEGIN 
REAL Rl; 
BEGIN 
INTEGER 11,12,13; 
• • • END; 
. 
BEGIN 
REAL R2; 
END; 
. 
END; 
Size of activation record of procedure 
A in procedure implementations 
a. taking account of parallel blocks 
= 4 words + link information 
b. ignoring parallel blocks 
= 5 words + link information 
Figure 5.1 
An Algol W procedure and the size of its activation record 
This implementation precludes recursion, but is interesting as 
a theoretical implementation since it provides a base line for the 
comparison of the three implementations of Algol W: storage 
allocation performed at block level, storage allocation performed 
at procedure level taking note of parallel blocks and storage 
allocation performed at procedure level ignoring parallel blocks. 
An implementation scheme following the Fortran-like approach, but 
with special l provision for recursion, has been suggested by 
Sattley (1961).(" 
In a Fortran-like implementation, all variables and arrays are 
always accessible since absolute addresses are used and no checks are 
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performed on addresses. except a simple check that they lie within 
the data area. No display is required, so the overhead of maintaining 
a display is removed. 
To avoid obscuring the important issues in the above discussion 
of various implementations of Algol W. no mention has been made of the 
need for working storage necessary for the retention of temporary 
intermediate results in the evaluation of expressions. The compiler 
can calculate the amount of storage required to evaluate each 
expression in a program and hence deduce the maximum amount of 
storage required in each block or procedure. The appropriate amount 
of extra space can then be allocated in the primary allocation of 
each block or procedure. Alternatively. it is possible to arrange 
that the workspace for temporary information is taken on top of 
the stack. Wichmann (1973) reports that examination of post mortem 
dumps from the KDF9 compiler for Algol-60 showed that working storage 
variables were much less numerous than user declared variables which 
in turn were less than array storage. 
An assumption made in discussing accessible areas of the stack 
\ 
is that array descriptors and actual parameter descriptors only allow 
access to the appropriate array elements, and actual parameters 
respectively. In the case of array descriptors, there is little 
problem since array elements can be addressed relative to a display 
register and thus any array element address is checked that it lies 
within the activation record to which the display register points. 
An actual parameter descriptor must contain an address relative to 
the base of the stack. as the parameter may not lie within the 
areas of the stack described by the display. To prevent access being 
gained to other supposedly inaccessible locations on the stack, it 
is necessary to ensure that a program cannot alter, even inadvertently, 
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the contents of the actual parameter descriptor. This point is 
taken up again in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Benefit and Cost Measures 
The purpose of this experiment is to compare the cost and 
benefit of protection in five implementations of Algol W. 'Protection', 
in this experiment, is defined to be accessibility to areas of the 
run-time stack. In other words, if a suitable address is presented 
to the addressing mechanism, will access be granted to a specific 
location? Access to files and devices, etc., and available instruction 
sets are not considered. 
The implementations being analysed are: 
11 an implementation based on a stack and performing storage 
allocation at the block level 
12 an implementation based on a stack and performing storage 
allocation at the procedure level taking account of 
., 
parallel blocks 
13 as for 12, but no account taken of parallel blocks 
14 a Fortran-like implementation with static allocation of 
space for all simple variables and array descriptors and 
using a stack for array allocation, no account is taken of 
parallel blocks within procedures 
15 the actual Algol W implementation used at Newcastle, based 
on a stack and performing storage allocation at the block 
level, but not checking access attempts to link information 
or extra words on the stack used for boundary alignment. 
Each implementation, except 15, is treated as an idealised abstract 
machine. Thus, certain details concerned with implementing these 
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machines on actual computers, which would otherwise detract from the 
essential aspects of this study, can be ignored. 
Practical implementations do exist corresponding to 11,12 and 13. 
14 represents a worst case situation where everything is accessible, 
and thus provides a lower limit for reference purposes. The actual 
implementation of Algol W on the IBM System/360 computer (15) is 
based on the 'ideal ' implementation 11, which represents Ipure l 
Algol W, reflecting the rules of the language. Problems, such as 
the limited numbers of registers available for use as a display, the 
method of addressing employed on System/360 and boundary alignment 
in main memory, have forced a less than ideal practical realisation. 
In all implementations, it is assumed that the display registers 
are of the base and limit form (even though this is not the case with 
the actual Algol W system), so only the allowed activation records can 
be accessed. The link information in implementations 11,12,13 and 
14 is presumed to be inaccessible to all instructions except those 
which change the context. A device such as that suggested by Lauer 
and Snow (1972) would achieve this. 
Temporary working storage is ignored and it is assumed that 
array and parameter descriptors only allow access to the appropriate 
part of the stack, and that some mechanism exists, such as tag bits, 
for preventing the contents of descriptors being changed by an 
executing program. We also ignore the possibility of preventing access 
to a variable by declaring a new variable with the same name. Further, 
the initial analysis does not distinguish between different types of 
access to the stack, namely read or write. 
To perform the analysis, benefit and cost measures have to be 
derived which are then evaluated using statistics from a sample set 
of programs. Before the measures can be derived, however, it is 
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necessary to consider the nature of domains in the Algol W 
environment. 
5.2.1 Domains in Algol W 
In terms of the rules of the Algol W language (ignoring the 
facility which permits the dynamic creation and deletion of records), 
once a block has been entered and any array declarations contained 
within the block processed, the set of accessible objects is well 
defined and does not vary during the execution of the remainder of 
the block. The set of accessible objects will in general alter 
when a transfer of control is made between blocks. (For the pur-
poses of this discussion, the term 'block ' encompasses blocks, pro-
cedures and implicit subroutines used to evaluate actual name para-
meters.) The appropriate semantic unit to which to tie domains is 
therefore the block. If domains were keyed to procedures, inconsis-
tencies would arise in certain cases. In particular, a block executing 
in the domain of its containing procedure would be allowed to access 
variables declared within other blocks within the procedure even 
if they were inaccessible according to the rules of the language. 
During execution of an Algol W program, the theoretically 
accessible set corresponds to the domain described above. This is 
defined by the scope rules of Algol W which specify that the variables 
accessible at a given point in the execution of an Algol W program 
are those declared in the block currently being executed and any 
statically enclosing blocks, together with any actual parameters 
passed to enclosing procedures. 
In this comparison of different implementations of Algol W, we 
are interested in the accessible set as defined by each of the 
implementations 11.12.13,14 and IS at any point in the activation 
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of an Algol W program and how these accessible sets compare with 
the theoretically accessible set. 
The run-time system 11, which directly implements the rules of 
the Algol W language, places an activation record on the stack for 
each activation of a block. The accessible set at any time is defined 
by the display, being composed of the accessib1e regions of the stack 
pointed to by the display plus any other areas of the stack indicated 
as accessible by descriptors contained within the directly accessible 
activation records. In the case of 11, the accessible set and the 
theoreticallYlset are identical. 
Implementations 12 and 13 put an activation record on the stack 
on entry to a procedure or implicit subroutine. Entry to a block 
may cause an adjustment to be made to an activation record if an 
array is declared within the block, but does not cause the creation 
of a new activation record. In implementations 12 and 13, the 
accessible set at any time during the execution of an Algol W 
program is defined by the primary and secondary allocations of 
activation records pointed to by the display, plus any actual 
parameters passed to procedures on the static chain. Each accessible 
set in implementations 12 and 13 will generally correspond to a 
number of domains as defined by Algol W. 
The execution of a program in the Fortran-like implementation 
14 occurs in what it is most convenient to regard as a single 
accessible set. The accessible set is composed of a static part, 
including all simple variables and array descriptors, and a 
dynamic part consisting of a stack on which arrays are implemented. 
It is assumed that an array descriptor is set to null t thereby 
denying access to the stack, except during the period of Gxistence 
of the arr"ay. 
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'The actual implementation of Algol W, 15, follows·the essential 
ideas of 11, but is limited by the architecture of the 360 computers. 
The display is maintained in a subset of the machine's general registers 
which have no limit extension. In practice, therefore, the majority 
of the stack, if not all of it, is usually accessible. However, 
presuming that the display is maintained in base and limit registers 
allows a crude comparison to be made between the actual Algol W 
implementation and the ideal 11. The main effects being studied are 
allowing the link information to be included in the accessible set 
and the effect of having to align arrays and activation records on 
double word boundaries. 
The following simplifying assumptions have been made in the above 
discussion. 
1. Space required for the temporary storage of intermediate results of 
expression evaluation has been ignored. This is partly due to the 
problem of calculating the amount of temporary storage required to 
evaluate an expression. since it will depend on the architecture of 
the machine being used. 
2. Standard functions (e.g., square-root, sine) have been treated as 
indivisible machine instructions causing no switch in domain. This 
is justified on the grounds that standard functions make no reference 
to the current domain except to the parameter(s) passed to the function. 
3. During a domain switch, it has been assumed that no access is made 
to source language variables. In other words, the fact that execution 
of array declarations can involve expression evaluation is ignored. 
Similarly. the initialisation of VALUE parameters and the setting of 
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RESULT parameters are also ignored. The number of references to 
source language variables involved in these actions is generally 
very small compared to the number of references made within a block 
and hence this simplifying assumption is reasonable. 
4. Algol W specifies that a control variable in a FOR statement is 
only accessible within the statement following the DO and can only 
be read. not written. This is checked by the compiler but not by 
the run-time system. Therefore, FOR loop control variables have 
been treated as being declared in the block enclosing the FOR 
statement and accessible throughout the block. 
5. All identifiers in a program are assumed to be unique, so that 
there is no possibility of redeclaration of an identifier already 
used within a program, which would cause a hole in the scope of 
the original variable with that name. 
6. In Algol W, an actual name parameter which is a simple variable 
is passed by reference, thus avoiding the activation of an implicit 
subroutine on each reference to the formal parameter. This 
optimisation is assumed to occur in all implementations. 
5.2.2 Benefit Measures 
To evaluate benefit.measures of the form suggested in Chapter 4, 
it is necessary to define the 'size' of an accessible set in the 
context of Algol W. The simple-minded approach of indicating the 
size of an accessible set by the number of simple variables. arrays 
and parameters contained in the set does not fairly represent an 
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accessible set, since an array is usually regarded not as a single 
object but as a collection of array elements. Individual array 
elements could be counted as objects, but problems would still arise 
in assessing the size of an accessible set in implementation 12, where 
space on the stack, which is not currently being used to store objects, 
is accessible. A more realistic approach, and one which avoids this 
last problem, is to consider an accessible set to be the total 
accessible area of the stack, i.e., the size of the current accessible 
set is expressed as the number of bytes on the stack which could be 
accessed if suitable addresses were presented to the addressing 
mechanism. 
Since accessible sets are being measured on an IBM. Syst~m/36n 
computer, some machine dependence will affect the measurements, 
e.g., descriptor sizes and space allocated to variables of different 
types. This effect is unlikely to be marked since it is only with 
logical variables, where for convenient manipulation a byte is 
allocated to each logical variable rather than one bit, that the 
360 architecture has had a strong influence, otherwise space allocated 
to variables of different types is fairly conventional. 
The calculation of the size of an accessible set in each of the 
implementations 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 is indicated in Table 5.1. 
The size of the theoretically accessible set, as defined by the Algol W 
language (subject to the simplifications noted earlier), is achieved 
by implementation 11. 
Let a program written in Algol Wand run on implementation 11 
execute in domains d1 ,d2, ••• ,dn (n~l) and the sizes of the corresponding 
accessible sets be sl,s2, ••• ,sn' The total number of distinct domains 
in which the program executes (= total number of activation records 
placed on the stack) is n~l. Execution in a domain may take the form 
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Table 5.1 
Definition of the size of the current accessible set during execution 
of an Algol W program in each implementation of Algol W. 
Implementation 
11 
12 
Size of Accessible Set 
The sum of the allocation of each block, procedure 
or implicit subroutine on the static chain of the 
activation record on top of the stack, where the 
allocation of an activation record is composed of: 
primary 
allocation 
secondary 
allocation 
(space for declared variables of simple type 
(space for descriptors of declared arrays 
(space for value/result parameters 
(space for descriptors for formal name 
( parameters 
(space for descriptors for array 
( parameters 
(space for elements of declared 
( arrays 
space for actual name parameters not 
otherwise accessible 
space for elements of (sub)arrays passed 
as parameters and not otherwise 
accessible 
The sum of the allocation of each activation record 
on the static chain of the activation record on top 
of the stack, where the allocation of an activation 
record is composed of: 
space for the primary allocation - the 
maximum required by the procedure 
calculated by summing the primary 
allocation of each block (as defined 
in 11 above) in the procedure, taking 
account of parallel blocks. 
space for elements of declared arrays, 
i.e., all arrays currently declared 
within-rhe procedure 
space for actual name parameters not 
otherwise accessible 
space for elements of (sub) arrays 
passed as parameters and not other-
wise accessible 
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Imp 1 ementa tion 
13 
14 
15 
Table 5.1 (continued) 
Size of Accessib1e Set 
As for 12, except that the primary a11ocation is 
ca1cu1ated for each procedure on the basis that no 
account is taken of parallel b10cks within the 
procedure 
The sum of the size of the primary allocation of 
each procedure declared in the program, p1us the 
space taken by the array e1ements of a11 arrays 
currently existing on the stack. 
The sum of the a11ocation of each activation record 
on the static chain of the activation record on top 
of the stack, where the a11ocation of an activation 
record is composed of: 
space for the activation record 
space for actua1 name parameters not 
otherwise accessib1e 
space for e1ements of (~ub) arrays 
passed as parameters and not. other-
wise accessible 
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of periods of execution separated by periods when the program is 
executing in other domains. 
When the same Algol W program is executed by implementation 
I j (j = 1,2,3,4,5), let the sizes of the accessible sets corresponding 
to the domains d, ,d2 , ••• ,dn be t ,t.2, ••• ,t. Whereas domains J' J In 
d, ,d 2 , ... ,d n are all distinct in 11, the corresponding accessible 
sets in the other implementations may not be distinct. 
A first benefit measure for the implementations of Algol W 
based on the execution of an Algol W program 
n 
D
J
. = I :.i. 
1=' JI 
n 
is: 
j=1,2.~4,5 
In this measure, no weights have been applied to the domains. 
Dj can be evaluated for each implementation for a given program, 
though for 11, Dl = 1. 
A further benefit measure can be developed by weighting each 
domain by some characterisation of the time spent in the domain. The 
statistics necessary to evaluate the benefit and cost measures are 
gathered from executing Algol W programs by an interpretive technique. 
This precludes accurate measurement of time spent in a domain since 
it is impossible to exclude the time required for interpretation. 
Instead, the number of references made in each domain to source 
language variables and array elements is used. If the number of 
references made while executing in domain dj is ~ , the weighted 
benefit measure is: 
n 
r· s· [ ~
B j 
t .. i:',2,3,4,5. = j :1 J I 
n 
L rj j=' 
The factor ~ is used to weight domains because it gives some 
indication of the 'time ' spent in domain dj from the Algol W or 
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source language point of view. 
In counting references to source language variables and array 
elements while in a domain, the following are ignored: 
references to constants, since constants are stored with the 
compiled code or in immediate instructions 
references to array descriptors 
references to parameter descriptors 
references to anonymous variables (temporary results) 
references to predeclared variables of the language 
It is possible that certain domains may be entered by the 
executing program but have a reference count of zero. An implicit 
subroutine, for example, may calculate the value of an expression 
involving predeclared variables and constants. Such domains 
contribute to the measure D. , but are discounted in B.. Normally, 
J J 
such domains exist for performing specialist functions and are 
relatively infrequent. 
These measures are applicable to implementation schemes where 
arrays are implemented off the stack, as in the case of Algol on the 
Burroughs B6700 (Organick 1973), as well as the type of implementation 
being considered in this chapter, where all arrays are kept on the 
stack. 
5.2.3 Cost Measures 
The mechanisms which contribute to protection in the five 
implementations of Algol W being considered also provide other 
advantages. For instance, addressing variables by lexicographical 
level and displacement, in conjunction with a display, facilitates 
recursion. So, it is difficult to distinguish and assess precisely 
the costs attributable to protection. Nevertheless, it is possible 
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to achieve a crude quantification of the relative costs of each 
implementation with regard to protection. 
Costs are incurred both at compile-time and run-time. Compile-
time costs will depend somewhat on what is provided by the run-time 
system. For example, the provision of special hardware or an 
interpretive run-time system with domain switching instructions might 
ease the task of the compiler. A particular difference between 
implementations 12 and 13 is that the compiler for 12 must take account 
of parallel blocks within each procedure in calculating the size of 
a procedure's activation record, whereas the compiler for 13 can 
ignore parallel blocks. It is thought that any differences in 
compilation costs between the five implementations would be minor 
and completely masked by the general overhead of compilation. 
Compilation costs are therefore ignored entirely and we concentrate on 
run-time costs. 
Run-time costs fall into three categories: extra processing time, 
extra storage space and the provision of special hardware. There is 
likely to be a tradeoff between these three costs; for instance, 
the provision of extra hardware is likely to reduce the increased 
processing time and storage requirements of the protection mechanism. 
Since implementations 11, 12, 13 and 14 are being regarded as 
abstract machines, no attention is paid to the precise nature of 
how the implementations could be achieved on an extant or proposed 
computer. The tradeoffs amongst the costs are therefore not 
examined and the question of the provision of special hardware is 
ignored. Any extra storage space required will depend to a great 
extent on the machine used but it is assumed to be minimal. Costs 
are therefore calculated in terms of extra processing time. 
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First, the costs of protection in implementation 11 are examined 
under the six headings proposed in Chapter 4. The differences 
occurring in implementations 12, 13, 14, and 15 are then described 
and two cost measures proposed. 
Domain creation. 
On entry to a new domain, it is necessary to place a new 
activation record on the stack and set up the appropriate linkage 
(static and dynamic) to other activation records on the stack. 
Descriptors located in the primary allocation and representing 
parameters and arrays will be set to describe the corresponding 
objects. The secondary allocation will be obtained as array 
declarations are executed. The display will be adjusted as part 
of the domain switch to this domain. 
Domain deletion. 
A domain is deleted when the program leaves the domain and 
either terminates execution or enters a domain from which it is 
impossible to return to the domain just left. The space occupied 
by the activation record corresponding to the domain is freed for 
future use. 
Domain maintenance. 
A domain remains in existence as long as the corresponding 
activation record remains on the stack, i.e., has not been deleted. 
Apart from the activation record remaining on the stack, the only 
cost involved in maintaining a domain is to ensure that when a 
domain is left by an executing program on a temporary basis, means 
are provided for returning to execute in that domain. In the 
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majority of implementations. this is achieved by means of the pointers 
in the linkage area of each activation record. The cost of domain 
maintenance can'therefore be ignored. 
Domain switch. 
A domain switch occurs on: 
a. Block entry or exit 
b. Procedure entry or exit 
c. Implicit subroutine entry or exit 
d. Non-local GOTO 
A domain switch implies an adjustment to the display to alter the 
set of accessible activation records. Entry to or exit from a 
procedure or implicit subroutine will generally cause a more 
substantial adjustment to be made to the display than block entry 
or exit. A non-local GOTO will always be directed to a visible 
label and hence will only result in display entries being discarded. 
The display can be reset on a domain switch from information in the 
link area of the activation record corresponding to the new domain 
of execution (c.f., (Hauck and Dent 1968)). 
Domain changes. 
In implementation 11, domains correspond to blocks. The 
acquisition of space for all objects declared in a block is treated 
as being part of domain creation. There is no possibility of dynamic 
variable creation or deletion within a block once an activation record 
has been establish~d;~thusthere are no domain changes. 
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Protection checking. 
Protection is enforced by the use of address couples which 
allow little possibility for protection violation. For an address 
couple (l,d), 1 must be less than or equal to the index of the 
current highest numbered active display register and d must be 
less than or equal to the limit portion of the l-th display register. 
The amount of checking which has to be performed is therefore 
minimal. 
Implementations 12 and 13 can be considered together since 
they will have the same run-time costs. A new activation record is 
created only on entry to a procedure or implicit subroutine and 
activation records are deleted in the same manner as in 11. Domain 
switches cause similar changes to be made to the display, though they 
will normally occur less frequently than in 11 and involve fewer 
display registers. Protection checking is performed in precisely 
the same way as in 11. The real difference between 12, 13 and 11 
occurs with array declarations in a block which cause an increase 
to be made in the size of the secondary allocation in the activation 
record on top of the stack. To enable the stack to be retracted 
by the correct amount on block exit, it is usual to maintain a vector 
within the link area of the activation record of each procedure, in 
which is recorded the limit of secondary storage for each block level 
within the procedure. On block exit it is then a simple matter to 
reset the size of the secondary allocation. 
The Fortran-like implementation, 14, is very different from 
11, 12, or 13. A single activation record exists in which the Algol W 
program carries out the whole of its execution. Apart from 
establishing this activation record prior to program execution, there 
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is no creation of activation records, similarly with deletion. 
There is no protection checking of the form described above since 
absolute addresses are used, but we assume a check to ensure that 
addresses lie within the program data area. All array declarations 
cause a change to the activation record in a manner similar to that 
for 12 and 13. 
Implementation 15 is assumed to have the same costs as 11. 
Activation records are a convenient means of allocating storage 
space and this is their prime function; the cost of actually putting 
activation records on the stack is therefore ignored. Array allocation 
occurs in all implementations and involves similar actions in all cases; 
since it is part of storage allocation this cost is also ignored. 
Protection checking occurs in all implemen~tionsand we assume this 
checking is done by hardware in parallel. with memory referencing, 
so it contributes nothing to extra processing time. Protection cost 
is therefore assessed as the cost of maintaining the display. Since 
each Algol W program will incur different costs, comparing absolute 
costs is meaningless, therefore, costs are compared relative to that 
of 11 for each program. 
In the simpler approach, we assume that the cost of a domain switch 
predominates and define the cost Kj of implementation I j as being 
the number of domain switches occurring during execution of an Algol W 
program on implementation IJ divided by the number of domain switches 
which would occur if the program were executed on implementation 11. 
Each domain switch is assumed to incur unit cost in processing time. 
This provides a crude basis for comparing the costs of each 
implementation. 
The other approach is to make a detailed analysis of the cost, 
breaking the maintenance of the display down into a number, say q, 
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of primitive actions each with associated cost cj (i = 1.2,. ..• q) and 
to measure the number of times (~i .i=l .2 •...• q) each primitive is 
invoked by implementation Ij (j=1.2.3.4.5) during the execution of an 
Algol W program. The cost Lj of implementation Ij relative to that 
of 11 for the execution of a 
L. = J 
Four primitive actions 
given program is then: 
q 
Lc.n .. 
i=l 1 )1 
q i: 1,2,3,4,5 
[ c.n,' 
, 1 1 1=, 
can be identified (assuming the existence 
of a top-of-stack pointer) and are as follows: 
1. Setting up the linkage information and top-of-stack pointer 
on the creation of a new activation record. 
2. Resetting the top-of-stack pointer on the deletion of a 
domain. 
3. Altering one display register on a domain switch. (A 
domain switch will generally involve more than one display 
register.) 
4, Setting or resetting the limit extension in the current top 
display register and the top-of-stack pointer on a domain 
change. 
The cost of each primitive action is c1.c2 .c3 .c4 respectively 
and is assumed constant and to have the same value for each imple-
mentation. This second cost measure is still somewhat crude. but 
enables a better assessment of relative costs to be made than the 
first measure. 
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5.3 Method of Gathering Statistics and Evaluating Measures 
The statistics required for the evaluation of the cost and benefit 
measures concern the dynamic execution of Algol W programs rather than 
the static program text. Therefore, it is necessary to gather the 
statistics during the execution of each Algol W program. There are 
three obvious techniques by which this may be done: hardware modification 
or monitoring, interpretive execution or emulation, or compiler 
modification; all of which have attendant problems. 
For this study, hardware modification was not feasible and there 
was no hardware monitor available. 
If the Algol W system was coded as an emulator which ran on a 
microcoded computer, it would, in theory, be possible to modify the 
emulator to record the appropriate statistics during execution. This 
method has two advantages; (1) emulators are generally relatively 
easy to alter and (2) the overhead of gathering the statistics would 
be low. Thus, the total execution time of an Algol W program would 
only be increased by a small proportion. Compilers which use inter-
preters to execute the compiled program also make the collection of 
such information a straightforward inexpensive operation, since the 
time required to gather the statistics is swamped by the time taken 
to interpret. Wichmann (1970),0973) utilised the interpreter of 
Randell and Russell (1964) in this way to obtain dynamic statistics 
from A1g01-60 programs. Wortman (1972) used an interpreter which ran 
on an IBM System/360 computer to study the design of a proposed 
machine for executing SPL programs (a dialect of PL/l). 
The third technique involves modifying the compiler so that code 
;s inserted into the object program at suitable points to record the 
activities of the executing program - this method has been used by 
Brundage and Batson (1974) to obtain symbolic address traces of 
Algol-60 programs. 
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In developing a tracing and debugging system for Algol W, 
Satterthwaite (1972) wrote what amounts to a simulator of an IBM 
System/360 computer. When tracing of a program is forced by the 
programmer, execution of the program is simulated and a trace 
produced, in terms of the original source program, which includes 
details of the statements executed and any variables which are 
read or altered. Since this simulator already existed, it was 
decided to use a variation of the interpretive technique to gather 
statistics rather than attempt to make alterations to the compiler 
which would have been a major undertaking. When programs are traced 
by the Algol W run-time system, the execution time of programs 
increases by a multiplicative factor of 50 to 150. This huge 
overhead of tracing meant that. the addition of code to gather 
statistics caused little further degradation, but had the dis-
advantage that some interesting Algol W programs could not be 
analysed because their execution time under simulation was prohibitive. 
To achieve flexibility, since it was envisaged that as the 
experiment progressed further statistics might be required, the 
general types of statistics to be gathered were identified and the 
most suitable places in the simulator for collection pinpointed. 
The statistics fell into four broad classes according to the time 
at which each statistic was gathered. These times were: initial 
program entry, reference to a source language variable, domain switch 
and final program exit. Having identified the places in the simulator 
where these statistics could be gathered, a skeletal measurement system 
was written to interface with the Algol W run-time system at these 
points. To obtain further measurements or to alter the statistics 
being obtained, it was only necessary to add code to or alter code in 
the procedure bodies of the skeletal measurement system. 
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This approach, as opposed to inserting odd pieces of code in the 
run-time system itself, was found to be effective. Once the inter-
face to the run-time system had been established, little further 
change was made to the code of the run-time system. 
The Algol W system at Newcastle appends to the end of each 
code segment produced by the compiler a name table containing details 
of all variables, arrays and parameters declared within the corresponding 
block or procedure. This information is necessary for diagnostic and 
tracing purposes and allowed the size of each accessible set to be 
calculated. When a program has been loaded into memory, but prior 
to execution, the measurement system performs an analysis of the 
static structure of the program. To increase efficiency, the execution 
of the program is mirrored on another stack on which information, useful 
in the evaluation of the measures, is kept to save it having to be 
recalculated each time it is needed. 
Evaluation of the cost and benefit measures could either be done 
on a separate run using the statistics from the execution of the 
program or during the actual execution of the program. The latter 
method was adopted since it added little further overhead to the time 
of execution of programs and avoided problems of storing the 
statistics and later evaluating the measures. 
It is perhaps interesting to note that what is being obtained 
by the measurement system, though not permanently recorded, is a 
source language trace of Algol W programs. In the study of paging 
algorithms, it has been common practice to analyse detailed address 
traces of programs, but as far as the author is aware, very little 
work has been done with source language traces of programs. A recent 
example of the use of a source language trace is the work of 
Brundage and Batson (1974) in examining the advantages of using 
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associative registers on a computer like the Burroughs B5500. A source 
language trace of the execution of a program reflects the structure 
contained in the original program which it is usually impossible to 
regain from an address trace. It seems plausible to expect that the 
behaviour of programs written in Algol W or other Algol-like languages 
is much better discussed in terms of Algol level trace data, and equally 
that such data can be usefully employed for the design of high-level 
language machines. 
5.4 Evaluation of the Measures 
To evaluate the measures, some 100 A~gol W programs were gathered 
from members of the computing community at Newcastle University. The 
majority of the programs were written by undergraduates in all three 
years of the degree course in computing science, and M.Sc. and Ph.D. 
students in computing science. This set of programs is representative 
of the programs submitted to the Algol W compiler at Newcastle. 
Included in the sample were solutions to exercises set by 
lecturers, projects done by undergraduates in their third year and 
programs written as part of research. work being carried out by post-
graduate students and members of staff. The applications themselves 
were in general of a scientific nature including numerical analysis, 
simulation, combinatorial problems and sorting. The programs could 
be classified as small to medium in size and complexity, containing 
from 1 to 55 blocks and procedures. The number of statements contained 
in the programs ranged from approximately 20 to 500 and the number of 
references to source language vqriables generated during execution 
varied between 381 and 1,134,434. 
The programs themselves were gathered on an ad hoc basis rather 
than altering the compiler to save systematically all syntactically 
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correct programs on magnetic tape or disk, a method used by Wichmann 
(1970) and Wortman (1972). The majority of programs submitted to the 
Algol W compiler arise from introductory programming courses given 
within the University. These programs tend to be short, typically 
10 - 15 lines, and contain only one block and no procedures. Such 
programs do not warrant the analysis being performed here, so it 
was decided to gather programs by personal contact to obtain a 
wider variety. 
Statistics were gathered from the execution of these programs 
and used to evaluate the cost and benefit measures for each implement-
ation. All the measures could be evaluated using the single set of 
statistics. When interpreting the results presented in this section, 
it is necessary to bear in mind the environment, namely one of 
teaching and research. 
The mean and standard deviation of the benefit measures obtained 
from the analysis of the execution of the programs are shown in Table 5.2. 
The values of the benefit measures are shown to 4 decimal places 
to illustrate the small difference between certain of the measures 
(particularly 02 and 03' B2 and B3)· The benefit measures of 
implementation Il, namely 0, and B, , both have the value 1, since 
11 implements the rules of the Algol W language. In general, D2~1, 
B2~1 and for most programs 02<1,B2<1. It can be seen from Table 5.2 
that the difference between B2 and B, for the sample of programs is 
relatively small. In implementation 12, the extra accessible locations 
in the implemented accessible set occur in the primary allocation 
(i.e., eq~ivalent to simple variables) and only in certain special 
cases in the secondary allocation (i.e., array elements). For the 
majority of domains, it is to be expected that the secondary allocation 
in the accessible sets of 11 and 12 will be the same, and since 
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01 O2 03 04 05 
mean 1. 0000 0.8909 0.8905 0.8138 0.7182 
standard 
deviation a 0.2309 0.2308 0.2510 0.1891 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 
mean 1. 0000 0.9686 0.9682 0.8938 0.7927 
standard a 0.1007 0.1008 deviation O. 1545 0.1595 
Table 5.2 
Benefit measures obtained from analysis of the sample Algol W programs 
storage occupied by array elements is usually much greater than that 
occupied by simple variables (Wichmann 1973) it is not surprising 
that the values of B, and B2 are very close. 
The difference between B2 and O2 can be explained by the effect 
of the weights used with domains in the B-measure. From studying the 
program texts, it was noted that a large proportion of the programs 
in the sample used dynamic arrays typically in the form: 
A: BEGIN 
INTEGER N; 
REAO(N); 
B: BEGIN 
INTEGER ARRAY MAT(l ::N,l ::N); 
. 
END; 
END. 
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In implementation 12, the two blocks A and B would be represented by 
one activation record on the stack. When executing in block B, the 
accessible sets defined by 11 and 12 would be the same but when 
executing in block A the accessible set defined by 12 would include 
not only the variable N (which is the sole contents of the accessible 
set defined by 11) but also the array descriptor for the array MAT 
and any other variables declared in block B. So the accessible set 
for the block A in implementation 12 would be much larger than the 
theoretically accessible set. In benefit measure 02' blocks A and B 
contribute equally to the measure. However, in B2 each domain is 
weighted by the number of references to source language variables 
occurring within the domain, and since the number of references 
occurring in block B will usually be very much greater than in block 
A, the effect of the implemented accessible set for block A will have 
a much more marked effect on 02 than on B2. 
In implementation 13, since no account is taken of parallel 
blocks within procedures, activation records will, in general, be 
1 arger than those of 12 and hence D3~ D2 and B3~ B2 . Apart from the 
most trivial programs, 03<D2 and B3<B2' but one would expect the 
differences to be small. This;s borne out by the measurements made 
of the sample set of programs, since the difference between 02 and ~ 
and that between B2 and B3 is only just discernible. To some extent, 
this is probably a reflection on the fact that most programs in the 
sample were small to medium in size and not complex in nature. 
The Fortran-like implementation will have a benefit measure of 1 
only for programs with one block and no procedures. Since all space 
for the primary allocation of all blocks is allocated at program entry 
D« 0 and B!!: B. Apart from the trivial programs mentioned above, 
4 .... 3 z. ..... 3 I 
the inequality is strict in both cases. The values of 04 and B4 
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are considerably better than might have been expected, indeed 14 
outperforms 15 very noticeably (the benefit is somewhat greater and 
as will be seen the cost is far lower). The probable reason for 
this is that the total primary allocation for all blocks declared in 
a program is often small compared to the total size of arrays accessible 
at any instant during execution of a program. 
The measures Ds and B5 illustrate the effect of the link 
information area in each activation record being accessible and the 
necessity for aligning activation records and arrays on double word 
boundaries. As in the case of 14, these effects are tempered by the 
large arrays declared in most of the programs contained in the sample. 
The values of the standard deviations of the benefit measures 
for the sample of programs indicate a fair variation in the values of 
the measures for individual programs. With a sample of some 100 
programs collected from about 70 different authors, and bearing in 
mind that these are empirical measures, such a wide variation is 
almost inevitable. However, the measures do indicate the essential 
aspects of the different implementation strategies. The larger 
standard deviations in the case of the D-measures can probably be 
explained along lines similar to that used to explain the difference 
between Band D , namely the effect of domains with accessible sets 
2 2 
that differ greatly in 11 and 12. 
The first cost measure K, the number of domain switches for each 
implementation relative to the number of domain switches in implementation 
11, are shown in Table 5.3. Costs K2 and K3 are the same, as precisely 
the same actions are involved in implementations 12 and 13 at run-time. 
The cost of 15 was assumed to be the same as that of 11. K4 is very 
small because it was assumed that there were only two domain switches 
in the case of implementation 14, namely program entry and program exit. 
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Kl K2 K3 K4 Ks 
mean 1.0000 0.7968 0.7968 0.0411 1.0000 
standard 
deviation 0 0.3112 0.3112 0.1094 0 
L1 L2 ~ L4 Ls 
mean 1.0000 0.8524 0.8524 0.3389 1.0000 
standard 0 0.1742 deviation 0.1742 0.1473 0 
Table 5.3 
The mean and standard deviation of cost measures K and L. 
K2 gives an indication of the cost saving of implementation 12 over 11, 
though there was a wide variation between individual programs. 
In the evaluation of cost measure L (see Table 5.3) the costs of 
the individual primitives were each taken to be 1 (i .e., c1 =c2=c3=c4 =1) 
since each primitive essentially involved setting the contents of a 
register. The individual cj 's are implementation dependent, but in 
this chapter we are concerned with implementation schemas rather than 
the precise details of how each implementation is mechanised, and so 
we take a simple approach here. L4 has a significantly higher value 
than K4 because the execution of an array declaration involves a cost 
to the Fortran-like implementation in the L-measure. Similarly, the 
cost of accommodating array declarations in blocks, as opposed to 
procedures, tends to make the cost L2 higher than K2· 
In Figure 5.2 two cost-benefit spaces are shown; cost K against 
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benefit D and cost L against benefit B. In both spaces, it is almost 
impossible to distinguish between implementations 12 and 13. 14 
appears to give a fair amount of protection at low cost, though this 
is largely due to the effect of arrays as discussed earlier. In terms 
of run-time costs. it would appear well worthwhile using implementation 
11 to achieve the greatest possible amount of protection. 
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Cost-benefit spaces: K against D indicated by . and L against B indicated by x 
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The significant improvement possible in the protection afforded 
by the Algol W run-time system in use at Newcastle, IS, is also 
illustrated in Figure 5.2. The changes necessary to obtain this 
improvement are making the registers forming the display into base 
and limit type registers, removing the necessity for aligning arrays 
and activation records on double word boundaries (a restriction 
imposed for technical reasons on the IBM System/360 computers but 
relaxed on the 370 series) and making the link information inaccessible 
to all but the context-changing instructions. 
5.5. Extensions to the Study 
A further point in cost-benefit space could be obtained by 
examining the implementation of Algol W which allocates storage on 
the basis of a program-level rather than a block or procedure. A 
program-level is a unit of the program which does not recurse within 
itself. This implementation is a hybrid of 12 and 14, it minimises 
the number of activation records which have to be placed on the stack 
but still allows recursion. To evaluate the cost and benefit 
measures for this implementation, it is necessary to detect all 
recursive procedures within a program. The only practical way to 
do this is by altering the compiler and since all other measurements were 
carried out by the run-time system, it was decided to omit this 
implementation from the study. 
o 
An extension to the anlysis would be to recognise different 
types of operation (e.g., read and write access) and the accessible 
set available to an operation of a given type. It would be an 
advantage, for instance, to flag all descriptors contained on the 
stack as being read-only, to prevent the possibility of a program 
, to ','naccessible ' areas of the run-time stack by gain,ng access 
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altering a descriptor. In Algol W, the control variable in a FOR 
statement is defined to be read-only within the body of the FOR 
statement and this could be catered for in a similar manner. 
If a machine with a tagged architecture (e.g., Burroughs B6700) 
was being considered, operations could be classified according to 
whether they operated on integers, reals, strings etc. The type of 
operation would restrict the accessible set to be the subset of the 
implemented accessible set containing objects of the appropriate 
type. This scheme would also enable the set of allowed domain 
crossings from a given domain (i.e., possible procedure calls 
and block entries) to be included in the analysis if such domain 
crossings were represented by descriptors. 
A different direction in which an analysis such as the one 
contained in this chapter could be taken is the evaluation of 
alternative scope rules for Algol-like languages. This would be 
more in the way of a study of how extra information could be 
supplied so that the domain as defined by the language matches 
more closely the objects actually used by a program. Proposals 
such as partitions in LIS (Ichbiah et al 1973), and ways of avoiding 
the automatic accessibility of global variables by an inner block 
(Wulf and Shaw 1973) could be assessed in specially written programs. 
The inclusion of the referenced set R in the protection model 
presented in Chapter 4 and the collection of symbolic trace information 
(i.e., trace information at the source program level), as is required 
for the evaluation of the cost and benefit measures, opens up the 
possibility of studying program locality. If domains are a close 
match to a program's requirements during execution, they can be used 
to predict the information which a program will need to access during 
the time the program executes in that domain. Madison and Batson (1975) 
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have studied program locality in the case of A1gol-60 programs on 
a Burroughs B5500 and the implications for modelling program behaviour 
and memory management in virtual memory systems. 
5.6 Evaluation of the Experiment 
Having performed the empirical analysis of different Algol W 
run-time implementations, it is necessary to question the utility of 
the model and methodology as put forward in Chapter 4, and the 
usefulness of the results of the experiment. 
The applicability of the model and methodology to some, if not 
many, situations has been demonstrated by this experiment. The 
employment of the methodology has provided a quantitative comparison 
of the benefits and costs of protection in alternative implementations 
of Algol W. The results could be used, for instance, as a quantitative 
basis for part of an assessment of run-time strategies in the imple-
mentation of a language similar to Algol W. It must be noted, however, 
that the results are empirical and reflect the environment in which 
Algol W is used at Newcastle. In another situation, e.g., a 
commercial environment, programs may exhibit a significant difference 
in the way they are written and use of a sample of programs from 
such an environment might lead to some variation in the results. 
Even so, the sample of programs used in this experiment was taken from 
a wide selection of people in the computing community at Newcastle, 
which compares favourably with the study conducted by Wortman (1972) 
into the design of an SPL machine. Wortman used programs from an 
introductory programming course, so his sample was biased by repetition 
of the same or very similar programs since the programs represented 
solutions to a collection of about 10 relatively easy problems. 
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The results of this experiment are largely unsurprising but 
argue in favour of a run-time system based on storage alloca~ion 
at the block level. This study has really been concerned with 
accidental errors such as hardware induced errors. A weighting 
of important domains or significant objects within each domain 
may change these results and their applicability. If one could 
identify potential 'small' violations which if achieved made it 
possible to access all objects in the system, and gave them a heavy 
weighting, evaluation of the measures would be of use in 
penetration studies, like that carried out by Belady and Weissman 
(1974). 
Apart from the main goal of achieving a quantitative assessment 
of protection in different implementations of Algol W, the 
methodology has lead to a number of beneficial side effects. An 
obvious one is that the analysis has drawn attention to possible 
improvements to the Algol W run-time system currently in use. 
The analysis could be extended to yield a cost and benefit assessment 
of the effect of each proposed improvement. 
The results presented here are essentially global measures of 
certain program behavioural characteristics, and we have shown how they 
can be used to evaluate different implementations of Algol W from the 
protection point of view. One important question concerns the extent 
to which the sample of programs used is representative of the mix of 
real world computing problems. Clearly an increase in the size of 
the sample would be an improvement and an obvious bias is the lack of 
any really large programs. 
There is a ,drawback of this general approach to the comparison of 
protection systems which should be mentioned here, though the topic is 
covered in greater detail in Chapter 7. A domain, in each implementation 
of Algol W, has been considered as a set of accessible areas of the 
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stack. Domains have been compared on the basis of the total amount 
of the stack (in terms of storage area) to which they permit access. 
This is a simplified view of the true nature of a domain but suffices 
for performing the gross comparisons which the methodology is aimed at. 
Treating a domain as the sum of accessible areas of the stack 
totally ignores any structure which may exist within the domain and 
which may itself provide additional protection (c.f., Lampson (1974)). 
If array descriptors, for instance, are formed according to the 
specification given by I1iffe and Jodeit (1962) using codewords, then 
it is a simple matter for the hardware to perform checks that each 
subscript of an array element lies within the defined range of 
values for that subscript. The concept of a structured domain is 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6 
INTER-PROCESS PROTECTION IN A NAIVE OPERATING SYSTEM: 
A STUDY OF THE IBM SYSTEM/370 DOS/VS OPERATING SYSTEM 
To demonstrate the utility of the proposed methodology in the 
comparison of simple protection systems providing inter-process 
protection, implemented as a policy of complete isolation between 
processes, an analysis of the IBM System/370 DOS/VS operating 
system (IBM 1973),(Birch 1973) was performed. This operating 
system was selected because it enabled the methodology to be applied 
to an environment in which inter-process protection is important 
and the statistics required for the analysis were readily available.* 
In this chapter, the protection system used in DOS/VS is 
compared, by means of a cost-benefit analysis, with an alternative 
protection system which offers greater memory protection but at an 
increased cost. DOS/VS uses a fixed sized partition approach whereas 
protection in the alternative system is based on variable sized 
partitions, which can be fitted to the individual memory requirements 
of each process. Only memory protection is considered in detail, 
though later in the chapter there is some discussion of I/O devices 
and the possibility of extending the comparison to include the file 
system. 
A rider must be added to the results obtained in this chapter 
concerning the validity of the data on which the analysis is based. 
It should be emphasised that the clock used to time the programs was 
relatively coarse (timings were available to the nearest 1/300th of 
a second), though this was compensated for in part by the relatively 
*The generous assistance given by Procter & Gamble Ltd. in obtaining 
the required statistics from their computing system is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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slow speed of the processor (IBM 370/135). More significant, only 
the total execution time of processes was available, so the amount 
of time spent in supervisor state by a process had to be estimated 
from the input/output counts for the process. Definitive conclusions 
concerning DOS/VS should not be drawn from the results of the analysis, 
rather the chapter should be viewed as a further example of the 
application of the methodology. 
6.1 IBM System/370 DOS/VS Operating System 
The disk operating system (DOS/VS) for the IBM System/370 
computers is a medium scale general purpose multiprogramming operating 
system designed to provide background batch processing facilities in 
conjunction with up to four foreground processes. It is a naive 
operating system from the protection point of view. Programs are 
executed in fixed-sized memory partitions and inter-process protection 
is achieved by endeavouring to enforce complete isolation between 
user processes. The storage key protection feature prevents a 
program in one of the five partitions from writing into, reading from 
or directing an input/output operation into any of the other partitions 
or the supervisor area. 
The unit of work a user submits to the system for processing is 
called a job. A job may consist of a number of job-steps, each job-
step consists of one program which executes after the preceding job-
step is completed. All the job-steps of a job are executed sequentially 
in the same partition. The execution of a job-step constitutes a 
process and forms the basic unit of protection. 
A single virtual memory is maintained as an extension to real 
memory and its organisation is shown in Figure 6.1. 
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The combined real and virtual memory can be any size up to 224 
bytes (providing it is a multiple of 2K bytes) and is divided into 
2K byte pages. Pages in virtual memory are brought into the page 
pool in real memory on demand by conventional demand paging techniques. 
The real memory area contains a resident supervisor area and 
the page pool. Virtual memory contains a shared virtual area and 
between 1 and 5 partitions, the number being specified at the time 
of system generation. The size of each partition (a multiple of 
2K bytes) is fixed at system generation time but can be modified by 
the operator. The number of partitions cannot be altered, but the 
amount of storage allocated to a partition can be set to zero, which 
in effect reduces the number of partitions. An assumption underlying 
the design of the operating system is that such changes to partitions 
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are relatively infrequent. Resident programs that can be shared 
between jobs and that are used frequently can be stored in the 
shared virtual area of the virtual memory. 
The use of the various partitions for foreground or background 
jobs is immaterial here. A partition may be allocated space in the 
real address area. A program being executed in such a partition 
can elect to run in real mode and to have all its pages kept in 
main memory throughout its execution. Running in real mode means 
that the dynamic address translation facility is bypassed resulting 
in a significant improvement in efficiency. The use of certain 
peripherals with timing constraints, e.g., an optical character 
reader, or if a program is doing a substantial amount of input/ 
output are also reasons for executing a program in real mode. In 
particular, the spooling program (POWER) supplied with the operating 
system runs in real mode. The usual mode of execution is virtual 
mode, in which case the real area allocated to the partition is 
viewed as part of the page pool and all addresses are converted by 
the dynamic address translation facility to real addresses. 
When a program is to be executed, it is allocated to one of the 
five partitions, according to specifications contained on the job 
card. The whole partition is allocated to the program regardless 
of how much memory the program actually requires. In virtual mode 
the partition in virtual memory is allocated and in real mode the 
area of real memory assigned to the partition is allocated to the 
program. There is no restriction on a program accessing ~" of 
its allocated partition; the only constraint on a program is I'" 
all memory references generated by the executing program must remain 
within the assigned partition. The size of a partition cannot be 
changed while it contains an executing program. 
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The dynamic address translation mechanism ensures that all 
addresses used to access virtual memory fall within the size of the 
combined virtual and real memory (M, say) by means of a simple 
comparison of the page bits contained in the address with the size 
of the page table. In real mode, the hardware traps any address 
that is outside the range of the physical memory. Inter-process 
protection is achieved by means of hardware storage keys. Physical 
memory is divided into 2K byte blocks and associated with each block 
is a 4-bit storage key which can be set to a number between 0 and 15. 
These storage keys may be set and examined by appropriate privileged 
instructions. Each partition is assigned a different key between 
1 and 15. When a page, from the virtual memory area of a partition, 
is transferred to a block in main memory the storage key of that 
block is set to the key assigned to the partition. 
When a program is being executed by the processor, the program 
status word (PSW) of the executing program contains the same 4-bit 
key as that assigned to the partition in which the program is 
executing. The supervisor and programs in the shared virtual area 
execute with key zero. Before access is allowed to storage, a 
comparison is made by hardware between the key associated with the 
memory block, containing the real address issued by the program in 
the case of execution in real mode or the real address corresponding 
to the virtual address issued by the program in virtual mode, and 
the key in the PSW. The access is only allowed if the two keys are 
equal or if the PSW contains the 'master key' (key zero). 
There are two versions of the storage key protection mechanism: 
fetch/store protection, which checks both fetch and store accesses to 
memory, and store protection which only checks stores. If a protection 
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violation does occur, a protection interrupt causes control to be 
regained by the supervisor. 
The memory protection feature functions independently of the 
supervisor/problem state status of the machine and is always active. 
However, DOS/VS for simplicity identifies states of the machine with 
protection states. When the processor is in problem state executing 
a user program, the protection key in the PSW is that of the partition 
to which the program has been allocated. If the supervisor or code 
from the shared virtual area is being executed the processor is in 
supervisor state and executes with key zero. Key zero allows access 
to all memory, thus the supervisor and programs in the shared virtual 
area are 'trusted' to be well-behaved. In problem state, privileged 
instructions cannot be executed, so user programs are unable to 
change the storage keys or the protection key in the PSW. 
References to memory can also be made by channels when trans-
ferring information to or from peripheral devices. Such transfers 
are also subject to the storage key protection mechanism. Channel 
programs which contain virtual addresses are first transformed by the 
supervisor into an equivalent channel program containing real 
addresses. A channel program contains one or more channel address 
words, each specifying an area of memory to or from which information 
is to be transferred. Each channel address word also contains a 
protection key and the hardware checks that this key matches the 
key(s) of the corresponding physical memory area before the transfer 
of information commences. In the case of unequal keys (key zero 
matches all storage keys) a protection interrupt occurs. 
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6.2 An Alternative Protection System 
With DOS/VS, the sizes of the individual partitions can be 
arranged so that few, if any, programs need to use overlays, the 
method employed to overcome the constraints of small partitions in 
360 DOS (IBM 1971). With larger partitions, it is to be expected 
that the majority of programs will use less than the whole of the 
allocated partition. The alternative protection system aims to 
limit a program during execution more closely to its known actual 
memory requirements than is achieved by DOS/VS. The same virtual 
storage organisation as used by DOS/VS is assumed. 
To suit a program's memory needs, it is necessary to have 
information on its memory requirements during execution. There are 
two obvious sources for this information: 
a. an estimate provided by the user 
b. information from the loader and from requests for more space. 
An estimate provided by the user can be expected to be greater than 
that actually required by a program and ignores the fact that 
programs, in general, have dynamic memory requirements. Recognising 
this behavioural aspect of programs can result in further improvement 
to the protection afforded to a program, though almost certainly at 
an increased cost. The alternative protection system is based, there-
fore, on information supplied by the loader and on requests from the 
executing program for more memory space. 
Before execution, every user program is assumed to be loaded into 
the appropriate partition by the loader and thus the immediate memOlj 
requirements of the program can be supplied to the supervisor. If 
the program is to run in virtual mode, the supervisor can then indicate 
that any unused pages in the virtual area of the partition are not to 
be referenced, by means of an extra bit (the 'used ' bit) on each page 
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entry in the page table. A reference to such a page will cause a 
protection violation interrupt. If a program requests more memory 
space (such requests can only be for a contiguous extension of a 
multiple of 2K bytes to the memory already allocated to the program), 
the appropriate 'unused' pages can be made available by resetting 
the relevant bits in the page table. 
A program which is to run in real mode will be allocated space 
in the real memory allocation of the partition. The blocks in this 
allocation will have their storage keys set to that of the partition. 
Any unused blocks remaining in the real memory allocation of the 
partition will have their storage keys set to a key (e.g., 15) which 
indicates 'unused'. Additional memory can be allocated to the 
program by changing the storage key on the appropriate block(s) from 
'unused' to that of the partition. 
Execution then proceeds as under DOS/VS except that attempted 
memory accesses by the program in problem state to the unused space 
are treated as protection violations. A new state, the SVC state, 
is introduced to allow the supervisor to perform functions on behalf 
of a user program, but be restricted by the protection system to 
the supervisor area and the program area, in the case of real mode, 
and the supervisor area, the shared virtual area and the allocated 
program area in virtual mode. The third state, supervisor state, is 
reserved for the supervisor when it performs functions on behalf of 
the system, e.g., scheduling programs to be executed. In this state, 
the whole machine is accessible and the storage keys can be altered. 
A possible mechanism to implement the alternative protection system 
is as follows. In problem state, the protection key of the partition, 
in which the currently executing job-step resides, is stored in the 
active program status word (PSW) and access is only permitted to blocks 
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of memory having the same key. On a switch to SVC-state, the protection 
key of the partition is still kept in the PSW, but access is now 
allowed to blocks with the same key or with key zero. By setting the 
storage keys of blocks containing supervisor code or shared virtual 
code to zero, access is restricted to the relevant portions of memory. 
In supervisor state, the master key (key 0) is stored in the PSW 
and access is allowed to the whole of memory. 
6.3 A Cost-Benefit Analysis of DOS/VS and the Alternative Protection 
System 
The first stage in performing a cost-benefit analysis is to 
identify the domains in which each process may execute and derive 
benefit measures for each of the protection systems. Cost measures 
must also be deduced for each protection system being considered. 
Then, given, in this case, a set of statistics of programs which 
have been run under DOS/VS, the measures can be evaluated and a 
comparison of the protection systems carried out. 
6.3.1 Identification of Domains 
In DOS/VS, two domains can be identified for each process: the 
problem state domain and the supervisor state domain. The problem 
state domain essentially consists of the partition allocated to the 
job-step and the machine instructions apart from the privileged 
instructions. In the supervisor state domain, the whole memory is 
accessible (either real or real + virtual depending on the mode) and 
all instructions can be executed. 
A uS,er process will normally execute in the problem state domain. 
From time to time, the process will need the services of the supervisor; 
usually requests for the initiation of input/output. Such requests 
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(SVC1s) are accompanied by a switch from the problem state domain 
to the supervisor state domain. Programs residing in the shared 
virtual area and the supervisor process, which performs scheduling 
functions, resource allocation, etc., always execute in supervisor 
state. 
Under the alternative protection system, the domains in which 
user processes execute are very similar to those implemented by 
DOS/VS. The problem state domain corresponds to the problem state 
domain in DOS/VS, except that a process is restricted to the 
portion of the partition which it actually requires. Supervisor 
state domain in DOS/VS corresponds to the SVC state domain in the 
alternative protection system. Under the alternative protection 
system, only the supervisor process executes in the supervisor state 
domain. 
The cost-benefit analysis of the two protection systems is 
performed on the basis of the amount of accessible memory in each 
domain, so other aspects such as available instruction sets, domain 
switches, etc., in each domain are ignored. 
6.3.2 Benefit and Cost Measures 
In the development of these measures we assume that fetch and 
store protection is in operation, i.e., all accesses to memory are 
checked by the protection system, and concentrate solely on memory 
protection. Access to memory by input/output devices via channels 
is ignored for the moment and it is assumed that there is no inter-
partition communication. 
Figure 6.1 showed the organisation of memory under both protection 
systems. Let the following quantities be represented as follows: 
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size of the resident supervisor area 
size of the shared virtual area 
size of physical memory 
size of real + virtual memory 
s bytes 
h bytes 
R bytes 
M bytes 
M,R,s and h will all be integral multiples of 2K bytes (the page 
size), so the supervisor and the shared virtual area may be allocated 
memory areas slightly larger than they strictly require. The 
possibility of making a correction for this is discussed later. 
Let all job-steps executed on the processor over a given test 
period be indexed by the positive integers, and the total number of 
job-steps be N. Job-step j(l~j~N) during its execution will occupy 
a certain amount of the partition (either in real or virtual memory 
depending on the mode) to which it is allocated, say q. bytes. If the 
J 
job-step has dynamic storage requirements, q. is the maximum memory 
J 
requirement of the job-step within the partition. In general, ~ will 
J 
only be known after the job-step has been executed. 
Since storage is allocated in 2K byte blocks, the minimum storage 
that can be allocated to job-step j 
2048 
= r. p. 
..L..L 
O<r~ 1 
J 
where p = size of the real or virtual allocation of the partition in 
J 
which job-step j executes. Hence, r. , the portion of the partition used 
J 
by job-step j, can be determined. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
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page bounda ri e s ::::------+1------1 
maximum memory 
requirement of job-step j in 
the partition 
Figure 6.2 
Job-step j executing in a partition 
In the problem state domain of job-step j: 
real mode 
amount of memory accessible under the r. P. 
alternative protection system J J 
amount of memory accessible under p. 
DOS/VS J 
;- In the SVC-state domain or supervisor 
state domain: 
amount of memory accessible under the s+r. p. 
alternative protection system J J 
amount of memory accessible under R 
DOS/VS 
partition allocation 
(in real or virtual 
memory) 
= Pj bytes 
virtual mode 
r. p. 
J J 
p. 
J 
s+h+r. p. 
J J 
M 
The amount of accessible memory under the alternative protection 
system in the problem state domain and SVC-state domain represents 
that amount of memory to which access is required, taking account of 
all known information about the job-steps. In a sense, this is a 
tighter upper bound on the memory requirements of job-steps than 
that used by DOS/VS, which could only be improved upon if further 
information about a process's intentions had been provided. From the 
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point of view of the model developed in Chapter 4, the alternative 
protection system represents the 'ideal ' system, making use of all 
available knowledge.· The amounts of accessible memory for the 
alternative protection system represent the sets to which access is 
required, i.e., the theoretically accessible set, in the model IS 
terms. 
If we ignore the supervisor process, the benefit measure under 
the above assumptions for DOS/VS is: 
N 
~ L (benefit measure for job-step j). 
j=l 
We choose to weight each domain by the time spent by a process in 
that domain, using time as a measure of the number of references 
made within a domain. So the benefit measure for job-step j 
= 
total execution time of job-step j 
~ ( amount of memory to which access ;s required in domain d 
~ amount of accessible memory in domain d 
domains d 
Hence for N job-steps the benefit measure 
time spent in domain d) 
for DOS/VS 
N 
( \"' (~ tjp+ ~j tjs) ) . ; L (t. +t. ) j=l JP JS 
= (B 1 ) 
where rtj = s+r p. for job-steps running in real mode J J 
R 
s+h+r. p. for job-steps running in virtual mode 
J J 
M 
123 
~p = problem state time for job-step j 
~s = supervisor state time for job-step j 
In this measure, we are assuming that the time spent in a domain is 
a good indicator of the number of memory references made in a domain. 
This is a reasonable assumption for the sample set of job-steps used 
in this analysis since all the job-steps used a wide mix of the 
machine instructions and the execution time is of the order of 
seconds for almost all the job-steps. 
When a 370 computer runs in virtual mode, the effective 
instruction rate is lower than that obtained in real mode due to the 
overhead of dynamic address translation. In the benefit measure, 
only the proportions of times spent in problem state and supervisor 
state are significant and so it is unnecessary to make a correction 
for job-steps running in virtual mode. 
The corresponding benefit measure for the alternative protection 
system is 1, since in problem state domain and in SVC-state domain 
the amount of accessible memory is precisely that which is required 
to be accessible. 
The above derivation of the benefit measure Bl was based on the 
maximum memory requirement of a job-step within a partition, namely 
q.. The alternative protection system in fact allows job-steps to 
J 
have dynamic memory requirements, more memory can be requested though 
not later released. Therefore, the memory requirements of a job-step 
can be represented by a monotonic increasing function of time, q.(t), 
J 
though its value only changes a finite number of times and by a 
discrete amount each time. 
If changes to the memory requirements of job-step j occur at 
times t. ,to , .• o,t. 1 (where any convenient measure is used for 'time ' , 
JO )1 '. )e+ 
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e.g., processor time), and tjorepresents the start of program 
execution and t. the end, and the corresponding memory requirements 
Je+l 
are q. ,q. , ... ,q, (measured after the memory change has taken place), )0 11 Je --
then the benefit measure is 
Nee 
( [(([ u. ,)+( [~.t,,)). e 1 ).2.. (B11) j= 1 i=O)1 lPI i=O jl JSI \'( N 
L.. t. .+t· .) 
where r .. = 
)1 
It .. = 
JI 
r 2:~sl 
s+r.. p. 
JI J 
R 
s+h+r.. Po )1 j 
M 
, 0 )PI JSI )= 
2048 
foY' job-steps running in real mode 
for job-steps running in virtual mode 
and t .. and t. are respectively the problem state and supervisor state jPI JSI 
times of execution between tji and tji+1 . 
If the benefit measures Bl and Bl' are compared: 
e Lt.. = t. 
. )PI JP 1:0 
e Lt .. =t. 
. JSI JS 1=0 
r..~ r. J 1 ) i=Oj',. ",e 
hence B11~ Bl. Thus Bl is an upper bound for the protection afforded 
by DOS/VS. 
Statistics at the level of detail necessary to calculate Bl' were 
not available, so this measure has not been evaluated. Instead, the 
measure Bl has been used since it represents an upper bound for Bli. 
In the case of the 370/135 system being considered, few of the job-steps 
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had dynamic memory requirements and thus Bl provides a good estimate 
for the measure Bl'. 
To complete the comparison, it is also necessary to compare the 
relative costs of the two protection systems. We consider first the 
DOS/VS scheme for utilising storage keys under the headings suggested 
in Chapter 4. 
There are three types of cost: hardware, storage space and 
processing time. The provision of the hardware to maintain the 
storage keys associated with each block and to check the protection 
key in the PSW (or channel address word in the case of I/O transfers) 
against the appropriate storage key on every memory reference will 
result in a significant once only cost. Since the protection checking 
is performed by hardware, software is only required to maintain the 
storage keys on the blocks of main memory. The space taken up by 
this extra code and any associated tables will be relatively small 
and is ignored in this analysis. Of more significance is likely to 
be the processing time required to maintain the protection system, 
but in the case of DOS/VS this is largely dwarfed by the paging over-
head. 
Domain creation 
The partitions, the shared virtual area and the supervisor area 
are established at system initialisation time. (In the case of the 
actual system being considered this was performed twice a day every 
day; once in the morning to establish the configuration for day-time 
use and once in the evening when the remote job entry lines were 
disconnected.) The significant actions are setting up the areas of 
real memory and creating the page table. This cost is relatively 
insignificant compared to the total cost of initialisation. When a 
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program is loaded into a partition prior to execution, either the 
appropriate part of the page table will have to be set up for 
execution in virtual mode or storage keys set on blocks in main 
memory for execution in real mode. Such costs are small compared 
to the loading overhead. 
Domain deletion 
When a process terminates execution, it is only necessary to 
reset the relevant entries in the page table and to change the 
storage keys on any pages which belonged to the process and were 
mapped into real memory, thus preventing another process executing 
in the same partition from inadvertently accessing those pages. 
Domain maintenance 
In real mode, the memory area allocated to a user process 
resides in the physical memory and no maintenance is necessary. 
In virtual mode, when a page is brought into real memory it is 
necessary to set the storage key on the block into which the page 
is loaded. The few instructions necessary to do this make little 
impact on the normal paging overhead. 
Domain switches 
User processes can switch between problem state domain and 
supervisor state domain by issuing a supervisor call (SVC). The 
appropriate changes to the protection key in the PSW take place 
automatically as part of the SVC instruction, so the cost of such 
a domain switch is minimal. The same is true of a domain switch 
from supervisor state domain to the problem state domain. 
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Domain changes 
Changes to partition sizes do not occur during execution of a 
job-step, so under DOS/VS no domain changes take place. In the 
actual system under consideration, the partition sizes were only 
changed when the system was reinitialised. 
Protection checking 
The actual protection checking on references to memory by 
the processor and channels is carried out by hardware and thus 
incurs the one-time hardware cost. 
It would be exceedingly difficult to deduce the actual total 
absolute cost of the DOS/VS protection system. However, since two 
protection systems are being compared which use essentially the 
same hardware mechanism, it is more convenient, for the purposes 
of comparison, to consider the extra cost of the alternative 
protection system over that of DOS/VS rather than the absolute 
cost of each system. It is only necessary, therefore, to identify 
the differences between the two systems and quantify the increased 
cost. 
As with DOS/VS, there will be a once only hardware cost for 
the provision of the storage key mechanism for the alternative 
protection system. The mechanism is largely the same in both 
cases, though the alternative scheme requires hardware support for 
the SVC state. It is likely that the increased cost would be small. 
Domain creation 
The initial setting up of. the system will be little different 
from the initialisation of DOS/VS except that the keys on the super-
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visor area memory blocks are set to zero. On loading a program to 
be executed, the portion of the partition not required by the job-step 
is flagged as 'unused ' . In virtual mode, use is made of an extra bit 
on every entry in the page table to indicate whether each page in a 
partition is 'used ' or 'unused ' , 
Domain deletion 
As with DOS/VS, when a process terminates execution the storage 
keys on any blocks containing pages which belonged to the process 
should be set to 'unused ' , If the process executed in virtual mode, 
the relevant page entries in the page table should be reset. 
Domain maintenance 
The maintenance of domains under the alternative protection 
system is very similar to that performed by DOS/VS except that when 
a page from the shared virtual area is loaded into real memory, the 
storage key on the memory block into which the page is loaded must 
be set to zero, 
Domain switches 
The number of switches between domains is the same as occurs 
under DOS/VS except for the switches caused by requests for more 
memory space. 
Domain changes 
Under the alternative protection system the portion of a partition 
allocated to a process can be increased if a request is made by the 
process. The servicing of such requests will involve a switch into 
the supervisor state domain to enable the allocation of more space 
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in either real memory, by changing 'unused' storage keys to 'used', 
or virtual memory, by setting the appropriate bits in the page table. 
It is assumed that requests for' more memory occur very infrequently 
relative to the number of instructions executed between such requests. 
Protection checking 
From the point of view of protection checking, problem state and 
supervisor state are the same as in DOS/VS. The introduction of the 
SVC state will involve some modification to the checking algorithm. 
The provision of a state indicator in the processor to represent SVC 
state and the necessary alterations to the checking algorithm are 
likely to add a small incremental amount to the once only hardware 
cost. 
To summarise the increased cost of the alternative system, there 
is a small additional hardware cost, a small extra storage cost, 
resulting from the new bit on every page table entry and the code to 
support the new features of the alternative protection system, and 
increased processing time. The extra hardware and storage space 
costs are ignored, hence cost in this analysis is equated to extra 
processor time required by the alternative protection system. 
The extra processor time is made up of repetitions of the 
following primitive actions: 
1. domain creation in real mode 
setting the storage key on a used memory block 
2. domain deletion in real mode -
setting the storage key on a previously used memory block to 'unused' 
3. domain creation in virtual mode -
settlng the' 'used' I bi t in the page table entry of a used 
virtual page 
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4. domain deletion in virtual mode -
resetting the 'used ' bit in the page table entry of a previously 
used virtual page 
5. protection checking in virtual mode -
on a page fault, checking that the 'used ' bit in the page table 
entry for the required page is set 
6. domain change in real mode -
setting the storage key on a memory block to 'used ' 
7. domain change in virtual mode -
setting the 'used ' bit in the page table entry of the allocated 
page 
8. servicing of request for more memory. 
If the processing time for each of these primitive actions is 
c, ,c2"" ,ca respectively, then an estimate for the extra time 
necessary to complete the sample of job-steps is 
8 Lc.n. (Cl) 
. 1 1 
1=1 
where n1 ,n2 , .•. ,na are the total number of times each respective 
primitive action is invoked during execution of the job-steps. 
This measure for the extra cost is only an estimate because in many 
cases storage keys will not need to be changed and thus there are 
opportunities for optimising the actions of the alternative 
protection system. 
6.3.3 Evaluation of the Measures 
The system from which statistics were obtained to compare DOS/VS 
and the alternative protection system was an IBM 370/135 with 192K 
bytes of main memory and associated peripherals. Figure 6.3 shows 
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the essential details of the configuration. 
IBM 370/135 
CPU 
192K bytes main 
memory 
1403 
printer 
3215 
console 
, 
3330 disks 
} three remote job entry lines 
2501 card reader 
1442 ca rd punch 
1287 optical character reader 
Figure 6.3 
IBM 370/135 configuration 
The system is run for two 8 hour shifts on each weekday, using 
DOS/VS release 30 as the operating system. Three partitions are 
maintained: one background (BG) and two foreground partitions (Fl and 
F2). The POWER spooling system (supplied by IBM with DOS/VS) always 
occupies the Fl partition. The background partition is used for batch 
production work and the remaining foreground partition, F2, for testing 
and system development during the day shift and for batch work during 
the night shift. During the night shift, the remote job entry lines 
are not supported. 
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The size of the Fl partition is changed at the start of each 
shift by re-initialising the system, though the number of partitions 
remains fixed. The organisation of real and virtual memory during 
both shifts is shown in Figure 6.4. 
464K 
192K 
o 
shared virtual area 
64K 
Fl virtual allocation 
64K 
F2 virtual allocation 
12K 
BG virtual allocation 
12K 
Page pool 20K (48K) 
Fl rea 1 a 11 oca ti on 
60K (32K) 
F2 real allocation 
36K 
BG real allocation 
36K 
Supervisor area 
40K (44K) 
Figure 6.4 
virtual memory 
real (i.e., physical) 
memory 
Organisation of real and virtual memory during the day-time shift 
(Where the size of an area changes for the night-time shift, the night-
time value is shown in brackets.) 
Space in real memory is allocated to each of the three partitions. 
In the case of the Fl partition this is always occupied by the POWER 
program since it runs in real mode. 
DOS/VS requires that every partition be allocated a minimum 64K 
bytes of virtual memory even though it may never be used. So the Fl 
partition has a 64K virtual memory allocation even thou'gh it remains 
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unused. For similar reasons, the shared virtual area occupies 64K 
of virtual memory, when in fact only about 10K is actually used by 
the system under consideration. 
Statistics were gathered on every job-step executed on the 
system in the space of one week. DOS/VS provides a facility whereby 
job-step statistics recorded by the operating system during the 
execution of the job-step are available to a user-supplied accounting 
routine at the termination of each job-step. These statistics were 
simply written to a disk-file during the two shifts each day, and 
at the start of the next day the file was dumped to cards for later 
analysis. 
The numbers of job-steps run each day (i.e., the cumulative 
totals for both shifts) in each partition, broken down by mode of 
execution, are detailed in Table 6.1. 
The majority of job-steps (92 - 94%) ran in virtual mode in 
partitions &G and F2. In assessing the results of evaluating the 
measures, therefore, greater emphasis will be placed on the BG and 
F2 virtual mode job-steps, rather than the job-steps run in real mode. 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
BG - real 18 8 7 6 5 
BG - virtual 220 257 215 270 256 
Fl - real 2 2 2 2 2 
Fl - virtual 0 0 0 0 0 
F2 - real 22 38 35 29 37 
F2 - virtual 342 431 348 311 321 
Total no. of 604 736 607 618 621 job-steps 
Table 6.1 
Numbers of job-steps run each day in each partition, broken down by 
mode of execution 
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The relevant statistics gathered on each job-step included: 
identification of job-step 
date and time of start of execution 
partition in which job-step was executed 
mode of execution (real or virtual) 
execution time of job-step 
address of block or page containing the largest 
address referenced by the job-step in problem 
state 
input/output counts for each peripheral device. 
Only the total execution time of each job-step was recorded by DOS/VS, 
separate values for the times spent in supervisor state and problem 
state, as required for the evaluation of the benefit measure Bl were 
not available. In theory, it would be possible to obtain the 
separate problem state time and supervisor state time for each job-
step, either by making alterations to the operating system or by 
use of a hardware monitor. In practice, there was no possibility of 
being able to make (the quite significant) changes to the operating 
system or to use a hardware monitor, since the system operated in 
a commercial environment. However, by making the assumption that 
almost all supervisor state time of a job-step is attributable to 
requests for input/output, it was possible to make an estimate for 
the supervisor state time of each job-step based on the I/O counts 
of the job step, since these were available. The precise details of 
how this was done are described in the Appendix. 
This situation has the advantage that it illustrates the use of 
the methodology in a context where one is working with partial 
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information, not untypical of the real world, and is representative of 
a design situation where one is using statistics from an existing 
system to predict the performance of a system which is partially 
designed and certainly not implemented. If, in fact, an existing 
system was being studied with a view to making improvements, 
e.g., IBM/370 with DOS/VS, the cost of acquiring the supervisor 
state time for each job-step could undoubtedly be justified. 
The job-steps in the sample fall into two broad categories: 
production runs of compiled programs and the compilation and testing 
of new programs. The majority of programs are written in COBOL or 
PL/l, with some assembler and other languages. The work performed by 
the installation is typical of medium sized commercial systems, 
namely file maintenance, stock control and payroll etc. Many~of 
the production runs are done on a specific day each week, thus it 
was felt that by taking one week's work done on the system, a 
reasonable sample of all programs run on the system would be obtained. 
In total, statistics were obtained on 3186 job-steps. 
The first measure to be evaluated was the benefit measure Bl. 
The values obtained for the various partitions and modes of execution 
are given in Table 6.2. 
The most significant values of the measure occur in the cases of 
BG-virtual and F2-virtual, on average 0.58 and 0.49 respectively, 
since the majority of job-steps are executed in these partitions in 
virtual mode. The difference in these two values probably arises 
because of the different nature of the job-steps run in the two 
partitions. The BG partition is used for batch production work 
and so the job-steps executed there consist primarily of compiled and 
link-edited object modules. F2 is used for compilations and test runs. 
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Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Average 
BG - real .35 .61 .27 .38 .38 .40 
BG - virtual .57 .57 .57 .57 .61 .58 
BG - real + .55 .57 .56 .57 .61 .57 
virtual 
F1 - real .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 
F2 - real .32 .32 .33 .33 .34 .33 
F2 - virtual .49 .49 .49 .50 .49 .49 
F2 - real + .48 .48 .48 .48 .47 .48 
virtual 
BG + F2 .51 .51 .51 .52 .53 .52 
BG + F1 + F2 .51 .51 .51 .52 .53 .52 
Table 6.2 
Evaluation of benefit measure Bl by partition and mode of execution 
From Table 6.2, it is evident that apart from BG-rea1, there is 
very close agreement for the value of the measure for each partition 
and mode of execution on each day of the week. The large fluctuations 
occurring in the case of BG-real can be accounted for by the very few 
job-steps executed each day in that partition and mode (18,8,7,6,5 
job-steps on each day of the week respectively). The very large value 
of the measure occurring in the case of the Fl partition is due to the 
fact that it is only used in real mode by two job-steps each day, and 
the real memory allocation of Fl is fitted to the requirements of 
these job-steps. 
The contribution to the benefit measure by individual job-steps 
varied widely as was to be expected since a large number of programs 
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were run each day all with greatly varying memory requirements. 
However, the very small variation in the values of the benefit 
measure for each day of the week shows that the value of the 
benefit measure averaged over a large number of job-steps is 
significant. 
Assume that a typical job-step requires 40K bytes of the 
virtual memory allocation of BG or F2 for its execution and that 
the ratio of problem state time to supervisor state time is 10:1. 
For this single job-step, Bl evaluates to .53. Consider now the 
improvement that is gained in the benefit measure by restricting 
the job-step to 40K bytes in the problem state domain, rather than 
the 72K bytes of the virtual memory allocation to BG or F2, as 
happens under DOS/VS. The value of Bl with a 40K byte allocation 
is 0.94. Thus a dramatic improvement in protection can be obtained 
by improving the protection afforded to the job-step in the problem 
state domain. This arises because programs spend relatively little 
time in supervisor state. (The ratio 10:1 of problem state time 
to supervisor state time is typical of the sample set of job-steps.) 
Though the time spent in the supervisor state domain is small, 
the effect of an undetected error could be devastating since the 
programs executing in the other partitions, or indeed the supervisor 
itself, could be corrupted. In the problem state domain under DOS/VS, 
a process can write into the unused portion of the partition in which 
the process executes. A process which does this is in error, but has 
no' direct effect on other processes, and thus this can be viewed as not 
so serious. Therefore, it may be desirable to apply weights to the 
various domains involved in the measure Bl, to reflect to some extent 
the relative consequences of an undetected error occurring in each 
of the domains. 
The average value of the measure Bl, namely .52, demonstrates 
that the typical job-step has access to approximately twice as 
much memory as it requires to perform its function. The alternative 
protection system therefore represents a significant improvement 
in protection over that afforded by DOS/VS. 
The extra cost of the alternative protection system in terms 
of increased processor time can be obtained by evaluating the 
measure Cl derived .in Section 6.3.2. The number of times each 
primitive is invoked is as follows (n. is the number of times 
I 
primitive i is invoked): 
total number of memory blocks used by job-steps executed 
in real mode 
total number of pages used by job-steps executed in virtual 
mode 
ns total number of page faults (which is proportional to the 
total execution time of all job-steps executed in virtual 
mode) 
n6 total number of memory blocks allocated to job-steps 
executing in real mode as a result of requests for extra 
storage 
n7 total number of pages allocated to job-steps executing in 
virtual mode as a result of requests for extra storage 
total number of requests for extra storage issued by all 
job-steps 
The totals n1 ,n2,n3 and n4 were calculated for the sample set 
of job-steps. For n
s
' the total execution time of all job-steps 
executed in virtual mode was calculated and multiplying this by the 
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average page fault rate ~ will yield nS' These results are given in 
Table 6.3 for one day (Tuesday). Similar results were obtained for 
the other days of the week. Since statistics were not gathered on 
requests for extra storage, n6 ,n7 and na were not determined. 
partiti on 
BG 
Fl 
F2 
96 
46 
230 
Table 6.3 
5405 
o 
7692 
Statistics from Tuesday's data 
3l68325(), 
o 
257247~ 
(The units of time used in determining ns are 1/300th of a second) 
It would be possible to determine the costs c, ,c 2"" ,ca of one 
invocation of each primitive by coding each primitive and calculating 
the execution times of the primitives from the individual instruction 
execution times. If statistics were available on requests for more 
memory, it would then be possible to evaluate the measure Cl. This 
has not been done because it is evident that the execution time of 
each primitive is very small, and the number of times each primitive 
is invoked is such that the total increase in execution time under 
the alternative protection system is likely to be almost insignificant 
compared to the total execution time of the sample set of job-steps. 
The alternative protection system is seen therefore to offer 
greatly improved protection at little extra cost. 
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6.3.4 Evaluation of Other Benefit Measures 
Measure Bl was derived on the assumption that all references to 
memory (both reads and writes) are checked by the protection system. 
It is instructive to derive a form of the benefit measure in the case 
where only writes to memory are checked. If we assume that the 
ratio of writes to all references is a constant w for all job-steps, 
this benefit measure, B2, is: 
where 
N 
( L ((wr. +(l-w)~. )t. +~.t. ) . j=l J J JP J JS ---(t. +t ) JP JS 
cc.. = s+r. p. ~. = r. p. for job-steps J J 1 J ...L...l. mode 
R R 
s+h+r. p. r. p. for job-steps 1 J _J_J mode 
M M 
(B2) 
running in real 
running in virtual 
Essentially, each job-step executes in four domains: two problem 
state domains, one for reads and one for writes, and two supervisor 
state domains. As the whole of memory (real or virtual depending on 
mode of execution) is accessible in supervisor state, the two 
supervisor state domains are identical regardless of the type of 
access to memory. 
The quantitative improvement in protection benefit afforded by 
read protection can be directly related to a financial cost, namely 
the extra cost of having the computer supplied with read protection. 
To evaluate B2, it is necessary to have a value for the constant w. 
w is assumed constant since almost all the sample job-steps have an 
execution time of the order of seconds and thus involve the execution 
of many 100,000'5 of instructions and include a wide mix of the 
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available instructions. Studies of Algol programs (Wichmann 1970), 
(Wyeth 1973) have shown that for references to operands the proportion 
of writes to all references is approximately .23. Burnell and Coffman 
(1975) quote a figure of 80% for the percentage of instructions 
requiring an operand (data) reference to memory. From these figures, 
it is possible to deduce that the proportion of writes to all 
references lies in the range .1 to .2. The measure B2 was evaluated 
for w = .15 for each day of the week in which statistics were gathered. 
Table 6.4 gives the values of the measure 82 (w = .15) obtained 
for each partition and mode of execution. In the case of BG-virtual, 
on average B2 is .18 compared with the corresponding average value 
of Bl, .58. A similar difference in values occurs with F2-virtual, 
namely .15 and .49. This large difference in the values of the two 
measures is to be expected, since in the case of 82, only 15% of 
memory references are being checked for possible protection violations. 
Thus, a very significant improvement in protection can be obtained 
by the implementation of read protection as well as write protection. 
From the point of view of the partitions, other than the one 
containing the currently executing job-step, the supervisor and the 
shared virtual area, a write protection violation is probably much 
more serious than a read violation. A write violation will almost 
certainly cause the eventual failure of the program whose code or 
data has been overwritten, whereas a read violation will at worst 
lead to a breach of confidentiality, though this itself may be very 
damaging in certain circumstances. To the executing job-step, a 
read violation and a write violation are equally serious, since they 
indicate that the program is in error. 
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Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Average 
BG-real .15(.35) .23(.61) . 14 (.27) · 16 ( .38) · 17 ( .38 ) · 17 (.40) 
BG-virtual .18(.57) .18(.57) .18(.57) .18(.57) .19(.61) .18(.58) 
BG-real + .18(.55) .18(.57) .18(.56) .18(.57) .19(.61) .18(.57) 
virtual 
Fl-rea 1 .37(.94) .37 (.94) .37 (.94) .37(.94) .37(.94) .37(.94) 
F2-real . 15 (.32) .14(.32) .15(.33) .14(.33) · 15 ( . 34) .15(.33) 
F2-virtual .15(.49) . 16 (.49) .15(.49) .16 (.50) .15(.49) .15(.49) 
F2-real + 
virtual 
. 15 ( .48) .15 (.48) . 15( .48) · 16( .48) .15(.47) · 15 ( .48) 
BG+F2 .16(.51) .16(.51) .16(.51) .17(.52) · 17 ( .53) · 16 ( . 52) 
BG+Fl+F2 .16(.51) .16(.51) .16(.51) · 17 ( .52) .17(.53) · 16 ( . 52) 
Table 6.4 
Evaluation of benefit measure B2 by partition and mode of execution 
(w=.15) Corresponding values of Bl are given in brackets 
I 
If the computer system is operated in a situation where 
confidentiality of information is not an overriding consideration, so 
that write errors are the main source of concern with respect to 
inter-process protection, it may be appropriate to give greater weight 
to the domains for writes than those for reads in the measure B2. 
It might be assumed that if reads are not checked, a read violation 
will eventually lead to a write violation or some other error which 
will be detected by the hardware. This is probably largely true, but 
the point of detection of the error is then that much further from its 
source than would have been the case if read protection had been 
employed. 
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It is necessary therefore to consider the environment of the 
computer system and then to derive an appropriate form for the measure 
B2 which reflects the functional requirements of the protection system. 
The evaluation of B2 and knowledge of the cost of installation of read 
protection would then provide a quantitative basis on which to make a 
decision. 
It is possible to extend the analysis of the protection benefit to 
include input/output operations carried out on behalf of a user job-
step by the channels. The channel address word (CAW) in a channel 
program contains the (real) address of the start of the physical 
memory area from which or into which data is to be transmitted by the 
channel. The CAW also contains the protection key of the partition 
in which the job-step resides, and, during the transmission of data, 
the hardware protection system checks that the key in the CAW matches 
the storage key(s) of the memory block(s) which are accessed. When 
transfers are done on behalf of the supervisor, the CAW contains the 
master key zero, so no checking is performed. Input/output transfers 
done on behalf of user job-steps are thus 'executed ' in the problem 
state domain. If the total duration time of input/output transfers 
for each job-step is available, the measures Bl and B2 can be adjusted 
to include input/output operations by increasing the time spent in 
the problem state domain by this amount. For 82, the time of input/ 
output transfers will have to be split into input transfer time and 
output transfer time. 
Yet another possible application of this analysis would be to 
compare the protection achieved by DOS/VS and the alternative protection 
system with the protection which could, in theory at least, be 
attained if job-steps could be restricted to the maximum amount of 
storage they require rather than having to round up all memory 
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requirements to a whole number of pages or blocks. This analysis 
would essentially be examining the effect of internal fragmentation 
(Randell 1969) which is a consequence of memory being allocated in 
units of 2K bytes. 
Using the notation of Section 6.3.2, job-step j actually requires 
a maximum qj bytes. Let the actual supervisor requirement be Sl bytes 
and that of the shared virtual area be hi bytes. Assuming that both 
reads and writes are checked by all protection systems and ignoring 
access to memory by input/output devices, the benefit measure for 
DOS/VS is: 
N ( I C~jP + ~ t ). t. )). 1 (B3) J JS (t. + N 
j= 1 J JP JS 
and the corresponding measure for the alternative protection syslt'I" 
N (I( q. t. t t. ). J Jp + J JS r. p. 
j=1 J J 
, I 
where ~. = s I+q. ¥j J J 
R 
s '+h I+q. 
J 
M 
1 
t
js
) ). (t jp + 
= Sl+q. 
__ J 
s+r. p. 
J J 
s'+h'+q. J 
s+h+r. P. 
J J 
(B4) 
N 
for job-steps running in 
real mode 
for job-steps running in 
virtual mode 
The utility of these measures would be that by evaluating the 
measures and comparing B3 and B4 with Bl and 1 respectively, they 
would show the effect of internal fragmentation. The exact maximum 
memory requirement of each job-step was not recorded by DOSjVS and 
so these measures could not be evaluated. Internal fragmentation is 
a function of the page size, and so B3 and B4 would be expected to 
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vary if the page size was altered. 
A further productive application of the benefit measure Bl is to 
use the measure as a figure of merit to assess the effect of proposed 
minor changes to a system from the point of view of protection. The 
first such change considered was that of making use of the knowledge 
that only 10K bytes of the shared virtual area are actually used. To 
investigate the relaxation of the DOS/VS constraint that the minimum 
allocatable area in virtual memory is 64K, the benefit measure Bl was 
evaluated for two memory organisations. The first in which the 
shared virtual area was 10K bytes and the total memory size (real + 
virtual) was 464K bytes, and the second in which the total memory 
size was 410K bytes, representing a reduction in the size of the 
shared virtual area from 64K to 10K bytes. Table 6.5 shows the 
results of evaluating Bl for these two memory organisations. 
BG-real 
BG-virtual 
BG-real+virtual 
Fl-real 
F2-real 
F2-virtual 
F2-real+virtual 
BG+F2 
BG+Fl+F2 
shared virtual area = 10K shared virtual area = 10K 
total memory size = 464K total memory size = 410K 
.611 
.556 
.558 
.938 
.324 
.480 
.467 
.500 
.501 
Table 6.5 
.611 
.559 
.560 
.938 
.324 
.482 
.469 
.502 
.503 
Evaluation of Bl for a shared virtual area of 10K using one day's data 
(Tuesday) 
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The values of Bl have been given to three decimal places so 
that the slight improvement obtained by reducing the total memory 
size can be seen. The values of Bl for the real mode of execution 
do not alter since the organisation of real memory is the same for 
both cases. The values of Bl for the first memory organisation 
(shared virtual area 10K bytes, total memory size 464K) are slightly 
lower than those obtained for a shared virtual area of 64K bytes 
and total memory size 464K bytes (Table 6.2). This is due to the 
fact that the two organisations are quite different, since in 
Section 6.3.3 it was assumed that all 64K bytes of the shared 
virtual area were used, and thus the benefit measures for the two 
situations cannot be compared directly. The reason that the 
increase in Bl, as shown in Table 6.4, is so slight is that only 
the term in Bl representing the supervisor state domain is altered 
by this change and most job-steps spend a low proportion of their 
time in supervisor state (typically 0-20%). 
A second obvious change to the memory organisation is the 
removal of the virtual allocation to the Fl partition. The values 
of Bl for the initial memory organisation (shared virtual area = 
64K and total memory size = 464K) and with the Fl virtual allocation 
removed (shared virtual area = 64K and total memory size = 400K) 
are given in Table 6.6. 
As in the previous case, the measure shows only a slight 
improvement which again reflects the small proportion of execution 
time spent in supervisor state by most job-steps. 
The combined effect of reducing the shared virtual area to 10K 
and removing the Fl virtual allocation is shown in Table 6.7. 
147 
total memory size 464K total memory size 400K 
BG - real .611 
.611 
BG - virtual .568 .573 
BG - real+virtual .569 
.574 
Fl - real .938 
.938 
F2 - real .324 .324 
F2 - virtual .490 .494 
F2 - real+virtual .477 .480 
BG+F2 .510 .514 
BG+Fl+F2 .511 .515 
Table 6.6 
Evaluation of Bl for total memory sizes 464K and 400K, reflecting 
removal of the Fl virtual allocation (shared virtual allocation 
= 64K) using one day's data (Tuesday). 
BG-real 
BG-virtual 
BG-real+virtual 
Fl-real 
F2-real 
F2-virtual 
F2-real+virtual 
BG+F2 
BG+Fl+F2 
shared virtual area = 10K shared virtual area = 10K 
total memory size = 464K total memory size = 346K 
.611 .611 
.556 .562 
.558 .564 
.938 .938 
.324 .324 
.480 .485 
.467 .472 
.500 .505 
.501 .506 
Table 6.7 
Evaluation of Bl showing the combined effect of reducing the 
shared virtual area to 10K and removing the Fl virtual allocation 
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Mention was made in the introduction to this chapter of the 
possibility of including certain input/output devices in the analysis. 
One feasible extension would be to include the file store. Belady 
and Weissman (1974) have suggested that the use of storage keys could 
be extended to backing store. If the details of such a scheme were 
worked out, it would be possible to compare their scheme with that 
used by DOS/VS to access the file store. 
6.4 Evaluation of the Comparison 
The above analysis has compared DOS/VS with an alternative 
protection system which uses the same protection mechanism, viz. 
storage keys, but which has been shown to offer greatly improved 
protection at little extra cost. 
In this analysis, we have examined how well the protection 
system of DOS/VS restricts user processes to the portion of memory 
they require. The protection considered here is a first-level 
inter-process protection. Any further structuring or protection 
method imposed by the process itself, e.g., an Algol-type display 
mechanism, has been ignored. 
Further improvements could probably be made to the alternative 
protection system if more information was available. For instance, 
if it was known which parts of the supervisor were required for each 
type of supervisor call, it is likely that improved protection could 
be obtained by making use of more values of the storage keys to 
implement a ring-like protection structure (Graham 1968). 
The comparison of DOS/VS and the alternative protection system, 
based on the statistics obtained from the IBM 370/135 configuration, 
strictly represents only a comparison of the two protection systems in 
the context of the particular configuration and type of work load 
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used to supply the statistics. It is probably a reasonable assumption 
that this computer system is 'typical ' of installations using DOS/VS, 
but before definitive conclusions concerning the alternative protection 
system could be reached, it would be necessary to gather similar 
statistics from other DOS/VS installations. 
Before considering the comparison of the two protection systems, 
it ;s useful to look at the cost of performing the analysis. The 
statistics used in the analysis were collected by the operating system 
as part of its provision of an accounting facility, so it was only 
necessary to arrange for the statistics to be retained in a machine 
readable form by dumping them onto cards. A number of experiments 
were carried out on an IBM 360/67 system to establish the basis 
for estimating the supervisor-state time of each job-step. These 
experiments consisted of writing and then running short programs on 
the system. Finally, a program was written to perform the evaluation 
of the various measures. The total cost of evaluating the measures 
was thus relatively small in terms of man hours and machine time. 
Apart from the usefulness of the comparison in its own right. 
it could be viewed as an exercise to examine the relative benefits 
and costs of the two protection systems. using available information, 
to see if there were grounds for justifying a substantial investment 
in a more detailed and widely based comparison. Considering the 
results of this comparison, it could be argued that there was indeed 
a case for collecting statistics on supervisor state time and 
gathering similar statistics from other DOS/VS installations. A 
further extension would be to consider gathering information on 
requests for more storage by user processes and analysing the costs 
involved in incorporating such a mechanism into a system. 
As well as providing the basis for the comparison of the two 
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protection systems, the measure Bl and its derivatives have been 
used as figures of merit to investigate the protection implications 
of the memory organisation of DOS/VS. So a comparison such as 
this can also be useful in evaluating relatively minor changes to 
an existing system. 
This chapter illustrates, therefore, that using a combination 
of available information and estimation, it is possible to perform 
a meaningful comparison of protection systems based on the proposed 
methodology. 
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Chapter 7 
PROTECTION AND STRUCTURE 
This chapter considers the use of structure to restrict further 
the accessible set and ways in which such structure may be provided. 
The concept of a domain is extended to that of a structured domain, 
where the relationship between objects contained within the domain 
can be exploited to provide additional protection. 
A measure is proposed to assist in the comparison of systems 
which exploit structure for protection purposes. Use of the measure 
and of the concept of a structured domain are illustrated in brief 
comparisons of various protection systems. 
Programmer defined types are a possible way of defining such 
structured domains, and a form of types and a possible implementation 
are presented in outline so that the protection aspects can be 
considered and compared with the protection available using con-
ventional block structure. 
Finally, the complementary notion of possible structured 
relationships between domains is discussed. 
7.1 Structured Domains 
The two studies contained in Chapters 5 and 6 have taken a one-
level view of domains as have nearly all other people writing on the 
topic (e.g., (Lampson 1971),(Graham and Denning 1972),(Graham 1968), 
(Price 1973)). In the comparison of Algol W implementations, a 
domain was defined as a set of accessible areas of the stack and in the 
study of DOS/VS a domain was taken to be the accessible part of real 
or virtual memory. This approach to domains is sufficient for 
achieving gross comparisons, but ignores any structural information 
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contained in domains which could be used for protection purposes. 
Domains are typically not composed of a set of uniform items, 
but are composed of many disparate items each with its own structure. 
Many domains can be usefully described by a tree representatifH1 • 
Each node in the tree represents an object, and the branches 
emanating from a node to other nodes represent the objects which 
are accessible from the given node. The domain itself corresponds 
to the root node. 
13 
III 131 
1121 1122 
Figure 7.1 
The tree representation of domain D 
Domain D, shown in Figure 7.1, permits direct access to objects 
11,12 and 13. Object 131 has to be accessed via 13, and 1121 via 
11 and 112. To the programmer, 112 is an abstraction of the two 
objects 1121 and 1122. Similarly, 11 can be regarded as an 
abstraction of the objects contained in the subtree emanating from 
the node labelled 11. The objects which appear at the non-leaf 
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nodes may simply be descriptors permitting access to a vector of 
objects. In other words, it is convenient to regard a descriptor 
as an object in the same way that Lampson regards a capability as 
an object (Lampson 1969b). 
The domains in which an Algol W program executes can be desc-
ribed in this way. Figure 7.2 shows a procedure P and the represen-
tation of the domain in which the activation of P executes. The 
domain is represented by a root node which has branches to the simple 
variables in the domain and the descriptors for any arrays or para-
meters. Thus, the root node permits access to the objects contained 
in the primary allocations of the accessible activation records. 
Certain of these objects, namely descriptors for arrays or parameters, 
themselves permit access to other objects such as array elements. 
Array descriptors permit access to parts of the secondary allocation 
of an activation record and parameter descriptors to objects stored 
anywhere on the stack. When executing in P, direct access is permitted 
to A,C and R, the actual parameter J is accessed via a descriptor and 
the elements of array X are also accessed via descriptors. 
Not all domains are hierarchically structured; when there is 
more than one access path to an object, a lattice-like representation 
m~y be more appropriate (Lampson 1974). 
To access objects in a domain which is hierarchically structured, 
it is necessary to traverse the tree representation using appropriate 
operations. The whole of the domain is not immediately accessible; 
the part of the domain addressable by the programmer at any instant 
is typically a true subset of the domain. A further protection device 
is to label the branches of the tree representation with the allowed 
operations which the programmer can invoke along each branch. Then 
the operation requested by the programmer limits the accessible set to 
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I 
J 
BEGIN 
END. 
INTEGER A; 
REAL ARRAY X (1::2,1::3); 
PROCEDURE P (INTEGER I); 
BEGIN 
INTEGER C; 
REAL R; 
· 
END Pi 
. 
BEGIN 
INTEGER J; 
· 
P (J) ; 
· 
END; 
. 
X(l,l) X(2,1) X(1,2) X(2,2) X(1,3) 
Figure 7.2 
An Algol W program and the representation of the domain 
in which the activation of procedure P executes 
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X(2,3) 
the branches emanating from the current node of interest tagged 
with that operation. We have seen in Chapter 6 how read and write 
access select different accessible sets when only store protection 
is implemented on IBM 370 computers. 
In this chapter, we are primarily concerned with the form of 
protection which Lampson (1974) terms defensive protection as opposed 
to absolute protection. Defensive protection tries to make it un-
likely rather than impossible that protection violations will occur, 
that is, the system is defending against accident rather than malice. 
Absolute protection purports to guarantee that no matter what 
program is executing in a domain, it will be unable to break the 
protection barriers imposed by that domain. Absolute protection 
depends on correct hardware and software and the correct setting up 
of domains. 
Between processes which are meant to be entirely independent 
(e.g., processes initiated from different users who do not even know 
of each other's existence) absolute protection is required. That is, 
the protection system should ensure that there is no interference 
between the processes. However, when there is intended to be 
cooperation between processes (e.g., users accessing a common data 
base, or even parallel processes in a single program put there in 
order to make good use of parallel hardware), absolute protection 
is required between the cooperating processes and other independent 
processes, but structure within domains can be exploited in the 
interests of defensive protection between the cooperating processes. 
We define the direct scope of a program executing in a domain 
as the objects contained in the domain which the program can access 
with a single operation. Clearly this definition depends on the 
meaning of 'single operation'. For instance, fetching an array 
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element A(i) on a non-structured machine using an optimising compiler 
would be one rather than two operations. Thus, the direct scope of 
a program has to be considered in a context where the nature of 
operations is clearly understood. 
The direct scope will vary during execution as changes occur 
in the set of objects which the program can access with a single 
operation. For a program executing in domain D shown in Figure 7.1, the 
initial direct scope includes the objects 11,12 and 13. If object 
11 is accessed the direct scope changes to objects III and 112. 
Thus, whenever the program accesses a non-terminal node of the 
tree-representation of the domain, the direct scope changes. The 
union of all possible direct scopes within a domain is termed the 
total sco~e of the domain. 
Absolute protection is not directly concerned with this structure, 
though it is useful conceptually for writing programs and for sharing 
objects between domains. A defensive protection system would attach 
value to the fact that certain objects can be accessed directly, 
while others cannot be referenced except by the execution of a 
carefully chosen sequence of operations. 
In the case of defensive protection, small direct scopes are 
significant since they limit the instantaneous possibilities, but 
the total scope can be large without seriously affecting the 
protection. A measure of structured domains based on the idea of 
direct scope is presented in the next section. 
7.2 A Measure of Structure within a Domain 
A measure of the structure contained within a domain is the 
average direct scope within the domain compared to the total scope of 
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the domain, 
i.e., average direct scope 
total scope 
There are various ways of quantifying the direct scope and total 
scope, similar to the possibilities available in measuring the 'size' 
of an accessible set. The obvious method is to use the number of 
objects contained in the direct scope and total scope. To 
accommodate the operations which can be applied to each object, an 
object 0 can be considered as a set of pairs (O,oc),(O,oc), ... ,(O,~', 
1 2 IV 
where oc. ,oc '0" ,IX. are the permitted operations for object 0, and 1 2 n 
each pair (O,~) considered as a separate object. 
I 
The average direct scope can be computed as the average of the 
direct scopes actually entered by a process during execution within 
the domain weighted by the number of operations invoked within each 
scope. An alternative is to take the average of all direct scopes 
within a domain, thus avoiding any dependence on the execution 
which actually takes place--within the domain. 
If the domain varies during execution due to domain changes, 
the measure can be evaluated as: 
average of current direct scope 
current total scope 
where the average is taken over those direct scopes entered 
by the process. 
The measure for a particular domain will have a value between 
o and 1. A value of indicates that the direct scope equals the 
total scope and thus the domain contains no structure which is used 
for protection. Values approaching 0 indicate a very highly 
structured situation with few objects contained within each direct 
scope. 
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7.3 Comparison of Structured Protection Systems 
A program executing in a domain consisting of a contiguous 
area of memory and using absolute addresses to access words in the 
memory area has the simplest of structured representations, viz.: 
012 n words of memory 
In such a domain, the direct scope equals the total scope and hence 
the value of the measure equals 1. 
This can be compared with a program executing in a domain con-
sisting of a number of distinct segments ~ ,s2, ... ,sn' Addresses 
used by the program take the form (s,l), where s selects a segment 
and 1 selects a word within that segment. The domain has a two-
level structure: 
n-l 0 
1 
Assuming that n = 
1 n-l ~n. , \hat 
i=1 I 
o n -1 
m 
is the total accessible memory area is 
the same as in the previous domain, the direct scope is considerably 
reduced in comparison with the previous case. The average direct 
scope over the whole domain = m+n,+n 2t ... +nm. Thus, if the 
(mtl) 
n n.~ 1m, the average direct scope ~ m+n and the measure evaluates to 
I m+l 
approximately 1 
(m+') 
As the number of segments, m, increases the 
measure tends to 0, which, compared to the previous case, indicates 
a significant improvement in protection. A refinement of this analysis 
would be to include the permitted accesses to each segment. For instance, 
159 
there may be three access modes to segments, Write, Read and Execute 
--- , 
but if some segments had less than the full set of access modes 
permitted, the average direct scope would be further reduced. 
The second example concerns the use of codewords as proposed 
by Iliffe and Jodeit (.(Jodeit 1968),(Iliffe 1969),(Iliffe and 
Jodeit 1962)) and implemented on the Rice computer (Feustel 1972). 
The purpose of using codewords is to retain structural information 
as an essential component of the representation of a program and 
its data. 
Structuring is provided by the array mechanism, each array is 
named and contains as elements data or subarrays. The elements of 
an array form a block, a set of consecutive memory locations. Each 
block is labelled by a codeword (a word corresponding to the name 
of the array). If A is an array, the i-th element of A is denoted 
(A,i). If the elements of A are subarrays, the i-th word in the 
block for A is a codeword which labels the array (A,i). 
Thus, an array is a tree structure. The codeword corresponding 
to the complete array is called the primary codeword. All subarrays 
and data elements of an array are addressed relative to the primary 
codeword. 
Scalar quantities are represented directly in a value table. 
Other entities, such as programs, vectors, multi-dimensional matrices, 
structured data, etc., are represented by arrays whose primary code-
words occur in the value table. The value table can be addressed 
directly by an executing program, thus the value table essentially 
defines the domain of the executing program. Elements of an array 
are addressed indirectly through the primary codeword for the array 
held in the value table. The indirect addressing is hardware 
implemented leading to an efficient implementation of codewords. 
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To access a particular element in an array, regardless of its 
position in the tree-structured representation of the array, the 
program inserts subscripts into a set of registers indicating the 
path to be taken through the array to reach the element. The 
program then addresses the primary codeword for the array and 
invokes the array element accessing instruction. The hardware 
traces a path through the array structure, using the subscripts 
in turn to determine the branch to be taken from each node in the 
tree representation of the array. Each subscript is checked, 
before being used, against information held in the current code-
word to ensure that it is valid. 
A two-dimensional square matrix M of n rows and n columns 
is thus represented by n vectors each n words long (see Figure 7.3). 
primary codeword 
for M 
n 
I 
I 
· 
/// · 
· I 
· 
· 
· I 
secondary codewords 
for rows of iV1 
Figure 7.3 
Mi,1 
Mj,2 
• 
· 
· 
Mj,n 
vector of n elements 
of M 
Codeword representation of a two dimensional square matrix 
(. 
Confining attention to this array alone, the average direct scope is 
n compared to the total scope (n2+n). The measure of structure 
evaluates to 1 ,which compares favourably with the value 1 for a 
n+ 1 
Fortran-type implementation of the same array. 
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The benefit of the codeword approach is a significant reduction 
in the size of the average direct scope (n compared to n2 for a 
Fortran-like implementation of the above array) and automatic checking 
of array subscripts. The cost of the retained structure in this 
instance is (n+l) words of memory and the time taken to set up the 
codeword structure. The time taken to access an array element is 
likely to be similar to the time taken in a Fortran-like implemen-
tation t since it is implemented in hardware and the address of the 
element does not have to be calculated explicitly. 
The use of a scalar measure to compare structured situations 
obviously has its limitations. but as illustrated above t it does 
lend some relative quantitative assessment in comparing structured 
protection systems. A particular limitation is that the measure of 
structure is defined in terms of operations and thus its evaluation 
will depend to a considerable extent on what is deemed to constitute 
an 'operation' in a specific situation. The array element accessing 
operation on the codeword machine t where the subscripts are put into 
registers and the hardware traces a path through the array structure 
to the designated element t can be treated as a single operation 
involving no switch in domains, but 1nstead a number of changes of 
direct scope. In contrast, on a machine such as the Burroughs B5000, 
to access an array element it is necessary to program explicitly 
each individual indexing instruction involved in accessing the 
element. These instructions can be considered as separate operations 
some of which may involve a switch in domain. A third variation is 
the Algol W array element accessing operation which performs sub-
script checking. The programmer can consider this operation as a 
single operation, but he relies on the compiler to generate the 
correct code sequence to carry out the checking and accessing. This 
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introduces the question of abstraction; by viewing array element 
accessing as a single operation the programmer is forming an 
abstraction of a sequence of machine language operations. In practice, 
there are likely to be many levels of abstraction; an operation is an 
abstraction of a sequence of sub-operations which in turn can be 
broken down into sequences of sub-sub-operations, etc. The question 
arises as to the appropriate level at which to view operations. 
Also, even though an operation is regarded as atomic, the sequence 
of operations from which it is formed can perhaps be interleaved 
with operations from other processes, thus introducing questions of 
parallel process interference. 
The assessment of structure poses the question of what is an 
operation and raises other issues such as what is a domain switch, 
what I hardware I checking is actually being done, etc. Rather than 
discuss these issues in general, they are most clearly explicated 
in terms of a particular system design, specifically in terms of a 
type-based design. 
7.4 Evaluation of a Type System 
The intended function of types is to allow the programmer to 
define new forms of data structure together with matching operations 
to access instances of such data structures. Current interest in 
types arises because of their potential for increasing programmer 
effectiveness. The sole aim in presenting types here is to 
investigate the enhanced protection facilities available with 
types compared to the situation where blocks are the only struc-
turing device which can be used to restrict accesS to program 
variables. 
Standard languages such as Fortran, Algol and PL/l have 
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independent means of structuring data and programs. For example, 
Algol W provides arrays and records for structuring data and 
procedures for programs. Types provide a uniform and coordinated 
means for structuring data and instructions. 
The types considered are embedded in an Algol-like programming 
language, the details of which do not concern us here. The block 
structure can be used to restrict the scope of variables within a 
program, that is a specification of domains, and types ensure that 
access to programmer defined data structures is only permitted via 
the set of operations defined for that type of data structure, by 
providing a convenient means to specify and change direct scopes. 
In the present situation, lacking a widely accepted typed 
language, indeed when much research into the subject is being 
carried out, we are forced into having to make certain choices re-
garding the facilities to be provided in such a language. Having 
made a choice, it provides a basis for the discussion of protection 
aspects. The particular choice of facilities is meant to be 
representative rather than definitive. 
It is not appropriate to attempt a survey of all related work 
in this fast-moving area, but the form of types presented in this 
section is an amalgam of ideas from existing work on types: 
classes of SIMULA 67 (Dahl et al 1970), modes of Algol 68 (Wijngaarden 
et al 1974), types of Morris (1973a) and Wang (1974). The notion of 
types and the supporting architecture, which are briefly described in 
the next two sections, are the result of joint work between the author 
and Roy Campbell (Campbell and Wyeth 1974); the evaluation of the 
protection aspects of types was performed solely by the author. 
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7.4.1 Types in a Block Structured Language 
Many languages, e.g., Fortran, Algol, PL/l, support simple 
data-types such as integer, real, boolean, character, etc., and 
operations (read, write, add, subtract, ... ) provided by the hard-
ware which can be applied to variables of these data-types. The 
types described here include the primitive types mentioned above 
but also allow the programmer to create new types and specify a 
set of operations which can be applied to instances of the type. 
A new type is introduced by a type definition. A type is a 
characterisation of a class of objects and, once defined, instances 
of that type can be declared. Example 1 shows the definition of 
a type Item, the notation used has been adopted for convenience and 
is not a proposed syntax. 
A type definition must occur at the beginning of a block along 
with any other declarations contained in the block and applies for 
the duration of the block. Thus, instances of the type can be 
declared within the block containing the type definition and any 
inner blocks. We do not consider here the dynamic creation and 
deletion of objects in the sense of Algol W records (Wirth and 
Hoare 1966). 
A type definition includes a schema or template for a data 
structure, which characterises individual objects of the type, and 
a set of operations which can be performed on such a data structure. 
In Example 1, the template specifies that an instance of an Item 
is composed of two integers, referred to as Part No and Stock, and 
a real number Price. The only means of manipulating an object of 
a user defined type is by invoking an operation defined for that 
type of object. These operations are defined within the template 
and are termed object-operations. 
I, 
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begi~ 
~ Item (integer P,S; real Cost); 
integer No_Items; 
initially: No_Items:=O; 
operation No_of_Parts (returns integer I): 
I :=No_Items; 
template 
integer Part_No, Stock; 
real Price; 
, 
initially: 
begin 
Part_No :=P; Stock :=S; Price :=Cost; 
No Items :=No Items + 1; 
finally: No Items :=No Items - 1; 
operation Allocate (accepts integer request): 
if request ~ stock then stock :=stock - request 
else error; 
end template; 
end type; 
Item Clutch(10451 ,100,10.41), Brake(10651,50,2.96); 
Example 1 
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The declared Items, Clutch and Brake, can only be accessed 
via the operation Allocate and other operations defined within the 
template. The significant point of types is the protection of 
objects from forms of access other than the operations defined for 
that type of object. 
The type Item provides the programmer with an abstraction 
of say car parts, and once this type definition has been specified 
he no longer need concern himself with the concrete representation 
of the objects he creates. The three components of the Item Clutch, 
viz.: Clutch.Part_No, Clutch.Stock and Clutch.Price, cannot be 
accessed directly outside the type definition. Thus the components 
of the Item Clutch can only be manipulated by invoking the appro-
priate object-operations. 
An object-operation can only be invoked by qualifying the 
operation by the object to which it is to be applied, e.g., 
Clutch.Allocate(20) 
Two distinguished operations may be declared: initially and finally. 
initially is invoked automatically on the execution of a declaration 
of an object of that type and finally is invoked when the object is 
deleted. The scope of the object-operations is the same as that of 
the type definition. 
For completeness, a type definition is considered to be the 
declaration of a type object, an object of type TYPE, another pre-
defined but non-simple type. The notion of a type being represented 
by an object is taken from the Hydra system (Wulf et al 1973). 
Treating type definitions as the declaration of an object of type 
TYPE, means that type definitions can be represented at run-time in 
a manner similar to other objects. A TYPE object includes any 
objects declared within the type definition but outside the template. 
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Such objects (e.g., No_Items in Example 1) correspond to lown l 
variables of the class of objects of this type and characterise 
the whole class. These objects are only accessible within the 
environment (i.e., domain) of the type definition. Indirect access 
to these objects is gained via the type-operations which are 
declared within the type definition but outside the template. Type-
operations have the same scope as the type definition in which they 
occur. The type-operation No_of_Parts, in Example 1, is intended 
to return the number of Items which have been declared. A 
distinguished type-operation initially may be declared with other 
type-operations, in which case it is invoked on execution of the 
type definition to initialise the objects declared in the type 
definition. 
Object-operations, declared within a type definition, can 
access the component parts of the object to which they are applied 
by means of the names of the components as defined in the template. 
Such names are automatically interpreted with respect to the object 
on which the operation is acting. Type operations need no qualifi-
cation to be invoked by a program. 
To increase the flexibility in the use of types, parameters are 
allowed to type definitions. Such parameters are bound on declaration 
of an object of that type. Ideally, any form of parameter would be 
permitted including types themselves. However, certain parameters 
and the use of parameters in a way which affects the precise form of 
object created, when an object of the given type is declared, can 
lead to complications such as polymorphic types (see (Morris 1973a), 
(Liskov and Zilles 1974) and (Wang 1974) for a fuller discussion of 
this topic). Thus, we restrict parameters to simple variable 
parameters (i.e., variables of a non-user defined type) used in a 
168 
'simple ' way. Example 1 used parameters to the type Item for the 
initialisation of the components of an object of type Item. 
7.4.2 A Computer Architecture for Types 
The purpose of presenting in outline a computer architecture for 
types is to demonstrate that it is practicable to design an architecture 
which supports at run-time the structure contained in a program written 
using blocks and programmer defined types. The protection rules of 
types are enforced at run-time by the architecture. 
The prototype for the implementation is that used in Algol-60 
run-time systems where activation records are allocated at the block 
level. Such a system was briefly described in Chapter 5 and is 
covered in detail by Randell and Russell (1964) and Wichmann (1973). 
Since Algol-like scope rules apply to all objects, it is feasible 
to maintain all descriptors, representations of objects, working 
storage and linkage information on a stack. An activation record is 
created on block entry, procedure call, operation call and on the 
declaration of a variable of a user defined type (the term program 
segment will be used for the code corresponding to a block, procedure, 
operation or creation of an object). An activation record consists 
of four parts: linkage information, parameter section, primary 
storage and secondary storage. Access to activation records is via 
a set of hardware maintained display registers. Each active display 
register contains a pointer to the base of the appropriate activation 
record and has its limit extension set to the extent of the parameter 
section plus primary allocation. 
Each object declared in the program segment corresponding to 
a given activation record has a descriptor in the primary storage. 
Objects of a simple type (i.e., integers, reals, etc.) have their 
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value contained in the descriptor for efficiency reasons. Descrip-
tors in the primary storage are accessed via the appropriate 
display register. 
The representations of arrays and objects of a user defined 
type, declared in the program segment, are contained in the secondary 
storage of the activation record. These representations are accessed 
via the descriptors in the primary storage. 
Objects of simple types (i.e., integer, real, character, etc.) 
are represented directly by a word containing the value and tagged 
with the appropriate type (see Figure 7.4(A)). Objects of non-simple 
types (i.e., strings, arrays or user defined types) are represented, 
in the first instance, by a descriptor in the primary storage (Figure 
7.4(8)). The type information contained in the first field of both 
(A) I type I value 
(8) I type I length I pointer I 
Figure 7.4 
Descriptor Formats 
descriptors takes the form of a pointer to the descriptor defining 
the type. The address of a descriptor which defines a type thus 
serves as the identity of the type. The number of contiguous ·words· 
to which a descriptor of format B permits access is contained in the 
length field, and the location of these words in the stack is given 
by the contents of the pointer field. 
A non-simple object is defined recursively as either a simple 
object or an ordered set of non-simple or simple objects (c.f., 
Jones (1973)). Figure 7.5 illustrates the structure of a non-simple 
object. The descriptor representing the non-simple object in 
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primary storage (labelled A in the Figure) points to the ordered set 
of objects of which it ;s composed (B). Objects in B may be simple 
or non-simple and constitute the primary storage of the object. 
A 
descriptor 
(i n primary 
storage) 
B 
~l 
2 
3 
n 
c 
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< value> 
<value> 
---'" 
< value> 
: "'-~ < value> 
< value> 
< value> 
< value> 
Figure 7.5 
The hierarchical representation of an object 
<value> 
~value> 
<value> 
<value> 
<value> 
Descriptor A only permits access to the descriptors in B, not the 
total representation of the object. B, is a non-simple object 
and the descriptor points to its representation C. B2 is a simple 
object and so its value is stored in the descriptor B2 . This 
process is carried on recursively until all the objects have been 
represented in terms of simple objects. The resulting structure 
is a hierarchical representation of an individual object. 
Apart from the descriptor contained in the primary storage of the 
declaring block, the tree structure drawn in Figure 7.5 is kept in 
a contiguous set of words in secondary storage. 
The descriptor for an object of type TYPE is a slight variant 
on the normal object descriptor and is shown. below. The extra field, 
I TYPE llength 1 operations I pointer I 
operations, in this descriptor contains the total number of type-
operations and object-operations declared within the type definition. 
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The representation of a type on the stack includes a descriptor for 
each of the lown l variables of the type definition and a descriptor 
for each code component produced by the compiler. Figure 7.6 
outlines the storage representation of a type definition. 
own variables 
operation 
descriptors 
final code 
template code 
T2 
Tl 
object-operation 
object-operation 
type-operati on 
final-code 
template 
TYPEI 7 13 1 
Figure 7.6 
Outline of a type representation 
r+--
On entry to a program segment the primary storage in the 
activation record is requested and allocated. Each declared object 
(including new types) gives rise to a CREATE instruction in the 
compiled code of the program segment. The descriptor for the object 
is tagged with the appropriate type and for objects of simple type 
no further action is required. 
The representation of non-simple objects is built up in the 
secondary allocation by the CREATE instruction invoking the template 
code for the corresponding type. This is addressed by referencing 
the descriptor for the template code (by convention the first des-
criptor in the primary storage of the type object) in the appropriate 
type object. The template code sets up the representation of the 
object and performs any necessary initialisation. It is analogous 
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to the code produced by an Algol compiler for setting up a dynamic 
array. 
On invocation of the template code, the display registers are 
updated to reflect the environment of the type definition, primary 
storage is requested and the address and extent of the primary 
storage are automatically put into the object descriptor. The 
template code creates on the stack, in its primary allocation, 
the first level representation of the object. In a similar manner, 
the representation of objects occurring in the first-level rep-
resentation of the object are implemented in the secondary allocation 
of the template by invoking the template code for each such 
object in turn. This process is carried on recursively until the 
whole representation for the object has been created. On return 
from template code, the activation record of the template code is 
not removed from the stack since it forms the representation of the 
object. During calls of template code, linkage information can be 
stored on a separate control stack so it is not incorporated into 
the representation of the object being created. 
Objects are deleted on exit from a program segment. For each 
object declared in the program segment, the distinguished operation 
finally is invoked, if defined for that type of object. The objects 
are then deleted by retracting the stack. 
Procedures and operations are essentially similar, but an 
object-operation has a distinguished parameter, namely the object 
to which it is applied, whereas a procedure has a pointer to its 
associated environment (static link) included in its descriptor. 
A procedure or operation descriptor, shown below, contains the 
segment name of the code segment to be invoked, the static link and 
the type procedure, type-operation or object-operation. 
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procedure static 
or segment name 
operation link 
The use of descriptors for procedures and operations means that 
they can be treated as objects implemented off the stack. A 
procedure is invoked by a call instruction which takes as its 
argument an address couple referencing the procedure descriptor. 
Object-operation calls in the source language of the form 
<object-name> . cobject-operation-name> 
are translated into 
object-operation-call <address couple specifying object> 
<operation number> 
The operation descriptor is located by following the pointer in the 
type field of the descriptor for the object to the descriptor for 
the type. Indexing the descriptor for the type with the operation 
number yields the operation descriptor. The operation number is 
checked against the total number of operations contained in the type 
descriptor to ensure it is within the allowed range. 
The domain of an object-operation is a concatenation of the 
domain of the type definition, the type definition, the local 
variables of the operation and the object to which the operation ;s 
applied. The descriptor for the object could either be the first 
descriptor in the parameter space of the activation record or be 
stored in a separate register. If the operation was compiled at 
program level k+l, one higher than its true program level k, the 
descriptor for the object could occupy the display register D{k). 
This would arise naturally if the template in the type definition 
was regarded as a block surrounding the operations. The first 
level representation of the object could then be referenced by 
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address couples, thus avoiding another addressing variant. 
Type-operations are translated into 
type-operation-call <type-address-couple> <operation-number> 
The operation descriptor is located by indexing the type descriptor 
by the operation number. The management of display registers etc., 
for object-operations and type-operations is the same as that for 
procedures. 
Only an outline of the machine architecture has been presented 
here, sufficient to facilitate a discussion of the protection aspects 
Of types. A fuller exposition can be found in (Campbell and Wyeth 
1974). 
7.4.3 Evaluation 
The previous section outlined an architecture which aims to 
achieve an implementation of block structure and types closely 
mirroring the source language structures apparent to the programmer. 
The philosophy underlying the run-time system is that the best time 
to check that an allowed operation ;s being applied to an object is 
just prior to the invocation of the operation. This does not run 
counter to policies of compile-time and load-time checking, but is 
to be seen as an additional checking time. A high degree of pro-
tection is achieved at run-time through a combination of a display 
mechanism, a tagged architecture, a dynamic type table and special 
hardware functions. 
The advantages of base and displacement addressing have already 
been discussed in Chapter 5. Here, this addressing mode has been 
extended to the naming of the parts of which a composite object is 
formed. There is thus a uniformity of attitude to blocks and objects, 
each ;s considered to be structured into primary and secondary 
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allocations. Further, this addressing scheme enables objects to be 
named within the correct scope, but there is no means by which to 
manipulate the representation of an object except by invoking the 
appropriate operations. Object-operations are invoked via the 
descriptor for the type definition corresponding to the type of the 
object. This descriptor is located using the type tag in the 
descriptor for the object. Hence, only those operations defined for 
the object can be invoked to manipulate the object. When an 
object-operation is invoked, the object to which it is applied 
is automatically included in the domain and access permitted to 
the object's first-level representation. 
Type information, in the form of type objects, is maintained 
on the stack during execution. Access to the type objects, which 
represent the various programmer defined types, is limited by the 
display mechanism. The maintenance of this type information thus 
constitutes a dynamic type table. Hydra, a system based on a 
similar form of types (Wulf et al 197~b). keeps type information 
(for the system and all users) in a single large type table. By 
keeping each user's type information in his own data-stack. the 
~ 
problems of accessing and protecting a large table are avoided. 
If a protection violation or an error occurs in a stack it only 
affects one user, whereas similar occurrences with the Hydra type 
table could affect other users. 
A change in context, which takes place on the transfer of 
control from one program segment to another. will involve a change 
I 
in the contents of some of the display registers and the stacking 
or unstacking of linkage information. Following the Burroughs 
B6700 hardware procedure call mechanism, the type machine would 
provide hardware or emulated instructions which perform the functions 
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associated with a context change. The integrity of the display 
registers and the linkage information is thus assured (hardware 
errors apart) as a program segment then has no means to access 
the registers or linkage information directly. 
An evaluation of the protection aspects of the above architecture 
which supports programmer defined types or a comparison with other 
type systems is a difficult problem because of the need to consider 
structure. However, the notion of a structured domain and the 
proposed measure can help such an evaluation whereas the one-level 
view of the set of objects in a program, adopted earlier in this 
thesis, would not be satisfactory. 
In evaluating the protection afforded by the implementation, we 
are interested in the improved protection offered within a block 
over the typical Algol implementation, and the cost at which this 
improvement is attained. 
The increased benefit depends on the extent to which a 
programmer structures his domains using types, thus providing 
structural information to the machine. It would be quite possible 
to ignore the type mechanism altogether and write essentially 
normal Algol programs. There would be no special benefit offered 
by the architecture to such a user over a conventional Algol 
implementation and the costs would be similar to those of an Algol 
system. 
We are concerned, principally, with the situation where 
programmers make extensive use of the facility to create new types 
to suit the requirements of each individual program. 
In the type machine, arrays would be implemented in a manner 
analogous to that described for codewords in Section 7.3. In terms 
of the measure, such an implementation was seen to give a dramatic 
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improvement in protection, measured in terms of the reduction in the 
size of the direct scope. Some Algol implementations (e.g., Algol W) 
use a dope vector to assist in the calculation of the address of an 
array element and include sufficient information in the dope vector 
to permit subscript checking. Thus, there is not necessarily any 
improvement in protection in the case of arrays. However, these 
implementations provide run-time protection by means of compile-time 
provided conventions for use of the machine. If the compiler is 
subverted such conventions may not hold. 
By using types, a programmer can impose on an address space a 
highly structured situation so that the direct scope will typically 
be much smaller than the total scope. 
Consider the type Person defined in Example 2 and the structure 
of an object of type Person shown in Figure 7.7. An object of type 
Person is seen to be a reasonably complex data structure, but by 
defining it in this way various aspects of protection can be enforced 
at run-time which cannot be achieved with a conventional implementation 
of block structure. The average direct scope of the object shown in 
Figure 7.7 is 2.6, and the total scope is 13. Hence, the value of 
the measure for this object alone is .2. 
If a Person is represented by individual variables: day, month. 
year, person-identity, address(1), ... ,address(5), the direct scope 
equals 9. So comparing an object of type Person with the variables 
implementing the corresponding object in a block implementation. the 
average direct scope is 2.6 in the first case and 9 in the second. 
This order of improvement was to. be expected since the proposed 
measure evaluates to .2. For ease of discussion. only the structure 
of a single object has been considered, but with extensive use of 
types it is not unlikely that similar improvements could be expected 
for whole domains. 
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begin 
~ Date; 
template 
lnteger Day,Month,Year; 
operation Set_Date (accepts integer A,B,C): 
be~in Day:=A; Month:=B; Year:=C;end; 
operatlon Read Year (returns integer~: 
I :='tear; 
. 
end template; 
end type; 
type Identity; 
integer Number; 
initially: Number:=O; 
template 
lnteger Identity No; 
initlally: begin-
Number:=Number+l; Identity No:=Number; end; 
operation Access (returns integer I):I:=Identity_No; 
end template; 
end type; 
type Address; 
template 
string(30) array Lines(l:S); 
operation Assign ... ; 
operation Getlinel •.. , 
. 
end template; 
end type; 
type Person; 
;nte~er No People; 
initla11y:-No People:=O; 
template -
bate Birth; 
Identity Person Identity; 
Address Person Address; 
operation Age Treturns integer I): 
I:=Current Year· Birth.Read Year; 
-' -
. 
end template; 
end type; 
Person Pl,P2,P3; 
Example 2 
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Day Month 
Person 
Identity 
Lines(l) Lines(2) 
Figure 7.7 
Person Address 
Lines(3) Lines(4) 
The structure of an object of type Person 
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Lines(5) 
The significant reduction in direct scope is not the only 
protection benefit to be expected from types. For instance, the 
components of the object named Birth within an object of type 
Person cannot be manipulated directly. From within the type 
definition Person, Birth can only be accessed by the operations 
defined for an object of type Date. Outside this type definition, 
even these operations cannot be invoked on Birth because there is 
no means of specifying the Birth component of an object of type 
Person. Access to Birth is restricted to the operation Age 
defined within the type definition Person. This protection would 
be enforced in the first place by the compiler but be validated 
by the proposed architecture. Similar comments can be made 
regarding the accessibility of other components of objects. 
The type Identity is used to assign each Person a unique 
identity, namely Person_Identity. The generation of unique numbers 
requires an integer Number in the type definition for Identity. 
Since no type-operation is defined, Number can only be altered 
from within the template. Similarly, the unique number of each 
object of type Identity cannot be changed because there is no 
object operation defined to alter it. 
The type mechanism in this example provides a restricted set 
of operations which can be used to manipulate objects. Since not 
all operations are valid for all objects, the direct scope will in 
practice be smaller in terms of (object,operation) pairs, than 
that calculated above. 
The potential benefit of types and the proposed architecture 
is a significant reduction in direct scope of objects and operations 
compared to the use of conventional block structure without programn~r 
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defined types. The reduction in direct scope results in increased 
reliability; errors are likely to be caught sooner than with a 
conventional Algol implementation and certain previously undetected 
errors will now be signalled as protection violations. When an error 
does occur, since objects are represented at run-time in a way 
which can be related to their source program definition, errors can 
be reported in source language terms, thereby assisting the diagnosis 
and correction of errors. 
The costs of this protection benefit can be considered in terms 
of space and time. Space is required on the stack for the represen-
tation of type objects, the descriptors defining the structured 
relationships of the components of each object and the linkage 
information which must be stored when each new direct scope is 
entered. Extra processing time is required to set up type objects 
and the representations of individual objects, and to perform the 
increased number of context changes. A context change will occur 
on each change of direct scope and will involve alteration of the 
display registers and the storing of linkage information. In 
addition, the proposed hardware itself is more complex than con-
ventional computers and this could increase the hardware cost and 
the basic cycle time of the machine. 
The proposed machine architecture reflects closely at run-time 
the source language structure of the program. Retention of structure 
enables the protection provided at run-time to match closely the 
protection specified by the programming language. The structure is 
exploited to achieve an efficient implementation of protection 
through addressing. It is the author's belief that in a suitably 
designed system, the costs of maintaining and using the system will 
be outweighed by the benefits. 
l~ 
This discussion has concentrated on the use of types within a 
single process. The extension to a machine design supporting 
cooperating processes which share objects of programmer defined 
types is not yet complete due to unresolved problems of such an 
architecture in connection with parallelism. Ways of structuring 
the relationships between domains, discussed in the next section, 
and the work of Campbell (Campbell and Habermann 1974) on process 
synchronisation, may provide techniques to overcome these problems. 
Other proposed or extant implementations of types include those 
of Wang (1974) and Morris (1973a) and the Hydra system (Wulf et al 
1974b). 
In his thesis, Wang proposes a method of implementing his 
type language but he does not explicitly represent the structure of 
an object at run-time, reducing all objects to collections of 
primitive objects at compile-time. The consequence of this is 
minimal run-time protection. The proposals of Morris for types 
are similar to those presented in this Chapter, but his 
implementation is radically different. using an unstructured 
storage space whereas we propose implementing all objects on a 
stack. 
The Hydra system also presents a similar view of types but 
without the overall block structure. Types encompass the whole 
computer system and thus present a uniform protection method to the 
programmer. In the Hydra system, an object has two parts: a data 
part and an object reference part. The objects which a process can 
name directly are specified by the capabilities in the process's 
local name space, which is akin to the capability list of Dennis and 
Van Horn (1966). An object which is a composition of other objects 
has capabilities for these objects in the object reference part of 
the given object. Circular links are prevented, thus the resulting 
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set of objects composing a domain and their structure can be 
represented by a tree. Objects in the domain are referred to by 
a path-name which indicates the path to be taken through the 
structured domain to reach the object. For instance, the path-
name i.j.k specifies the k-th capability in the (capability part 
of the) object named by the j-th capability in the object named 
by the i-th capability in the local name space of the process. 
The Hydra system offers more flexibility than the proposed type 
machine but with the result that the cost of a domain switch is 
high, thus discouraging the use of a large number of small domains 
and domains with a large number of small direct scopes. 
7.5 Complementary Notion of Structured Relationships between Domains 
The use of structure within a domain for protection purposes 
has been discussed at length in this ch?pter and, in this final 
section, the complementary notion of structured relationships 
between domains is briefly considered. Two possible types of 
relationship are presented as examples. The first type of struc-
turing is that found in block structured languages where domains 
are linked to blocks and the second is the strict nesting of domains. 
A program written in an Algol-like language can be represented 
by a tree structure where each node corresponds to a block or 
procedure. The branches emanating from a node link the given node 
to nodes representing blocks or procedures declared within the given 
block or procedure. The root node represents the outermost block of 
the program. Figure 7.8 shows the tree representation of a simple 
Algol program. 
The tree is a representation of the static structure of the 
program. Execution of the program, or the program's dynamic structure, 
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Figure 7.8 
An Algol program and its tree representation 
is represented by a path from the root node to the node representing 
the block in which execution is currently taking place. In Figure 
7.8, the path marked indicates execution within the block labelled 
C. If each node is also deemed to represent the set of objects 
declared within the corresponding block or procedure, the path 
through the tree, indicating the current execution state, also 
• indicates the currently accessible objects, apart from parameters to 
procedures. 
Each node corresponds to a block or procedure, and since domains 
are tied to blocks and procedures, a node represents a possible domain 
of execution. The tree structure is thus a representation of the 
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relationship between the domains. The interpretation of the tree 
structure is that the domain represented by a node includes the 
objects associated with that node (that is objects declared within 
the corresponding block or procedure) and objects associated with 
nodes on the path from the given node to the root node. Hence a 
domain includes those domains on the path to the root as subsets. 
A second type of relationship is illustrated by the process 
structure of the Cambridge CAP computer (Walker 1973),{Needham and 
Walker 1974). Processes are structured in a hierarchical manner 
so that any process can only access a subset of its father's 
resources. 
The protection implemented by CAP is memory protection, the 
basic unit of protection being a segment which is viewed as a 
contiguous set of words. Input/output protection can be achieved 
via memory protection by assigning each device an address and either 
including or not including that address in the process's address 
space. 
The segments which a process can access are defined by the 
process's capability segment (PsCS). For each segment which the 
process can access, there is a capability in its PsCS containing, 
inter alia, the identity of the segment, in terms of a capability 
in the PsCS of the father process, and the type of access the 
process can make to the segment. 
A process can act as a coordinator for a number of processes, 
that is a process can spawn junior processes, providing any 
operating system functions such as interlocks and the control of 
the allocation of the CPU for the junior processes. A junior 
process is created by defining its PsCS in terms of the capabilities 
contained in the PsCS of the coordinator~ The capabilities in the 
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PsCS of the junior process are refinements of those in the coordinator's 
PsCS, that is represent a subsegment or a reduction in access permissions. 
Thus, the architecture of the CAP computer supports a hierarchy 
of processes, where each process knows of its father and its junior 
processes but does not know if a junior process has set itself up as 
a coordinator and is multiprogramming among a set of junior-junior 
processes. 
A process addresses a word in a segment by specifying a capa-
bility in its PsCS and the offset of the word within the segment. 
The access type is checked against the allowed access types defined 
within the capability and the offset is checked that it lies 
within the segment. The address is then converted, by means of 
information contained within the capability, to an address in the 
universe of discourse of the coordinator of the process. This 
address in turn is converted to an address valid within the universe 
of discourse of the coordinator's coordinator, etc., until the 
address space of the master coordinator is reached. The capabilities 
in the master coordinator's PsCS (alternatively termed the master 
segment list) define the actual identities of the segments, which 
may then be mapped onto physical storage addresses by a paging 
mechanism. 
Providing a process is not passed a capability for its own PsCS 
or any PsCS on the path from its own PsCS to the master segment list, 
coordinators on this path are fully protected from the effects of 
junior processes (save what a process may do to the segments for which 
it has been passed capabilities). 
A domain of execution of a process is defined by its PsCS, which 
in turn is defined in terms of the surrounding domain. The strict 
hierarchical structure of processes, and hence of domains, achieves 
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Figure 7.9 
Domain and process structure of CAP 
inter-process protection. 
Figure 7.9 shows the hierarchical structure of a small set of 
domains, represented by the processes' PsCS's, and indicates that 
a capability in a PsCS is defined in terms of capabilities in PsCS's 
on the path to the master segment list. Though the domains are 
related by a tree structure, as in the previous example, the tree 
structure now has to be interpreted in terms of containment. A domain, 
represented by a node, is contained within the domain represented by 
the next node on the path to the root node. This contrasts sharply 
with the previous case where the node further from the root rep-
resented a domain containing the domain corresponding to the node 
nearer the root. 
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Lauer and Wyeth (1973) have presented a machine design which 
also supports a hierarchically structured set of domains and is 
basically similar to the CAP architecture presented above. The 
advantage of both these designs is that there is no need to treat 
any of the information which describes a domain as sacred to the 
basic protection system. Each level, i.e., process, can be 
responsible for setting up the data structures which define the 
domains for the next junior level and the memory protection system 
simply interprets these structures. Since any addresses produced 
by a process will be interpreted in the domain provided by the 
coordinator. there is no need to constrain the addresses a process 
can produce. The domain structure provides multiple levels which 
are never collapsed into a single level. An error made in describing 
the domain which a coordinator presents to a junior process may cause 
harm to the coordinator but not to the coordinator's coordinator. 
In contrast to the hierarchical process structure, within 
process protection in CAP is completely flexible. The unit of 
protection is the 'procedure', which mayor may not correspond to 
a high level language procedure. the choice is left open. The 
segments the procedure can access when being executed are defined 
by capabilities in a set of four indirectories. The details of these 
indirectories are described fully by Walker (1973). Basically, the 
indirectories used by a procedure invocation define the domain of the 
procedure as a subset of the PsCS. To be strictly correct, Figure 7.9 
should be drawn with indirectories interspersed between PsCS's. 
It should be mentioned that there are difficulties with 
architectures along the lines of the CAP computer and the Lauer-
Wyeth architecture concerning efficient implementation when 
parallelism exists. also that CAP restricts itself to a two-level 
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hierarchy because of protection problems with ENTER capabilities (an 
ENTER capability embodies permission to call a procedure). The Lauer-
Wyeth architecture has similar problems in connection with invocations 
of operations by a junior process, where the operation is implemented 
by an ancestor process, and interrupts from external devices. 
The complementary notion of a structured relationship between 
domains has been discussed in terms of two examples. Thus, it has 
been demonstrated that it is possible to gain protection from 
structure between domains and from structure within a domain. The 
two views of structure in practice tend to merge into one, since 
a direct scope can be considered to be a domain and then a change 
of direct scope becomes a switch in domain. In this section, 
emphasis has been placed on the structure existing between domains, 
but, as the second example demonstrated, domain structure is often 
closely tied to process structure. Various forms of process 
structuring have been discussed in detail by Horning and Randell 
(1973). In the design and comparison of protection systems, the 
structure within a domain should not be considered in isolation, 
but in conjunction with the structure of the relationship between 
domains and the structure between processes. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
The work reported in this thesis has demonstrated that it is 
possible to develop quantitative ways of comparing protection 
systems and that the assessment based on cost and benefit measures 
is indeed both practical and useful. 
Comparisons of protection systems based on the cost and benefit 
measures are in a sense gross comparisons since much of the fine 
detail of a protection system is ignored. Because of this, the 
comparison methodology is not claimed to be a complete assessment 
method, but is to be viewed as a part of a comprehensive evaluation. 
In addition to the gross quantitative comparison, such an evaluation 
would need to examine the detailed mechanics of protection systems 
and for this the protection models of Lampson (1971) and Jones (1973) 
would be useful. Also, it would be necessary to assess the influence 
of a protection system on its environment, that is on the structure 
I 
of the operating system, the writing of user programs, etc. 
The quantitative comparison methodology is thus complementary 
to the protection models developed by Lampson and Jones. Apart from 
the suitability measure of Jones, these models do not provide a 
yardstick to be used in any form of quantitative comparison. The 
limitations of the suitabi 1 ity measure were di scussed in Chapter 3. 
The use of cost and benefit measures in comparing protection 
systems is new. The advantage of this quantitative comparison 
methodology is that one gains an appreciation of how much better one 
protection system is compared to another and at what extra cost, if 
any, this increased protection is obtained. Qualitative comparisons 
based on formal protection models are hampered by the attention to 
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detail and the disregard paid to costs. A further advantage of the 
quantitative approach is that various features of a protection 
system can be individually assessed in terms of the protection 
benefit they afford and their cost. Unlike the suitability measure 
of Jones, the comparison methodology does not require detailed 
knowledge of the accessing patterns of executing programs but only 
knowledge of domains and the corresponding implemented accessible 
sets. 
The utility of the comparison methodology is exemplified by 
the two detailed comparisons performed in Chapters 5 and 6, but to 
extend the applicability of this approach it is necessary to take 
account of structure. Tools for the assessment of protection 
systems which exploit structure to achieve protection, namely the 
concept of a structured domain and a measure of structure, were 
described in Chapter 7. 
The comparison methodology and the techniques for assessing 
the exploitation of structure are probably most profitably used in 
the design of new protection systems and their implementations. Two 
areas where this work may be of assistance are the design of new 
machine architectures and the design of new run-time systems for 
high-level languages. The methodblog~ provides a means of performing 
a quantitative comparison of a proposed system with an existing 
similar system. Even if the full quantitative comparison cannot be 
carried out, it may be possible to use the protection model and 
measures developed in Chapter 4, together with available statistics 
or estimates, to perform a semi-quantitative assessment. As 
mentioned above, the quantitative method of assessment also allows 
particular aspects of a protection system to be compared with each 
other. Further factors which may assist the design of new protection 
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systems are the concept of a domain, the relationship between 
protection and addressing, and the utilisation of structure for 
protection; all three aspects have been considered in detail in 
this thesis. 
The comparison of structured situations is recognised to be 
a very complex problem. A number of existing protection systems 
retain structural information at run-time so that it can be 
exploited for protection. The concept of a structured domain 
describes many structured situations in a useful manner, but it 
is only a first step. The suggested measure of structure, though 
crude, attempts to quantify the benefit of the structured situation 
over the unstructured. The assessment of structure relates back 
to the relationship between protection and addressing, discussed 
in Chapter 2, since the retained structure is typically used by the 
addressing mechanism to limit accessibility. 
Chapter 7 is only the start of the work which remains to be 
done in this area. A further step in the assessment of structure 
and its exploitation to achieve effective and efficient protection 
mechanisms would be to gain a combined understanding of process 
structuring, domain structuring and the structuring of objects within 
a domain. Such an understanding should lead to an appreciation of 
how processes should be structured to realise the maximum benefit 
from domains, and the identification of improved ways to specify 
domains and domain switches. A further outcome would probably be 
pointers to the further development of protection systems, 
particularly how the protection embodied in user defined types could 
be improved or extended. 
An area of research suggested by the protection model, described 
in Chapter 4, but not pursued in this thesis, is a study of the 
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relationship between domains and locality, that is between the 
accessible set A and the referenced set R. A study of symbolic 
address tapes, where references to objects are recorded in source 
language terms, to analyse the correlation between static program 
structure and dynamic behaviour, could lead to an investigation 
of better ways to represent dynamic behaviour statically. Static 
structure is significant to protection since in the form of 
context information it is used to indicate domain definitions. 
In addition, if the static structure is sufficiently precise, it 
can convey predictive information concerning the objects likely to 
be accessed in a given period of execution. The importance of 
locality to language and machine design has been underlined in a 
recent Department of Industry report: 
"There is a need for a systematic representation of the concept 
of locality within programming languages, and for a uniform 
implementation of this representation in computer architecture. 
Until this is achieved, it is likely that both language and 
architectural developments will continue in an ad hoc manner, 
and be in conflict with one another." 
(Department of Industry 1975) 
Related,to this work is research into the best way of specifying 
redundancy (Randell 1975). Not all redundancy is 'useful', that is 
can be exploited to predict future actions of a process or detect 
error situations, indeed any form of redundancy will lengthen the 
program text, thereby increasing the opportunities for clerical errors. 
The relation between machine architecture and programming 
language structure is a topic of current interest of direct relevance 
to protection (Department of Industry 1975). The aim of present 
work is the development of programming languages and machine 
architectures. which encourage in a 'natural' way use of the facilities 
provided by the protection system. The two areas of work mentioned 
above are directly relevant to this aim. 
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A possible way of achieving this aim is to design a machine 
and programming language such that one uniform protection 
mechanism is used throughout the system. The systems likely to 
succeed in this respect are those which allow domains to be 
specified and modified so conveniently that the decomposition of 
a process into domains need not be unduly constrained by the 
cost of transmitting arguments or switching domains. Languages 
permitting user defined types provide a uniform protection 
mechanism to programmers if supported by a suitable machine 
architecture. Such a language and architecture were outlined in 
Chapter 7, but there is still a lot more work to be done on 
languages which provide user defined types. 
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Appendix 
ESTIMATION OF SUPERVISOR STATE TIME 
To estimate the time spent in supervisor state by a job-step, 
required in Chapter 6 to evaluate benefit measure Bl, it is 
assumed that the supervisor state time arises from input/output 
requests issued by the executing job-step. The servicing of page 
faults and interrupts, and the functions of scheduling, dispatching 
and resource allocation etc., are treated as part of the general 
supervisory function of the system. Therefore, the time spent by 
the supervisor on these functions is not allocatable to user job-
steps. 
The amount of supervisor state time (as opposed to I/O transfer 
time) necessary to transmit nd records (card images, lines to be 
printed, disk records etc.) to or from device d is assumed to take 
the general form 
n = 0 
where o(.a and ~d are constants. O(.d represents some set-up cost, e.g., 
establishing the logical-physical device mapping, and ~d the 
incremental cost for each record transmitted. The total supervisor 
state time for job-step j is then given by 
supervi sor state time = L «()(..d + ~d nd) for job-step j d J 
(s.t. njd;t: 0) 
where the summation is taken over those devices d for which njl 0, and 
the problem state time ,is then the total execution time of the job-
step less the supervisor state time. 
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The form of this function to represent the supervisor state 
time was deduced as an approximate model from initial experiments 
carried out on an IBM 360/67 system. 
The numbers of records transmitted to or from each device by 
each job-step (i.e., n d=1,2, ••. ,m) were included in the statistics id 
collected by DOS/VS. To estimate the supervisor state time, there-
fore, it was only necessary to obtain values for the device constants 
O(.d and ¥d for each device. 
The following devices were supported by the 370/135 system: 
console 
printer 
card reader 
card punch 
optical character reader 
di sks 
remote job entry lines 
dummy card reader l dummy card punch used ~y the 
dummy printer spoollng system 
To reduce the number of constants to be determined, the optical 
character reader was assumed to have the same characteristics as a 
card punch and the remote job entry lines were treated as card 
reader/punches. On average, only seven job-steps each day used the 
optical character reader and only one job-step, the POWER spooling 
program in the first shift each day, used the remote job entry lines, 
so any errors introduced by these assumptions would be slight. 
Ideally, the device constants should be determined on the 
system from which the statistics were gathered, or at least on a 
370/135 system with a similar configuration. Unfortunately, such 
a system was not available, and so the method adopted was to 
determine the constants on an IBM 360/67 system running under the 
Michigan Terminal System, and then to adjust the constants for the 
difference in speed of the 135 and 67. 
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On the 360/67 system, the constants were determined by 
recording the supervisor state time used in the transmission of 
various numbers of records to or from each device under consideration. 
From these results, the constants for the 67 could be estimated and 
in turn those for the 135 derived. 
The method of timing statements was essentially that used by 
Wichmann (1969) to time Algol statement execution times. The 
various corrections to the measured times, suggested by Wichmann, 
turned out to be negligible compared to the times being measured 
and thus could be ignored. 
The 360/67 system running under the Michigan Terminal System is 
a paging system and thus has many of the same characteristics as the 
370/135 system, though in almost all respects it is a much more 
sophisticated system. It was felt that estimating the device constants 
by using the 360/67 system was a reasonable approach, but to increase 
confidence in the values obtained some experiments were performed to 
I" 
verify the results. 
The proportion of supervisor state time to total execution time 
, 
for a number of programs on the 360/67 system was measured. The 
proportion of supervisor state time to total execution time was 
calculated for all job-steps run during one day on the 370/135 system, 
using the device constants and input/output counts to estimate the 
supervisor state time. The average proportion of supervisor state 
time and the variation in the proportion were sufficiently similar 
in both cases to justify the method used to estimate the supervisor 
state time. 
\I 
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